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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything”
— Paul Krugman
“The heart of science is measurement”
— Erik Brynjolfsson
Productivity is a main determinant of economic development. In fact, it is by many
regarded as the single most important determinant of welfare. Loosely speaking, pro-
ductivity growth is deﬁned as the ability to produce more for less. Growth in productiv-
ity is thus the result of, inter alia, improved products, processes, services, technologies,
ideas and organisational structure. It follows that productivity growth leads to economic
growth, which further yields higher income and usually increased welfare.
To enhance productivity it is necessary to identify the correspondence between possible
determinants and productivity. During the last decades a vast literature has been trying
to identify the drivers of economic growth. Some of the main ﬁndings suggest that
the level of R&D, the skill level of the labour force, the distance to the technological
frontier and institutions, such as the political system, are important determinants of
productivity, see e.g., Wolﬀ (2014).
The quotes from Brynjolfsson and Krugman are taken from Lohr (2013) and Krugman (1997, p.
11), respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Labour productivity. Measured as GDP per hour worked relative to the United
States in 2013. Converted using current PPPs for the total economy. Sources: OECD and
Statistics Norway. Mainland Norway consists of all domestic production activity except oil and
gas extraction including services, transport via pipelines and ocean transport.
Even though much has been learned about the general determinants of productivity,
many questions are still unanswered and new questions arise. To illustrate, consider
the two diﬀerent measures of productivity provided in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. Fig-
ure 1.1 compares the level of labour productivity across countries. In particular, it shows
GDP per hour worked, relative to the United States, for a group of OECD countries
in 2013. According to this measure, labour productivity in Norway as well as in Main-
land Norway are higher than in all the other countries. Figure 1.2 shows the index for
labour productivity over time for Mainland Norway and the group of seven countries
(G7) consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States. From the early 1990s Norway experienced an increased growth rate in
labour productivity and a higher growth than in G7 lasting until 2005. In 2005 labour
productivity growth was reduced both in Norway and across the G7 countries. Labour
productivity declined in Norway from 2007 to 2009, before increasing again thereafter.
Several important questions arise from Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. Why is the measured
level of productivity in Norway so high compared with other countries? Was the growth
in productivity from the mid 1990s to 2005 exceptionally high and what caused the
slump in productivity from 2005? How has the increased level of productivity impacted
the economy? Have technological changes impacted skilled and unskilled labour equally,
or has the shift in production technology favoured some educational groups more than
others? Are there any sectors of the economy that have been particularly exposed to
technological change? The purpose of my thesis is to answer these questions. As will
be shown, much of the answers can be found within the theory of measurement. Hence,
to form a point of reference from which my thesis evolves, I proceed this introductory
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Figure 1.2: Labour productivity. Measured as GDP per hour worked (1971=1). Sources:
OECD and Statistics Norway. Mainland Norway consists of all domestic production activity
except oil and gas extraction including services, transport via pipelines and ocean transport.
The group of seven countries (G7) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
chapter with a short overview of productivity measurement followed by a summary of
the four main chapters of the thesis and concluding remarks.
1.1 An overview of productivity measurement
Productivity is commonly deﬁned as a the ratio of outputs to inputs, both terms mea-
sured in volumes. For example, labour productivity can be deﬁned as value added per
unit of labour. A challenge with measuring productivity is that the value of output and
the value of labour are observable, while the volume of output and the volume of labour
must be measured with the aid of price indices. To be speciﬁc, let V Y denote value
added in current prices and V L denote labour in current prices. Moreover, let PY and
PL represent price indices for value added and labour, respectively. It then follows that
a measure for labour productivity can be written
Labour productivity =
V Y
/
PY
V L
/
PL
. (1.1)
The importance of measurement for productivity analysis can bee seen from Equa-
tion 1.1. It is not only value added and labour in current prices that need to be measured,
but also price indices for value added and labour must be calculated to measure labour
productivity. Measuring aggregate price changes is thus crucial to identify productivity.
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How to combine numerous price changes into an aggregate index for price changes is the
basic index number problem. Calculating a total index is not trivial as it involves the
aggregation of numerous prices of potentially very heterogenous items. Because the price
changes of these items usually diﬀer, a formula to aggregate the individual price changes
to an overall index is needed. In Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2, the Drobisch price index was
used to measure labour services. However, given the choice between several diﬀerent
index formulas, such as Laspeyres, Paasche, Dutot, To¨rnqvist, Fisher or Drobisch, a
relevant question is: what objective criteria should be applied when deciding on what
index number to use?
Two types of criteria are widely applied: axiomatic and economic. The axiomatic ap-
proach is based on a number of objective tests. For example, the Proportionality axiom
implies that if all prices change by the same common factor, the price index should also
change by that factor. The Identity axiom states that if prices do not change between
time periods neither should the overall price index. The Commensurability axiom states
that the price index should be invariant to changes in the units of measurement. The
Monotonicity axiom states that the price index should increase if there are one or more
price increases in the current period but there are no price declines. The Factor reversal
axiom states that if a price index is multiplied with its corresponding quantity index the
product should equal the ratio of values for the two comparison periods.
A thorough discussion of these and many more axioms can be found in e.g., The Con-
sumer Price Index Manual (ILO et al., 2004b). It turns out that the Fisher index is the
only index number that satisﬁes all of the 20 axiomatic tests that are discussed in what
is labelled the ﬁrst axiomatic approach. In comparison, the To¨rnqvist index passes 11
of these tests (ILO et al., 2004b, p. 297). In contrast, in what is labelled the second
axiomatic approach, where a price index is deﬁned by two sets of prices and two sets
of values (and not quantities), it is the To¨rnqvist index that passes all of the axiomatic
tests.
There are several practical problems with the axiomatic approaches. It is not clear
what criteria to use to weight the diﬀerent tests and how to decide on which of the two
axiomatic approaches to use. Also, any given list of axioms can be viewed as arbitrary.
Moreover, even if an index fails a particular test, it does not necessarily imply that using
this index will result in a large error. Nevertheless, the Fisher and the To¨rnqvist indices
stand out as superior to many of the other indices in the ﬁrst and second axiomatic
approach, respectively. Also, these indices tend to behave similarly as they both use
information about value shares in both comparison periods.
Using an economic criterion as a basis for evaluating price indices dates back to Konu¨s
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(1939). The purpose of the economic approach is to yield an index that shows the change
in the cost-of-living between two time periods for a given level of utility. Interestingly,
both the Fisher and the To¨rnqvist indices also score high when assessed by economic
criteria. In a seminal article by Diewert (1976) it was shown that these indices are
superlative, i.e., they are consistent with the change in cost-of-living when the economic
framework is approximated with second-order accuracy. In particular, the To¨rnqvist
index is exact if the cost function in the economic system is of translog form. Since
both the Fisher and the To¨rnqvist index score high on both axiomatic and economic
test criteria they are considered by many to be superior indices.
Despite desirable properties of the Fisher and the To¨rnqvist indices, other indices are
often used in practical work due to lack of data. For example, when measuring labour
productivity, a unit value index, also referred to as a Drobisch index, is used to calculate
the contribution from labour, see e.g., the OECD Productivity Database (OECD, 2013,
p. 66).
There are also cases other than data availability that prevents the use of the Fisher
and the To¨rnqvist indices, or any other standard price index for that matter. For
example, consider the case when a new product is released to the market at time t. In
this case, there is a price observation at time t, but there is no price observation at time
t−1. Since standard indices rely on price information at both comparison periods, these
indices cannot be applied in the case of new goods. If one wait until period t before the
good is included in the price index, the initial welfare gain between period t − 1 and t
is unaccounted for, a bias referred to by the Boskin commision as the new goods bias
(Boskin et al., 1996). In terms of labour services, the new good bias is tantamount to
the bias of not taking into account the eﬀect of workers entering the labour force.
There are also cases where it is feasible to apply indices, but where the economic and
axiomatic criteria yield diﬀerent conclusions regarding which index to choose. In the
standard cases mentioned above, such as with the Fisher and To¨rnqvist indices, the price
level is unimportant for the development of the index. But the price level can become
important for costs of imports during say a gradual process of trade liberalisation. An
increased supply of low cost goods and services lowers the costs of imports, ceteris
paribus. This implies that even if prices are unchanged, a lowering of trade barriers will
lead to lower costs of imports. It can be accounted for in an economic framework, but
any index that accounts for such lower costs must violate the identity axiom.
Equation 1.1 can also be used to illustrate the calculation and comparison of productivity
levels between countries. So far, the interpretation of the indices PY and PL has been
in a temporal context, i.e., between time periods. However, they could equally well
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represent spatial indices showing the relative price levels between countries. If PY and
PL are spatial indices measuring the price level diﬀerence between say Norway and
United States, the productivity index in Equation 1.1 shows Norway’s level of labour
productivity measured in USD. Applying Equation 1.1 to several countries allows for
comparison of productivity levels since the index is measured in a common set of prices,
see Figure 1.1.
A problem with the pure index approach, as represented by Equation 1.1, is the lack
of theoretical foundations. For example, the index number obtained by applying Equa-
tion 1.1 does not provide any information about what type of technical change that has
occurred. Solow (1957) used an economic framework for productivity analysis to shed
light on the structure of technical change. The starting point was a general aggregate
value added (Y ) production function of capital (K) and labour (L)
Y = f(K,L, z),
where the variables are measured in constant prices, i.e., Y = V Y/PY , K = V K/PK and
L = V L/PL. For expositional purposes capital and labour are presented as aggregates,
but they could also be split into sub-aggregates. For example, capital could be split into
capital objects such as land, buildings and motor vehicles, whereas labour could be split
into groups according to the level of education. The vector z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) consists
of n technology variables. These variables capture any kind of shift in the production
function caused by, inter alia, changes in the R&D capital stock, political institutions,
skill level of the labour force, eﬃciency of which the factors of production are utilised
and the organisation of production. To isolate the impact from technological changes
on production, it is convenient to rewrite the production function assuming a translog
functional form
lnY = ln a + aK lnK + aL lnL, (1.2)
where the second order eﬀects except the cross products are excluded. In this speciﬁ-
cation, the technology variables in z have now been mapped into three new variables
representing two types of technological change: neutral and factor biased. The term a
represents factor neutral technical change and it is a log linear function of the technology
variables z. Factor biased technical change is represented by the terms aK and aL, which
also are log linear functions of the underlying technology variables. There is a large lit-
erature analysing the eﬀect from factor biased technical change on important economic
variables such as wages and employment, see e.g., Acemoglu and Autor (2011). There
exists also a literature analysing if the sectors where factor biased technical change oc-
curs matter for the impact on wages and employment, the so called sector bias of factor
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biased technical change hypothesis, see e.g., Haskel and Slaughter (2002).
Total factor productivity growth is the portion of output growth not explained by labour
and capital growth. It can be measured using the To¨rnqvist index, which is consistent
with Equation 1.2. Total factor productivity growth is aﬀected both by factor neutral
and factor biased technical change, and it is consequently dependent on the technology
variables in z. There is a large literature trying to identify which variables that are
causing productivity growth and should be included in the vector z, see Hall et al.
(2010); Hulten (2010); Syverson (2011); Wolﬀ (2014) for some recent overviews on this
literature.
My thesis builds on the concepts of measurement outlined above using Norway as an
illustrative example. In Chapter 2, the growth in productivity is analysed across coun-
tries taking both the distance to the technological frontier, R&D and human capital into
account. Also, the spatial price index used to calculate overall productivity in Norway
in Figure 1.1 will be analysed and compared with alternatives. In particular, it is shown
that Norway’s level of productivity by many measures are not as high as Figure 1.1
shows, a result which is traced back to the measurement of the spatial price index for
value added. In Chapter 3, it is shown that about a quarter of the slowdown in produc-
tivity after 2005, illustrated in Figure 1.2, can be explained by the use of hours worked as
an index for labour services. A central part of the analysis deals with the bias caused by
workers entering and exiting the workforce. Using a more appropriate index than hours
worked reduces labour services approximately between 1 to 2 percentage points annually.
The backdrop of Chapter 4 is the hypothesis that mismeasurement of import prices has
contributed to the particularly high measured level of productivity growth in Wholesale
and retail trade, an industry which has been a main driver of overall productivity growth
in Norway from the beginning of the 1990s. It will be shown how mismeasurement of
import prices leads to mismeasured productivity due to the calculating procedures in
the National Accounts. An economic approach to deal with the impact from trade liber-
alisation on import prices is thus proposed in Chapter 4 and the procedure is illustrated
using the example of clothing imports to Norway. In Chapter 5, the framework typically
used to measure factor biased technical change is critically evaluated, and it is shown
in the case of Norway that making too many simplifying assumptions when measuring
factor biased technical change may yield biased results. In the following sections a more
detailed summary of the ﬁndings from each chapter is presented.
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1.2 Chapter 2: The Norwegian productivity puzzle – not
so puzzling after all?
In standard economic textbooks on economic growth, such as Acemoglu (2009, p. 12),
Jones and Vollrath (2013, p. 278), Weil (2013, p. 186) or Ros (2013, p. 410), we can read
about measures indicating that Norway enjoys one of the highest levels of productivity
in the world. Such a high level of productivity level seems puzzling when compared
with the relatively low aggregate level of R&D investments in Norway. As stated in
the opening lines of OECDs Economic Survey: “There is a puzzle about Norway. How
did it succeed in reaching one of the highest living standards among OECD countries
from a relatively poor ranking in 1970?”(OECD, 2007a, p. 18). It is not only the level
of living standards, or productivity, that is high, but also the growth in productivity
has been high in Norway. According to OECD “the Norwegian puzzle is that despite
weak innovation inputs and even weaker outputs, Norwegian per capita incomes are very
high by international comparison, even excluding petroleum earnings. Furthermore, the
level and growth rate of total factor productivity – TFP – has been respectable by
international comparison” (2007a, p. 125). Moreover, it is stated that “Productivity
is high, real growth rates have been respectable, overall TFP growth is better than in
many countries with higher R&D spending, and industry has by and large managed to
survive a changing world and a strong exchange rate.”(OECD, 2007a, p. 129).
The ﬁrst aim of Chapter 2 is to analyse if the level of productivity in Norway is really as
high as reported statistics suggest. I ﬁnd that using Purchasing Power Parities (PPP)
with a recent base year can signiﬁcantly overestimate the level of productivity in Norway.
The reason is that net exports is deﬂated directly in the calculation of overall expen-
diture PPPs. However, the contributions from exports and imports should be deﬂated
separately since net exports can take upon both positive and negative values. Using
export and import price indices relative to the US, I show that a separate deﬂation of
exports and imports can account for most of the diﬀerence between constant and current
PPPs between 1997 and 2010. When using PPPs with a base year in 1997, i.e., before
the surge in Norway’s terms of trade began, the productivity level in Norway is on par
with the levels in Sweden and France in 2005, but around 7 and 3 per cent lower than
in the USA and Germany, respectively.
The second aim of Chapter 2 is to analyse if there is a puzzle underlying the relatively
high productivity growth in Norway beginning in the mid 1990s. To analyse if the high
growth rate represents a puzzle, I estimate a model that takes into account the level
of human capital, R&D capital stock and the distance to the technological frontier. If
there really is a puzzle about productivity in Norway one would expect the unexplained
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growth in productivity to be signiﬁcantly higher in Norway compared with other coun-
tries. I show that unexplained productivity growth between 1995 and 2005 is quite
evenly distributed across countries. For Norway the result is clearly within one stan-
dard deviation from the mean unexplained rate of TFP growth across countries. Thus,
based on these results there is no reason to claim that the development of productivity
in Norway represents a puzzle.
1.3 Chapter 3: Understanding the productivity slowdown:
the importance of exit and entry of workers1
Many OECD countries have experienced a measured slowdown in labor productivity
from 2005 and onwards. Norway is no exception in this respect. While the average pro-
ductivity growth was 2.7 percent between 2002 and 2005, it dropped markedly after 2005
and reached -1.4 per cent in 2008, see Figure 1.2. This productivity slowdown occurred
in tandem with a massive increase in immigration following the 2004 enlargement of the
European Union. The ratio of net immigration to the total number of employees almost
tripled from a level of about 0.6 before 2005 to 1.7 in 2008. Several other European
countries have experienced a similar surge in immigration after 2005.
The negative correlation between net immigration and productivity growth raises a
particular concern with respect to how productivity is measured. Labour productivity
growth is deﬁned as the ratio of the index for value added to the index for labour
services. It is standard practice to use the change in hours worked as a proxy for the
labour services index. However, it is well known that hours worked represents a biased
proxy for labour services. The reason is that a worker’s contribution to labour services
should be weighted by his or her cost to the ﬁrm, not the share of hours worked. For
example, if there are a large number of low paid immigrants entering the labour market
after 2005, and if wages reﬂect marginal productivity, a measure of labour services based
on hours worked would overstate the contribution to labour services and consequently
understate the true development in productivity.
The bias between using hours worked and a more theoretically based index for labour
services, such as Fisher or To¨rnqvist, is referred to as the unit value bias. In a more
general context, the unit value bias has been discussed extensively in the literature, see
e.g., Pa´rniczky (1974); Timmer (1996); Balk (1998b) and Silver (2010). Diewert and
Lippe (2010) summarise many of these ﬁndings and analyse the unit value bias more
explicitly with respect to the Laspeyres, the Paasche and the Fisher price indices.
1This chapter was written together with A˚dne Cappelen and Diana-Cristina Iancu.
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To counteract the weaknesses of using hours worked it is common to control for worker
characteristics in a two-step procedure: the ﬁrst step deﬁnes groups by worker charac-
teristics and the second step aggregates hours worked across these groups using an index
with good theoretical and axiomatic properties such as To¨rnqvist or Fisher, see e.g., Jor-
genson et al. (1987), Jorgenson et al. (2005), Cao et al. (2009) and work based on the EU
KLEMS databse such as O’Mahony and Timmer (2009); Timmer et al. (2010). Based
on this framework Zoghi (2010) discusses the use of predicted wages in calculating the
weighting scheme, which is the current practice at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Using data for Norway, Hægeland (1997) calculated labour services using register data
and classiﬁcations of workers according to education and sex. Nilsen et al. (2011), anal-
ysed productivity across manufacturing industries in Norway also using register data
and categorised employed persons into 12 subgroups. They added to this literature by
using weights based on an estimate of predicted wages associated with individual skill
attributes.
The theoretical rationale for the two-step procedure can be found in Pa´rniczky (1974)
and Diewert and Lippe (2010). They show that the unit value bias decreases with
increased disaggregation if it is compositional eﬀects between the groups that contribute
most to the overall bias. However, if compositional eﬀects within groups are dominant,
disaggregation may increase the unit value bias. Note that these theoretical results follow
from comparing the change in hours worked relative to indices that require underlying
prices and quantities to be deﬁned in both the base and the comparison period, such as
the Fisher and To¨rnqvist indices. But, when applying hours worked to calculate labour
services, this proxy is also calculated across those workers that were only present in either
the comparison period or the base period. The unit value bias should consequently be
deﬁned relative to an index that allows for workers entering and exiting the labour
market, a property which becomes increasingly important when net immigration surges.
In this chapter, we generalise the results from Pa´rniczky (1974) and Diewert and Lippe
(2010) to allow for workers entering and exiting the labour market. To this end, we build
on the theory of Feenstra (1994) who analysed the impact of new product varieties on
import prices when the underlying cost function was of constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) form. These theoretical results and some generalisations can also be found in
Balk (1999). Using the case of perfect substitutes as a benchmark, we show that the
contribution from entering and exiting workers on the unit value bias depends on the unit
value of entering and exiting workers relative to the unit value of continuing workers.
We also show theoretically that controlling for worker characteristics in the two-step
procedure can exacerbate the unit value bias through entering and exiting eﬀects.
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Using Norwegian register data spanning the years 2002 to 2008, we empirically decom-
pose the contributions from workers entering and exiting employment and those that
are continuously employed. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study on how entry and
exit eﬀects impact aggregate wages, labour services and consequently the measure of
productivity. We ﬁnd that the standard practice of using hours worked overestimates
labour services by approximately between 1 to 2 percentage points annually from 2002 to
2008. Correspondingly, wages and productivity are thus underestimated by between 1 to
2 percentage points annually. About half is attributed to a bias among continuing work-
ers and half is attributed to the eﬀect of workers entering and exiting employment. We
also ﬁnd that controlling for the level of education in the two-step procedure exacerbates
the unit value bias in most years.
The backdrop of this chapter is the hypothesis that mismeasurement can explain parts of
the observed drop in productivity growth in Norway after 2005. On average, productivity
grew 2.7 per cent annually in mainland Norway between 2002 and 2005. Between 2006
and 2008 average annual growth reduced to 0.2 percent, down by about 2.5 percentage
points. We show that the bias from using hours worked as a measure for labour services,
compared to an index of labour services with desirable properties in line with index
theory, increases on average with 0.7 percentage points annually after 2005. Most of
this bias is due to an increasing number of entering workers with a relatively low wage
rate, a development that must be seen in conjunction with the surge in immigration
after 2005. Mismeasurement of productivity can thus explain about a quarter of the
measured productivity slowdown after 2005.
1.4 Chapter 4: The import price index with trade barriers:
theory and evidence
Although Chapter 2 shows there is no reason to claim that the development of produc-
tivity in Norway represents a puzzle, the sizeable productivity growth in the Wholesale
and retail trade industry (henceforth WRT industry) is still largely unexplained. The
backdrop of Chapter 4 is the hypothesis that mismeasurement of import prices has con-
tributed to the high level of productivity growth in the WRT industry. It is well known
that mismeasurement of import prices may lead to mismeasurement of productivity in
general. As shown in Feenstra et al. (2013b), the import price index is used to deﬂate
nominal value added, which is the output measure often used to calculate productivity.
As the following example illustrates, a mismeasurement of import prices will, due to
the calculating procedures of the National Accounts at Statistics Norway, also impact
productivity in the WRT industry speciﬁcally. It will not impact production in the
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WRT industry, but it will impact the level of intermediates, and hence the level of value
added, and thereby also the level of productivity.
To illustrate the link between import prices and productivity, consider how value added
in the WRT industry is calculated in the National Accounts at Statistics Norway.2 Let
X, Y and R denote production, value added and intermediates, respectively, measured
in current prices. Moreover, let P denote a price index. For example, if PX = 1.05, the
price level of production is 5 per cent higher than in the comparison period.
Production in the WRT industry, often referred to as the value of trade margins, is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the purchasers’ value of sales (S) and the basic value
of costs (B), i.e., X = S−B (when ignoring net taxes). Since there exists no measured
price index to deﬂate trade margins it is assumed that the volume of trade margins
grow proportionally with the sale of underlying products. However, if the measured
purchasers’ price and the measured basic price deviate in such a manner that the identity
between trade margins, the purchasers’ price and the basic price is violated, then the
National Accounts department adjusts trade margins based on the statistics found to be
most reliable. As there is no measured price index for production in the WRT industry,
it is the current value of production that is adjusted. Speciﬁcally, production is deﬂated
using purchasers’ prices, i.e., X/PS . This method ensures that production in constant
prices is independent of the basic price. Moreover, the basic price index is used to create
an adjusted level of the basic value B˜ = B (PB/PS), where the adjusted level is marked
by a wide tilde. As a result, the adjusted production is given by
X˜ = S − B˜
= S −B (PB/PS) .
Accordingly, the adjusted production is decreasing in the measured level of basic prices.
Generally, basic prices is a weighted average of domestic and import prices of all com-
modities traded through the WRT industry. Hence, mismeasured import prices that
show too high a growth rate leads to a lower production in the WRT industry.
Although production in constant prices is independent of the basic price index, value
added in constant prices is still aﬀected when using this adjustment procedure. To see
this, consider how value added is constructed. Since there exist statistics on operating
margins and wages underlying the current price estimate of value added, the adjusted
current price estimate of intermediates is measured as the diﬀerence between adjusted
2Thanks are due to Steinar Todsen for providing me with this example. Note that the National
Accounts department tries to override unreasonable eﬀects on value added caused by the adjustment
procedure by calibrating the volume of intermediates or production.
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production and value added, i.e.,
R˜ = X˜ − Y
= S −B (PB/PS)− Y,
which is decreasing in basic prices. Since there exist reliable statistics on the prices of
intermediates, the constant price estimate is measured by deﬂating the current price
estimate with the price index of intermediates R˜/PR. The constant price estimate of
intermediates is therefore a decreasing function of the measured basic price. As a result,
value added in constant prices, measured as the diﬀerence between production and
intermediates
X/PS − R˜/PR,
is an increasing function of the measured basic price. Consequently, even though pro-
duction is not aﬀected by mismeasured basic prices, if basic prices wrongly show too
high a growth rate, the measured value added in the WRT industry will be also too
high. Consistent with this example, the average annual growth in value added in the
WRT industry between 1995 and 2010 was 1.2 percentage points higher than the average
annual growth in production.
Since the basic price depends on the import price of the product, mismeasurement of
import prices can lead to serious mismeasurement of productivity. The results from the
example above raise the question: under what circumstances will the import price index
be overestimated?
In Chapter 4 it is shown why import prices can be overestimated during times of trade
liberalisation. The starting point is the strong assumption of free trade underlying
standard price indices. If the assumption is true, the price level of a particular good
is irrelevant for the development of the price index. However, if goods are not traded
freely, which is often the case in practice, the price level becomes important for the ﬁnal
index number. Hence, neglecting the price level can lead to serious mismeasurement of
import prices. To circumvent this problem it is common in the literature to use average
prices as an aggregator formula. However, average prices may still underestimate the
cost of imports eﬀects from trade liberalisation. In this chapter, I generalise the import
price index to allow for barriers to trade in the form of quantity constraints and develop
an upper bound index to the true index. To illustrate the theoretical framework, I
use the case of clothing imports to Norway for which have undergone massive trade
liberalisation during the last two decades, and show that the Laspeyres price index
overestimates the true cost-of-imports annual inﬂation rate by 1.5 percentage points
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between 1988 and 2005. I also show that a unit value index, which is believed to be
appropriate for the aggregation of homogenous items, overestimates the annual inﬂation
rate by 0.5 percentage points when goods are perfect substitutes. The results of the
article thus point to mismeasurement of import prices as a potential source underlying
the high productivity growth measured in the Wholesale and retail trade industry.
1.5 Chapter 5: Identifying the sector bias of technical
change3
The theory of skill-biased technical change (SBTC) has been linked to the increase in the
wage premium and/or the increase in the relative unemployment rates between high-
and low-skilled labour observed in most OECD countries in the past three decades.
If technical change is directed at high skilled, and if high and low skilled labour are
substitutes, the increased demand for high skilled labour can lead to either an increase
in the relative wage rate or a decrease in the relative unemployment rate between the
two factors of production, see Acemoglu (2009, p. 500). In the literature on SBTC there
is an ongoing debate concerning the importance of a sector bias of SBTC. While the
SBTC hypothesis is based on the relative proﬁtability between factors of production, the
sector bias hypothesis focuses on the relative proﬁtability between sectors. For example,
if the proportion of high-skilled labour varies across sectors, it is not clear that skill-
biased technical change will lead to a higher wage premium. If technical change favours
skilled labour in a sector where the proportion of skilled labour is low, this will increase
the proﬁtability of the sector where technical change takes place. Even if technical
change were directed at the high-skilled, because technical change took place in a sector
dominated by low-skilled labour, this would lead to an increase in demand of low-skilled
labour and consequently a lowering of the wage premium. In other words, the skill
intensity of the sector where technical change occurs matters for the development of the
wage premium. This theoretical result is well known and dates back to at least Findlay
and Grubert (1959).
The empirical literature studying sector bias of technical change has only focused on
skill-biased technical change. The purpose of Chapter 5 is to analyse if sector bias of
both factor-neutral and factor-biased technical change can explain the changing relative
unemployment rates between high and low skilled labour in Norway. Using data from
1972 to 2007, the empirical evidence is not clear on the impact of a sector bias of skill-
biased technical change, but it points to a sector bias of factor–neutral technical change
from the 1970s to the 1990s. That said, the impact of the sector bias seems to have
3This chapter has been published in Empirical Economics, see Brasch (2015).
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gradually reduced towards the latter part of the sample period. I also evaluate the cross-
section model used in the literature and show that strong restrictions must be placed on
a vector equilibrium correction model to end up with this model. If these restrictions
do not hold, the results reported in the literature may be biased. I show that these
restrictions are strongly rejected, and erroneously imposing them signiﬁcantly change
the estimates of skill-biased technical change in many sectors. The results from the
Oil and gas exploration sector shed light on two general problems with the framework
used in the literature. It is shown that what is interpreted as equilibrium correction in
the vector equilibrium correction model is wrongfully interpreted as SBTC in the cross-
section model. Also, assuming high- and low-skilled labour to be either substitutes or
complements leads to a large bias of SBTC. By using a vector equilibrium correction
model, the pitfalls of the cross-section model can be avoided.
1.6 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this thesis has been to analyse some important concepts of productivity
measurement and relate them to the case of Norway. This thesis shows the importance
of correctly measuring productivity both across countries and across time. In particular,
the high measured level of productivity in Norway is questioned, and the treatment of
net exports is pointed to as a potential source of the discrepancy between the levels
of productivity when using diﬀerent base years. Moreover, what has been labelled a
Norwegian productivity puzzle, i.e., the combination of high productivity and a low level
of determinants of productivity, is shown not to be present when taking R&D, distance
to the technological frontier and the skill intensity into account. In addition, it has also
been shown that adjusting for compositional eﬀects in the measurement of labour ser-
vices yields approximately between 1 to 2 percentage points higher productivity growth
annually from 2002 to 2008. Adjusting for compositional eﬀects also explains about a
quarter of the productivity slowdown after 2005. This thesis also points to a potential
mismeasurement of productivity in the Wholesale and retail trade industry, which ac-
cording to oﬃcial statistics has experienced an exceptionally high rate of productivity
from the beginning of the 1990s. It is shown that a mismeasurement of import prices
leads to a higher measured rate of productivity, and that the measurement of import
prices during times of trade liberalisation is likely to be biased. Furthermore, it is shown
that factor biased technical change is not the only theory consistent with the changes
in relative unemployment and wages across educational groups observed during the last
decades. Diﬀerences in technological advances across sectors, the so called sector bias of
technical change hypothesis, is identiﬁed as a plausible driving force, in particular from
the 1970s until the mid-1990s.
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Although this thesis answers some speciﬁc questions regarding measurement of produc-
tivity, many questions are still largely unexplained, and new questions arise. For exam-
ple, although the model in Chapter 2 accounts for important determinants of produc-
tivity growth, some of the productivity growth is still unexplained and further research
is needed to identify additional determinants. Also, the production structure must be
relatively equal between countries to compare productivity levels. However, Norway is
a large producer of products that our neighbouring countries do not produce much of,
such as aluminium, ﬁsh and oﬀshore equipment. To take into account the diﬀerent pro-
duction structures across countries one would need to study the production processes at
the product level in each country. In Chapter 3, the importance of compositional eﬀects
for the measurement of labour productivity is illustrated. It was implicitly assumed
that the ﬂow of labour services from each worker changed only through changes in hours
worked. However, experience also matters for growth in labour services. Taking account
of experience is left for future research and could be analysed within the framework of
hedonic indices. In Chapter 4, the proposed index based on quantity restrictions to
account for cost reductions during periods of trade liberalisation raises some practical
concerns. In particular, it can be diﬃcult to evaluate when and to what extent quantity
restrictions are present, and hence, if the proposed index should be applied instead of
a standard price index. The framework proposed in Chapter 4 also begs a question
with respect to the results from Chapter 3. If the increased immigration after 2005 is
caused by the 2004 enlargement of the European Union and is thus a result from trade
liberalisation, should not the framework outlined in Chapter 4 be used to analyse the
impact from immigration on labour services in Chapter 3? In Chapter 5, the impact
of technological change on relative wages and unemployment is analysed in terms of a
deterministic trend. However, for policy analysis, it is important to also identify what
types of technological change that cause changes in relative wages and unemployment.
The abovementioned questions are some of those that arise from this thesis. Hence, the
quotation by Øksendal (2003) puts the ﬁndings of this thesis in its right perspective:
We have not succeeded in answering all our problems. The answers we
have found only serve to raise a whole set of new questions. In some ways
we feel we are as confused as ever, but we believe we are confused on a higher
level and about more important things.
Chapter 2
The Norwegian productivity
puzzle – not so puzzling after all?
Abstract: The Norwegian productivity puzzle is rooted in three seemingly contradictory “facts”: First,
Norway is one of the most productive OECD countries. Second, Norway has experienced high growth
in productivity. Third, Norway has a relatively low level of R&D intensity. In this chapter, I show that
the ﬁrst premise of the puzzle is probably false. Explicitly, I demonstrate that labour productivity in
Norway is not particularly high when using production purchasing power parities instead of expenditure
purchasing power parities to measure mainland GDP in a common currency. The gap between the two
measures is traced back to the use of market exchange rates as proxies for relative net export prices
in the calculation of expenditure PPPs. In addition, I show that the high growth rate in productivity
can be explained by an empirical growth model that takes both R&D capital, human capital and the
distance to the technological frontier into account. Based on these results, there is no reason to claim
that the development of productivity in Norway represents a puzzle.
2.1 Introduction
In standard economic textbooks on economic growth, such as Acemoglu (2009, p. 12),
Jones and Vollrath (2013, p. 278), Weil (2013, p. 186) or Ros (2013, p. 410), we can read
about measures indicating that Norway enjoys one of the highest levels of productivity
in the world. Some of these measures, such as those provided by OECD, Penn World
Table (Heston et al., 2012; Feenstra et al., 2013a) and The Total Economy Database
(The Conference Board, 2014), are based on gross domestic product (GDP) for the whole
economy and include petroleum extraction. Since much of petroleum extraction is the
collection of economic rent, these measures overestimate the true level of productivity.
That said, the level of productivity in Norway is still reported to be higher than in
Thanks to A˚dne Cappelen, Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe, P˚al Boug, Tord Krogh and Eilev Jansen for
useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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other countries when controlling for the petroleum extraction industry. For example,
Statistics Norway reported the level of productivity to be between 20 and 30 per cent
higher than in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany and France in 2010, see Statistics
Norway (2013, p. 46). Also, OECD reported the Norwegian GDP per worker in the
mainland economy to be about 10 to 20 per cent higher than in the abovementioned
countries in 2005 (OECD, 2007a, Figure 1.1.B, p. 19).
Such high productivity levels seem puzzling when compared with the relatively low
aggregate level of R&D investments in Norway. As stated in the opening lines of OECDs
Economic Survey: “There is a puzzle about Norway. How did it succeed in reaching one
of the highest living standards among OECD countries from a relatively poor ranking in
1970?”(OECD, 2007a, p. 18). It is not only the level of living standards, or productivity,
that is high, but also the growth in productivity has been high in Norway. According to
OECD “the Norwegian puzzle is that despite weak innovation inputs and even weaker
outputs, Norwegian per capita incomes are very high by international comparison, even
excluding petroleum earnings. Furthermore, the level and growth rate of total factor
productivity – TFP – have been respectable by international comparison” (2007a, p.
125). Moreover, it is stated that “Productivity is high, real growth rates have been
respectable, overall TFP growth is better than in many countries with higher R&D
spending, and industry has by and large managed to survive a changing world and a
strong exchange rate.”(OECD, 2007a, p. 129).
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The ﬁrst aim is to analyse if the level of pro-
ductivity in Norway is really as high as reported statistics suggest. I ﬁnd that using
Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) with a recent base year can signiﬁcantly overestimate
the level of productivity in Norway. The reason is that net exports is deﬂated directly in
the calculation of overall expenditure PPPs (Eurostat and OECD, 2012, Section 12.39).
However, the contributions from exports and imports should be deﬂated separately since
net exports can take upon both positive and negative values. Using export and import
price indices relative to the US, I show that a separate deﬂation of exports and imports
can account for most of the diﬀerence between constant and current PPPs between 1997
and 2010. When using PPPs with a base year in 1997, i.e., before the surge in Nor-
way’s terms of trade began, the productivity level in Norway is on par with the levels
in Sweden and France in 2005, but around 7 and 3 per cent lower than in the USA and
Germany, respectively.
The second aim of the chapter is to analyse if there is a puzzle underlying the rela-
tively high productivity growth in Norway beginning in the mid 1990s. To analyse if
the high growth rate represents a puzzle, I estimate a model that takes into account
the level of human capital, R&D capital stock and the distance to the technological
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frontier by means of panel data techniques. The functional form of the model represents
a hybrid between the models in Griﬃth et al. (2004), Cameron et al. (2005) and Coe
et al. (2009). If there really is a puzzle about productivity in Norway one would expect
the unexplained growth in productivity to be signiﬁcantly higher in Norway compared
with other countries. I show that unexplained productivity growth between 1995 and
2005 is quite evenly distributed across countries. For Norway the result is clearly within
one standard deviation from the mean unexplained rate of TFP growth across coun-
tries. Thus, based on these results there is no reason to claim that the development of
productivity in Norway represents a puzzle.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, related literature regarding
both the level and growth in productivity in Norway is discussed. In Section 2.3, the
level of productivity in Norway is analysed, with a particular focus on the construction
of PPPs. In Section 2.4, productivity growth in Norway from 1995 to 2005 is analysed. I
outline the econometric framework and the main results are presented. The last section
concludes.
2.2 Related literature
The Norwegian productivity puzzle, sometimes also referred to as the Norwegian para-
dox, has spurred research trying to explain it. With this puzzle in mind, Grønning
et al. (2008), Fagerberg et al. (2009) and Asheim (2012) point to diﬀerent aspects of the
Norwegian national system of innovation. In contrast, Castellacci (2008) claims that the
source of the paradox lies not with innovative activities, but it has rather to do with the
sectoral composition of the economy.
Several international studies analysing productivity use total GDP which includes the
petroleum industry. Recently Feenstra et al. (2009) propose a new method to measure
real GDP from the production side by modifying real GDP from the expenditure side
to include diﬀerences in terms of trade between countries. Madsen et al. (2010) use
aggregate data for Norway and show that R&D intensity, the interaction with distance
to the frontier, educational attainment-based absorptive capacity, and technology gap
positively inﬂuence TFP growth.
By focusing at the industry level the problems related to measuring productivity in
the petroleum sector can be avoided. Griﬃth et al. (2004) analyse productivity across
15 manufacturing industries in a panel of OECD countries from the beginning of the
1970s to 1990. To convert value added in domestic currency to US dollars they use an
economy wide PPP. However, since relative prices can vary greatly between countries
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and industries, using a common PPP across all industries could distort the estimate of
the technological frontier. To account for this Griﬃth et al. (2004) also use disaggregated
industry speciﬁc PPPs for 7 of the OECD countries in their sample, but not for Norway.
For those countries where industry speciﬁc PPP data were not available they adjust the
whole economy PPP by the average ratio across countries of the industry-speciﬁc to the
whole economy PPP in a particular industry.
The studies by Griﬃth et al. (2004), Kneller (2005) and Kneller and Stevens (2006) were
conducted using data on a limited set of manufacturing industries and the sample ended
before the acceleration of Norway’s productivity growth began. More recent data are
needed to analyse the underlying causes of this surge in measured productivity growth.
Within the EU KLEMS project there has been extensive research eﬀorts to provide
production PPPs at the industry level. Inklaar and Timmer (2013) outline the procedure
needed to adjust PPPs for ﬁnal domestic demand to output PPPs and Inklaar and
Timmer (2008) provide detailed information about the Productivity Level Database at
the Groningen Growth and Development Centre. Unfortunately, data for Norway are
currently not included in the Productivity Level Database. However, Timmer et al.
(2006) did provide production PPPs at the industry level for the benchmark year 1997
also for Norway. These output PPPs are a mixture of adjusted expenditure PPPs and
production PPPs where the weighting between the two methods is based on the quality
and availability of data. The results from the present study are based on the production
PPPs provided by Timmer et al. (2006).
2.3 Comparing the level of productivity across countries
In this section I analyse if the level of productivity in Norway, measured as GDP per
hour worked, is really as high as reported statistics suggest. The analysis will focus on
the choice of PPPs used to measure GDP in a common currency.
There are diﬀerent concepts of PPPs that can be applied, for example current or constant
PPPs. Current PPPs at time t refers to PPPs generated from a price survey at time t.
In contrast, the term constant PPPs at time t refers to the PPPs from a price survey
at a particular base year and then extrapolated to time t using relative temporal price
indices between countries. When comparing productivity across countries over time it
is constant PPPs that should be used since they capture volume changes only, whereas
current PPPs capture both volume and price changes.
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Since the level of productivity refers to the ratio of output to inputs in real terms, a PPP
that yields the ratio of real value added (Yjt/Ykt) between country j and k at time t is
preferred. To illustrate, let PjtYjt be value added measured in current prices in country
j. If data on value added in current prices in both countries are available, the use of a
purchasing power parity that represents the price ratio of value added between country
j and k, PPPjkt = Pjt/Pkt, yields the desired result
(PjtYjt)
(PPPjkt) (PktYkt)
=
(
Yjt
Ykt
)
. (2.1)
This expression illustrates that PPPs are not only price deﬂators, but also currency
converters if value added in country j and k is measured in diﬀerent currencies. Equa-
tion 2.1 also shows why an exchange rate is not suitable for comparisons of productivity:
since an exchange rate ﬂuctuates due to for example investors’ sentiments, government
intervention and capital ﬂows between countries, there is no reason why an exchange
rate should equal the price ratio of value added between the two countries at all time
periods.
The measured level of productivity is directly impacted by the choice of PPPs when
applying Equation 2.1. It is therefore important which PPP that is used for productivity
analysis. In the following I will compare the PPPs provided by the Eurostat-OECD PPP
Programme and a set of PPPs provided by Timmer et al. (2006). The purpose of the
Eurostat-OECD PPP Programme is to create PPPs for value added across countries.
Theoretically, they can be constructed from either the production or the expenditure
side. Due to data availability they are constructed from the expenditure side and cover
consumption, investment and net exports for the whole economy. These PPPs are
suitable if the purpose is to study aggregate productivity. However, if the purpose
is to analyse productivity at the industry level or to control for the impact from the
petroleum industry, production PPPs at the industry level are required (Eurostat and
OECD, 2012, Section 1.2.2). Timmer et al. (2006) have made available a dataset with
PPPs for industry output that includes Norway. It is constructed from both PPPs
based on producer prices and on adjusted PPPs based on purchasers’ prices. To derive
an output price from a domestic expenditure prices they make adjustments for margins
and taxes, international trade prices and an adjustment for intermediate consumption.
They provide PPPs at a two digit industry level. To get PPPs at a more aggregate level,
I follow their work and apply the E`lteto¨-Ko¨ves-Szulc (EKS) method to aggregate PPPs
across industries and countries in the base year 1997.4 The EKS method is also used to
aggregate PPPs by OECD and Eurostat (2012). To calculate the PPPs from Timmer
et al. (2006) for other years than the base year I extend the PPPs from the base year
4See the appendix, Section A.1 for details regarding the computation of the EKS index.
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using the relative price index for value added between countries. More explicitly, for a
given base year t = b, the PPP between country j and country k, for all time periods t,
is calculated as
PPPjkt = PPPjkb
(Pjt/Pjb)
(Pkt/Pkb)
. (2.2)
where (Pjt/Pjb) and (Pkt/Pkb) are the temporal price indices for value added in country
j and k, respectively. This way of constructing PPPs is often referred to as “constant
PPPs” and it preserves the domestic volume growth rates when applying Equation 2.1
over time. Relative productivity is thus measured with respect to a constant base year
b.
Figure 2.1 compares the expenditure PPP from OECD and the aggregated PPPs based
on Timmer et al. (2006), both for all industries and when excluding the petroleum and
computer industries.5 The current expenditure PPP from OECD is converted to basic
prices by multiplying with the relative ratio of GDP measured at basic and purchasers’
prices between Norway and USA.6 In 1997, the production PPP for all industries and
the production PPP for all industries except petroleum and computers are 10.2 per cent
and 6.8 per cent higher than the PPP from OECD, when measured by NOK/USD.
Using the PPPs from Timmer et al. (2006) would thus lead to a lower measured relative
level of productivity for Norway. Before 1995 there is a close correspondence between the
PPPs provided by OECD and the PPPs based on Timmer et al. (2006). The reason why
there is so little discrepancy between these series is due to how OECD has calculated the
PPPs. Prior to 1995, PPPs for all countries have been backdated using the relative rates
of inﬂation between countries as measured by their implicit price deﬂators for GDP.7
The series labeled current PPPs by OECD thus represent constant PPPs prior to 1995.
After 1998 there is a widening gap between the diﬀerent measures of PPPs.
5Isic Rev. 4 codes d05t09 (Mining and quarrying) and d26 (Computer, electronic and optical prod-
ucts). Mining and quarrying has been excluded since much of the value added from this industry is
the collection of economic rent. To study relative productivity levels, the portion of an industry’s value
added being economic rent should be excluded. Excluding the computer, electronic and optical products
industry does not change the overall picture much, but this industry has been excluded since for some
countries, the growth in value added has been extremely high. It is therefore possible that diﬀerences in
productivity for this industry are mainly caused by diﬀerences across countries in dividing the current
price estimate into a price index and a constant price estimate. For example, the value added deﬂator
in Sweden went from 52.7 in 1993 to 1 in 2005. From estimates based on the US intermediate input
price deﬂators from semiconductors and microprocessors, Edquist (2005) concludes that the productivity
growth of the Swedish Radio, television and communication equipment industry during the 1990s is an
artefact, see also Edquist (2013).
6The PPP from OECD in basic prices NOK/USD is calculated as PPPB =
PPPP
(
GDPBNOR/GDP
P
NOR
GDPB
USA
/GDPP
USA
)
, where GDP is the value of gross domestic product and the super-
scripts P and B refer to purchasers’ and basic prices, respectively.
7See www.oecd.org/std/ppp/faq.
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Figure 2.1: Expenditure and production PPPs measured in basic prices, NOK/USD. Sources:
OECD and Timmer et al. (2006), author’s calculations. Constant Production PPPs are generated
by ﬁrst applying the EKS index at the lower industry level to create an aggregate PPP and then
using Equation 2.2 to create a time series at the aggregate level. In contrast, the Semi-current
Production PPPs are generated by ﬁrst using Equation 2.2 to create time series for PPPs at the
lower industry level, and then aggregate using the EKS index. The current expenditure PPP
from OECD is converted to basic prices by multiplying with the relative ratio of GDP measured
at basic and purchasers’ prices between Norway and USA.
There are several potential explanations for the large gap between constant and current
PPPs. It could be due to diﬀerences across countries in creating price indices and
diﬀerent frameworks in the creation of national accounts and in the creation of PPPs.
For example, there are diﬀerences in how countries adjust for quality changes in the
construction of price indices. Since the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis uses hedonic
methods extensively to account for quality changes, the price changes in the U.S. GDP
deﬂator will be lower than in countries not taking into account quality changes, all
other things equal (McCarthy, 2013), potentially causing a gap between extrapolated
PPPs and current PPPs relative to the U.S. In the following, I will consider two other
explanations for the large and widening gap: the so called “Tableau eﬀect” and the
treatment of net exports in the creation aggregate PPPs.
2.3.1 The Tableau eﬀect
A potential reason for the widening gap is the diﬀerence in weighting schemes applied
when constructing current and constant PPPs. If there are large diﬀerences in industry
structure over time, the PPPs based on data in 2005 will potentially diﬀer from the PPPs
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calculated in 1997 and extrapolated to 2005 using Equation 2.2. To illustrate, consider
the following example: There are two goods and two countries, and the price of the two
goods is the same in both countries at all time periods. Thus, the current PPP equals
unity in all time periods. Further, assume that country j almost only produces one of the
goods, say petroleum, and that the price of this good has increased by 5 per cent since
the base year. As country j almost only produces petroleum, the aggregate price index
is approximately equal to Pjt/Pjb= 1.05. Symmetrically, assume that the other good is
almost only produced in country k and that the price is unchanged across time periods:
Pkt/Pkb= 1. In contrast to the spatial price index which yields a PPP equal to unity at
time t, the constant PPP one gets from applying Equation 2.2 equals 1.05. The problem
arises since current PPPs are based on common weights whereas constant PPPs are based
on national weights. While current PPPs measure the aggregate relative price of the
same goods in diﬀerent countries, the constant PPPs are also inﬂuenced by price changes
of the goods that countries produce relatively much or little of. This example illustrates
how the choice of currency converter for productivity analysis typically depends on the
base year chosen, a well known result dubbed the “tableau eﬀect” by Summers and
Heston (1991, p. 340). Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure the size of the
tableau eﬀect directly since current production PPP data are not available. However,
it is possible to construct a semi-current production PPP from a two digit industry
level using the data from Timmer et al. (2006). As pointed out above, the construction
of constant PPPs was done in two steps: ﬁrst applying the EKS index at the lower
industry level and then using Equation 2.2 to create a time series at the aggregate level.
In contrast, the semi-current production PPPs is generated by ﬁrst using Equation 2.2
to create time series for PPPs at the lower industry level, and then aggregate using the
EKS index. Any price structure shift at the lower industry level is then accounted for.
Figure 2.1 shows semi-current production PPPs for both all industries and all industries
except petroleum and computers measured in Norwegian Kroner per US dollars. The
deviation between the constant and semi-current PPPs for all industries is large, reﬂect-
ing the sizeable increase in the petroleum price after 2000. In contrast, for most of the
years the deviations between the constant and semi-current PPPs when subtracting the
petroleum and computers industries are within 1 per cent. The change in price structure
between industries at the two-digit level is therefore not able to explain the diﬀerence
between constant and semi-current PPPs. This robustness check points to a diﬀerent
explanation for the increasing discrepancy between the constant production PPPs and
the current expenditure PPPs after 2000.
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2.3.2 The nominal exchange rate as a proxy for relative net export
prices
Another explanation for the widening gap between constant and current PPPs relates
to how net exports is treated in the construction of current expenditure PPPs. The
contribution from net exports to the total PPP is based on the assumption that market
exchange rates can be used to value net exports (Eurostat and OECD, 2012, Section
12.39). To be precise, the contribution from net exports (NX) is calculated as
1/2
(
sNXjt + s
NX
kt
)
ln(PPPNXjkt ) (2.3)
where sNX = P
XX−PMM
PY represents the share of net exports in GDP measured in current
prices and where the oﬃcial exchange rate is used to proxy relative net export prices
PPPNXjkt . Using exchange rates to proxy relative net export prices is a strong assumption
since the construction of a net export price index does not have the consistency in
aggregation property.8 When import and export prices have diﬀerent growth rates, the
aggregate net export price index may show little correspondence with how terms of
trade develop. The reason is that net exports can take upon both positive and negative
values. As pointed out by Diewert (2005, p. 12 ): “...normal index number theory fails
spectacularly as a value aggregate approaches zero”. It is only in the extreme case where
relative import and export prices between countries both follow the exchange rate that
the procedure used to create oﬃcial PPPs is valid. To illustrate, consider the To¨rnqvist
PPP index for net exports between countries j and k
ln(PPPNXjkt ) = 1/2
(
s˜Xjt + s˜
X
kt
)
ln(PPPXjkt)− 1/2
(
s˜Mjt + s˜
M
kt
)
ln(PPPMjkt), (2.4)
where the superscripts X and M refer to exports and imports, respectively, and where
s˜X and s˜M represents the export and import share of net exports measured in current
prices, i.e., s˜X = P
XX
PXX−PMM and s˜
M = P
MM
PXX−PMM , respectively. To calculate the
total impact from net export prices to PPPjkt for GDP, the index (Equation 2.4) must
be weighted with the mean share of net exports in GDP between the two countries.
Accordingly, inserting Equation 2.4 into Equation 2.3 yields
1/2
(
sNXjt + s
NX
kt
)
ln(PPPNXjkt ) = 1/4
(
sNXjt + s
NX
kt
) (
s˜Xjt + s˜
X
kt
)
ln(PPPXjkt)
− 1/4 (sNXjt + sNXkt ) (s˜Mjt + s˜Mkt ) ln(PPPMjkt). (2.5)
8An index is consistent in aggregation when “the index for some aggregate has the same value whether
it is calculated directly in a single operation, without distinguishing its components, or it is calculated
in two or more steps by ﬁrst calculating separate indices, or sub-indices, for its components, or sub-
components, and then aggregating them, the same formula being used at each step” (OECD, 2007b, p.
136).
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In contrast to the seminal result from Diewert (1978), where it was shown that the
To¨rnqvist index is approximately consistent in aggregation, the two-step procedure in
Equation 2.5 is not consistent in aggregation. While the value aggregates in Diewert
(1978) were of the same sign, the net export ﬁgure in Equation 2.5 can take on both
positive and negative values, possibly yielding very diﬀerent results compared with a
one-step procedure, see also ILO et al. (2009, p. 468). Ideally, if data on relative export
and import prices between countries are available, the contribution from net exports
should be calculated as the separate sum of contributions from exports and imports
1/2
(
sXjt + s
X
kt
)
ln(PPPXjkt)− 1/2
(
sMjt + s
M
kt
)
ln(PPPMjkt), (2.6)
where sX and sM represents the export and import shares of GDP measured in current
prices, i.e., sX = P
XX
PY and s
M = P
MM
PY , respectively. There is no particular reason why
the calculation from the one-step procedure (Equation 2.6) should equal the two-step
aggregation procedure (Equation 2.5) since the weights in the two expressions can be
very diﬀerent. Only if PPPXjkt = PPP
M
jkt will the two methods be equal irrespective
of the weights. If the exchange rate perfectly reﬂects the relative price of both exports
and imports, the procedure used by Eurostat and OECD to aggregate PPPs is therefore
valid. However, if the exchange rate does not perfectly reﬂect the relative price of both
exports and imports, the two methods can yield very diﬀerent results. To illustrate,
compare the export weights 1/2
(
sXjt + s
X
kt
)
with the weights from the two-step procedure
1/4
(
sNXjt + s
NX
kt
)(
s˜Xjt + s˜
X
kt
)
for Norway and the USA. The export share sX in 2010 was
0.41 in Norway and 0.12 in the USA, which yields an average export share equal to 0.26.
The export share out of net exports s˜X in Norway was 3.39 and it was -3.55 in the USA,
reﬂecting a negative trade balance. Since one country is running a trade surplus and the
other country is running a trade deﬁcit, the mean of these export shares can be close
to zero. In this case the mean was -0.08. To get the overall weight, this number must
be multiplied with the mean net export share of total GDP. In Norway the net export
share was 0.12 and in the USA it was -0.03, which yields a mean equal to 0.05. The
aggregate product of mean net export shares and mean export shares then equals -0.003.
As a result, the export price growth in the two-step approach in Equation 2.5 is given
negligible (and negative) weight compared with the one-step approach in Equation 2.6.
Figure 2.2 compares the results from applying Equation 2.5 and Equation 2.6 when
relative export and import price indices are used as proxies for PPPXNOR,USA and
PPPMNOR,USA. The two-step aggregation procedure (Equation 2.5) yields by all practical
means no contribution to aggregate PPP after 1999. In contrast, the one-step aggre-
gation (Equation 2.6) shows that net exports contributes to a 16 per cent higher PPP
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Figure 2.2: Contribution to changes in bilateral PPPs between Norway and USA. Source:
OECD, author’s calculations. Relative export and import price indices between the USA and
Norway are used in Equation 2.5 and Equation 2.6 to calculate Net exports, two-step aggregation
and Net exports, one-step aggregation respectively. The series Net exports, exchange rate as
reference PPP is calculated as 1/2(sNXNOR + s
NX
USA) ln(EXNOR,USA), where EX is the oﬃcial
exchange rate between Norway and USA. All series are normalised to unity in 1997.
in 2010 compared with the level in 1997. For the sake of comparison, the semi-current
production PPP for all industries given in Figure 2.1 was 24 per cent higher than the
oﬃcial current PPP published by OECD in 2010. Figure 2.2 also shows the contribution
to changes in PPPs when using the oﬃcial exchange rate as a reference PPP for net
exports (Equation 2.3). The volatility of the series between 1997 and 2002 reﬂects the
large changes in Norway’s net export share during this time span. In 2010 the level
was on par with the value in 1997, indicating that using the exchange rate as reference
PPP has not contributed to the aggregate PPP between Norway and USA between 1997
and 2010. The relative price indices for exports and imports might be poor proxies
for the development of relative export and import prices (due to the tableau eﬀect).
Nevertheless, since index theory fails when value aggregates approaches zero, the results
from Figure 2.2 point to the aggregation of net exports as a potential important cause
underlying the widening gap between current and constant PPPs.
2.3.3 Is the ﬁrst premise of the Norwegian productivity puzzle real?
As noted in the introduction, the ﬁrst premise of the Norwegian productivity puzzle is
the high measured level of productivity in Norway. Several issues treated above have
shed new light on this premise. It has been shown that how net exports are treated
by Eurostat and OECD in the calculation of overall PPPs can be the cause of the
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Figure 2.3: Diﬀerence between constant production PPPs and current expenditure PPPs in
1997 and 2010, per cent. Sources: OECD and EU KLEMS, author’s calculations. The con-
stant production PPPs are from Timmer et al. (2006) and aggregated over all industries except
petroleum and computers. PPPs are measured in local currency per USD at basic prices, i.e.,
USA=1. The current expenditure PPP from OECD is converted to basic prices by multiplying
with the relative ratio of GDP measured at basic and purchasers’ prices between Norway and
USA.
widening gap between constant production PPPs and current expenditure PPPs after
1998. As a result, using current expenditure PPPs instead of production PPPs can lead
to signiﬁcant overestimation of the level of productivity, as illustrated in Figure 2.3.9 It
shows the ratio of expenditure PPPs to production PPPs across countries in 1997 and
2010. In the basis year 1997 the diﬀerence is positive for all countries, indicating that
productivity is overrated when using the PPPs calculated from the expenditure side. The
diﬀerence is most pronounced in France at 11.6 per cent and for Norway the diﬀerence is
6.8 per cent. For all countries but Sweden, the diﬀerence between the current expenditure
PPP in 2010 and the constant production PPP in 2010 has increased, in particular for
Norway. This general increase across most countries should be viewed in conjunction
with how hedonic regressions are widely used by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
to control for quality changes. In the speciﬁc case of Norway, however, the increase has
been particularly large. As a result, using constant production PPPs from Timmer et al.
(2006) to evaluate productivity in 2010 yields a 23.3 per cent lower level of productivity
in Norway compared with using current expenditure PPPs. The ﬁrst premise of the
Norwegian productivity puzzle can thus be an artifact of the choice of PPPs and the
strong assumption that exchange rates are a good proxy for relative net export prices.
Figure 2.4 shows levels of labour productivity across countries, measured as value added
per hour worked in all industries except petroleum and computers, converted from do-
mestic currency to US dollars using constant production PPPs from Timmer et al.
(2006). In the 1970s, the level of labour productivity in Norway was 28 per cent below
9Recently, Warner et al. (2014) shows how the use of PPPs with diﬀerent benchmark years impacts
the level and trend of global inequality.
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Figure 2.4: Value added per hour worked. Sources: OECD and EU KLEMS, author’s calcu-
lations. Measured in basic prices and USD using constant production PPPs from Timmer et al.
(2006). All industries except petroleum and computers.
the level in the USA, 7 per cent below the level in Sweden and 4 per cent below the
level in Denmark, but 30 per cent higher than in Finland. During the 1980s the growth
in labour productivity was lower than in most of the other countries, but in the mid
1990s, growth picked up. By 2005, the level of labour productivity in Norway was at
par with the levels in Sweden and France, and the distance to the level in the USA had
shrunk to 7 per cent. In contrast to the ﬁrst premise of the Norwegian productivity
puzzle, Figure 2.4 illustrates that Norway is not particularly productive compared with
the USA, Germany, Sweden and France when measured by production PPPs, although
performance has been good from the mid 1990s.
2.4 Comparing productivity growth across countries
In the previous section it was shown that when using constant production PPPs from
Timmer et al. (2006) the level of productivity in Norway is on par with the level in
Sweden and France and somewhat lower than in the USA and Germany. Nevertheless,
except for Sweden, trend productivity growth was somewhat higher from the mid 1990s.
In light of moderate R&D spending, is the development in Norway still a puzzle? In this
section, I answer this question by estimating a model suitable for identifying the role
of technology transfer, R&D capital and human capital for productivity growth across
countries.
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2.4.1 Econometric speciﬁcation
In this section I outline the basis for the econometric model. Value added Yijt in industry
i in country j at time t is produced with labour Lijt and capital Kijt according to the
production technology
Yijt = Aijt Fij(Lijt,Kijt), (2.7)
where the function Fij(·) is assumed to be homogenous of degree one and to exhibit
diminishing marginal return to each factor. Aijt is an index for total factor productivity
(TFP) and is allowed to vary across industries, countries and time. The country with
the highest level of TFP in industry i at time t is deﬁned as the frontier country, denoted
by AiF t.
The starting point of the analysis is the literature connecting the index for TFP (Aijt)
with R&D and the level of technology at the frontier. I employ a model that is a
combination of the ones used by Griﬃth et al. (2004), Cameron et al. (2005) and Coe
et al. (2009). Griﬃth et al. (2004) and Cameron et al. (2005) modelled TFP growth as
a function of the distance to the technology frontier and R&D intensity, among other
things. In contrast to Griﬃth et al. (2004), who focused on the rate of change in TFP,
Coe et al. (2009) analysed the level of TFP. The level was modelled as a function of
both the domestic R&D capital stock and the foreign R&D capital stock. The starting
point of the model used in the current chapter is a speciﬁcation where TFP in levels
(log transformed) in industry i of country j is a function of both the TFP level in the
frontier industry AiF t, the R&D capital stock Rijt, and human capital Sijt, proxied by
high skilled workers’ share in total hours worked
lnAijt = cij + ηijt lnRijt + γijt lnAiF t + φSijt. (2.8)
Both elasticities of TFP with respect to TFP in the frontier country (γijt) and R&D (ηijt)
are time varying. A constant elasticity of TFP with respect to R&D is ”not consistent
with any reasonable optimal R&D behaviour” if there are large diﬀerences in the R&D
intensity (Griliches, 1998, p. 221). A more reasonable assumption is to let the real rate
of return η˜ = ∂Yijt/∂Rijt be common across industries. Also, the extent to which the
level of TFP depends on the frontier level of TFP is time dependant. It is reasonable
to expect the potential for technology transfer to be greater when the distance to the
frontier is large. To be speciﬁc, γijt should go towards zero when the productivity level
goes towards the productivity level in the frontier. One functional form that satisﬁes this
criterion is γijt = γ˜ ln(AiF t−1/Aijt−1). Inserting this relationship and the relationship
that the elasticity of R&D equals the product of the real return of R&D and the R&D
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intensity (ηijt = η˜ Rijt/Yijt) back into Equation 2.8 yields the equilibrium relationship
lnAijt = cij + η˜ ln R˜ijt + γ˜ ln A˜iF t + φSijt. (2.9)
where I have deﬁned the auxiliary variables
R˜t = e(Rijt/Yijt) lnRijt and A˜iF t = eln(AiFt−1/Aijt−1) lnAiFt .
The model will be estimated using a panel of annual data for seven OECD countries
spanning 1978 - 2007. To analyse if productivity growth in Norway represents a puzzle
I compare the unexplained level of productivity growth in Norway between 1995 and
2005 with the unexplained productivity growth in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany and the USA.
2.4.2 Data description
Data are taken from the OECD STAN database, the EU KLEMS database and Statistics
Norway. Data on value added, hours worked, labour compensation, the capital stock,
etc. are for Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany and France taken from the
OECD STAN database. The only exception is the construction and the Wholesale and
retail trade industry in Norway, where data are taken from Statistics Norway. For USA,
the National Accounts data by industry are taken from the EU KLEMS database where
data from both the 2008 and 2009 release have been used, see O’Mahony and Timmer
(2009). Data sources are thus consistent within these countries, but vary between USA
and the other countries. The exception is data on hours worked and labour compen-
sation for diﬀerent educational groups. These data are taken from EU KLEMS for all
countries but Norway, where data are taken from Statistics Norway. There are some
discrepancies between the industry classiﬁcation for educational data and the ISIC Rev.
4 classiﬁcation. For example, the Norwegian data exclude the Transport via pipelines
industry from the aggregate transportation industry. Also, companies and organisations
that are labeled as private enterprises within the Public administration and defence ;
education ; human health and social work activities (D84t88) are a part of the Other
services industry in the Norwegian data. Also, data for Sweden and Germany have
been extrapolated backwards using the growth rates from the EU KLEMS database.
Purchasing power parities for gross ﬁxed capital formation are taken from OECD and
Eurostat (2008). EU KLEMS data and OECD data for France have been mapped from
the ISIC Rev. 3 classiﬁcation to ISIC Rev. 4 classiﬁcation using the approximate 2-digit
mapping provided in The OECD Compendium of Productivity Indicators 2013 (OECD,
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2013, Annex D), see also the appendix, Section A.4. Data from EU KLEMS (USA)
and OECD ISIC Rev. 3 (FRA), such as value added and gross production, have been
extrapolated with growth rates from the OECD STAN ISIC Rev. 4 database if the
variables were available. Population and employment data are taken from the Labour
force survey (LFS). For Germany data have been extrapolated assuming a constant level
between 1990 and 1991 and using the growth rates from LFS prior to 1990 to extend
the series backwards in time.
R&D investments are taken from the OECD database ISIC Rev 4. For many countries,
R&D surveys have not been completed every year. Log linear interpolation has been
used to impute missing observations. Nominal R&D expenditure has been extrapolated
backwards using the growth rate from both OECD ISIC Rev. 3 data and ISIC Rev.2
data, see the appendix, Section A.3. For Denmark and Sweden the levels from the ISIC
Rev. 2 data have been used. The R&D deﬂator is the output price index from the R&D
sector (D72) if it was available, otherwise the R&D deﬂator from the Main Science and
Technology Indicators by OECD is used. If the output price index from the R&D sector
was available it has been extrapolated using the growth rate from the R&D deﬂator
in the Main Science and Technology Indicators. To get a measure of R&D capital in
industry i of country j (Rijt) I apply the Perpetual Inventory Method
Rijt = (1− δ)Rijt−1 + Iijt, (2.10)
where Iijt is real R&D investments constructed from nominal R&D investments and
the R&D deﬂator using the product rule10 and where I have used the depreciation
rate δ = 0.15 and the initial condition Rij0 = Iij0/(δ + 0.05) by following Hollanders
and ter Weel (2002, p. 588). Table 2.1 shows the median R&D intensity, deﬁned as
the ratio of real R&D investments to value added (Iijt/Yijt), between 2005 and 2010
across industries and countries. The R&D intensity in Manufacturing in Norway is
roughly half the mean intensity in the other countries. A low level of R&D intensity
is consistent with the low level of productivity growth in manufacturing. Overall, the
R&D intensity in Manufacturing is much higher than in the other industries. The R&D
intensity in Information and communication is also relatively high in all countries. In
the Wholesale and retail trade industry however, it is below unity in all countries. The
puzzling productivity growth in this industry for Norway can therefore not be explained
by the level of R&D investments. The total R&D intensity in Norway, calculated as a
weighted average of the industry speciﬁc intensities using value added shares as weights,
is 2.0 per cent. All of the other countries have a higher total R&D intensity, where the
highest is in Finland and Sweden at 4.6 per cent. The low overall R&D intensity in
10The product rule refers to the identity of a value ratio being equal to a price ratio times a quantity
ratio, see Frisch (1930).
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Figure 2.5: Comparing TFP levels across countries. Sources: OECD and EU KLEMS, author’s
calculations. The ﬁgure illustrates the TFP levels of industry i in country j relative to industry
i in the USA, i.e., (Aij/AiUSA).
Norway is thus partly a result of a low R&D intensity in manufacturing in combination
with manufacturing accounting for a lower share of total value added in Norway than in
the other countries.
To get a measure for the distance to the frontier I apply the spatial productivity index
suggested by Caves et al. (1982)
lnAij − lnAi =
(
lnYij − lnYi
)
− 1/2(sKij + sKi )
(
lnKij − lnKi
)− 1/2(sLij + sLi ) (lnLij − lnLi) , (2.11)
where Yij , Kij , Lij and sij represent value added, the net capital stock, hours worked
and the factor shares respectively. lnYi, lnKi and lnLi are the geometric means of
value added, the net capital stock and hours worked across n = 7 countries, e.g.,
lnYi = 1n
∑n
j=1 lnYij , and si is the arithmetic mean of the respective factor share across
countries, i.e., si = 1n
∑n
j=1 sij . The frontier AiF is deﬁned as the country with the
highest index value
(
lnAij − lnAi
)
in any given time period. An industry’s distance to
the frontier is measured by
(
lnAij − lnAi
) − (lnAiF − lnAi) = (lnAij − lnAiF ) in a
given base year.
In Figure 2.5, the development of industry productivity is shown relative to USA
(Aijt/AiUSAt) between 1978 and 2007 for Manufacturing and Wholesale and retail trade.
In Manufacturing, the USA was the frontier country for most of the time period. All
countries but Denmark and Norway show a tendency for convergence. The productivity
level in Norway has been between 60 and 70 per cent below the productivity level in the
USA during this time period. In contrast, Finland has shown a great surge in relative
productivity growth, a development that should be viewed in relation to the develop-
ment of the mobile phone producer Nokia during this time period. The development
in Wholesale and retail trade diﬀers from Manufacturing in several respects. While the
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
NOR USA DNK SWE FRA FIN DEU
TFP as Proportion of Frontier TFP (per cent)a
Agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing 51.5 100 79.5 93.2 55.7 36.3 85.8
Manufacturing 47.2 92.4 48.9 99.3 67.2 98.5 79.6
Construction 78.5 64.9 71.6 63.5 71.0 100 69.0
Wholesale and retail trade 95.4 100 89.9 88.0 76.8 94.4 96.1
Transportation and storage 51.8 100 64.5 61.8 78.2 83.8 69.1
Information and communication 98.3 100 62.2 94.6 n/a 60.1 71.6
Financial and insurance activities 61.2 88.1 100 86.1 71.3 78.3 37.2
Total 69.6 92.1 72.5 88.5 64.3 87.9 76.8
R&D intensityb
Agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing 1.7 n/a 0.3 n/a 0.3 0.0 0.5
Manufacturing 4.7 10.4 9.9 12.5 7.0 10.2 7.7
Construction 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1
Wholesale and retail trade 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.1
Transportation and storage 0.1 0.0 0.2 n/a 0.1 0.2 0.1
Information and communication 4.7 5.9 7.1 n/a 3.0 4.5 2.0
Financial and insurance activities 1.2 0.1 2.0 0.5 0.2 1.5 0.2
Total 2.0 3.7 3.0 4.6 2.3 4.6 3.5
Share of high skilled in total hours worked c
Agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing 54.5 n/a 45.8 69.4 70.3 73.7 57.7
Manufacturing 61.3 n/a 67.5 79.7 76.4 79.1 73.5
Construction 61.4 n/a 68.7 77.8 69.5 75.5 70.9
Wholesale and retail trade 43.8 n/a 66.0 78.7 80.7 77.2 66.4
Transportation and storage 51.6 n/a 61.2 82.6 76.9 70.1 66.4
Information and communication 72.3 n/a 27.9 n/a 21.8 23.0 17.7
Financial and insurance activities 54.5 n/a 89.3 95.9 95.0 84.0 89.0
Total 55.1 n/a 63.5 74.0 74.1 72.8 67.7
Sources: OECD, Statistics Norway and EU KLEMS, author’s calculations. Sample: 2005 –
2010, medians.
a Deﬁned as 100 × (Aij/AiF ), where Aij is TFP in industry i in country j and where AiF
is TFP in the frontier country. (Aij/AiF ) is calculated using the spatial productivity index
in Caves et al. (1982), see Equation 2.11. Total is calculated as a weighted average across
industries where the weights are value added shares.
b Calculated as the ratio of real R&D investments to real value added. Total is calculated as
a weighted average across industries where the weights are value added shares.
c For Norway, labour with either vocational or tertiary education are deﬁned as high skilled.
For the remaining countries high skilled are deﬁned as DNK: Long to short-cycle higher ed-
ucation and vocational education and training, SWE: Postgraduates, undergraduates, higher
and intermediate vocational, FRA: University graduates, higher education below degree, low
intermediate and vocational education, FIN: Tertiary schooling (or parts thereof), upper sec-
ondary level with or without matriculation, DEU: University graduates and intermediate
education, see Timmer et al. (2010, Table 3A.4, includes both high and medium skilled).
Total is calculated as a weighted average across industries where the weights are shares in
total hours worked.
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USA was by far the technology leader in Manufacturing in the 1980s, almost all coun-
tries were at the level of USA in Wholesale and retail trade. The exception is Norway.
In 1978 the relative productivity level was 60 per cent compared with the USA. At that
time there were not many chain stores and not many shopping malls in Norway.11 From
a state of great ineﬃciency, Norway has had surge in productivity growth, even when
compared to the USA which growth were much higher than in Europe during the 1990s.
In 2007 the productivity in Norway is at level of Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, but
still about 3 per cent lower than in the USA. Table 2.1 shows productivity levels across
industries. There are large variations in productivity levels across countries. Except for
the Wholesale and retail trade and Information and communication industries, the tech-
nology level in Norway is about 45 to 65 per cent of the technology leader. Interestingly,
with the exception of these two industries, the other countries are ahead of Norway in
most of the other industries. One exception is the low level of productivity in Germany
in Financial and insurance activities.
Table 2.1 also shows the share of high skilled labour in total hours worked. Due to
diﬀerent education systems the deﬁnition of high and low skilled varies across countries.
In Norway, labour with no formal qualiﬁcations, primary eduction, secondary school
(excluding vocational eduction) or unknown are deﬁned as low skilled. Labour with
either vocational or tertiary education are deﬁned as high skilled. For the remaining
countries high skilled are deﬁned by: long to short-cycle higher education and vocational
education and training in Denmark, postgraduates, undergraduates, higher and inter-
mediate vocational in Sweden, university graduates, higher education below degree, low
intermediate and vocational education in France, tertiary schooling (or parts thereof),
upper secondary level with or without matriculation in Finland and university gradu-
ates and intermediate education in Germany (Timmer et al., 2010, Table 3A.4, includes
both high and medium skilled). The diﬀerence in educational systems and the diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of high skilled means that the high skill share in total hours worked is not
directly comparable across countries. Equation 2.9 is therefore estimated both with and
without the human capital variable. Nevertheless, there are important diﬀerences across
countries. The largest share of high skilled can be found in the Information and com-
munication industry in Norway. In contrast, in all other countries, this industry has the
lowest share of high skilled. Also, the high skill share in both Wholesale and retail trade
and in Financial and insurance activities is lower in Norway than in the other countries.
In all countries but Norway, the largest high skill share can be found in the Financial
and insurance activities.
11The ﬁrst chain store Jernia was established around 1960 and what was referred to as the ﬁrst
shopping mall Eiksmarka senter was established in 1953. But the surge in shopping malls began ﬁrst in
the late 1980s and in the 1990s (Rasmussen and Reidarson, 2007).
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Table 2.2: Panel unit root tests
TFP R&D TFP–frontier Skill intensity
Levin et al. (2002)a 2.24 0.81 -15.38** 1.78
(0.99) (0.79) (0.00) (0.96)
Breitung (2000)b 6.58 1.96 0.46 1.76
(1.00) (0.97) (0.68) (0.96)
Hadri (2000)c 17.95** 14.07** 11.23** 14.22**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sample: 1977 – 2008, 7 countries, 6 industries. The 10 and 5 per cent sig-
niﬁcance levels are marked with * and **, respectively. p–values in paren-
thesis. The TFP variable is deﬁned by ln Aijt. The R&D and TFP–frontier
variables are deﬁned by the auxiliary variables R˜t = e(Rijt/Yijt) lnRijt and
A˜iF t = eln(AiFt−1/Aijt−1) lnAiFt , where R, Y and A represent R&D invest-
ments, value added and TFP, respectively, and where the index F denotes
the frontier country with the highest level of TFP. Skill intensity is deﬁned
by high skilled workers’ share in total hours worked. Countries included:
USA, Germany, France, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Industries
included: Manufacturing (only for Norway, Denmark, France and Germany);
Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Transportation and storage; In-
formation and communication; and Financial and insurance activities.
a Null hypothesis: Unit root.
b Null hypothesis: Stationarity.
2.4.3 Results
Before estimating the long run relationship in Equation 2.9, the variables are tested for
unit roots and cointegration. Three diﬀerent types of unit root tests are conducted, based
on the methods in Levin et al. (2002), Breitung (2000) and Hadri (2000), see Table 2.2.
All variables shows sign of unit roots. In the ﬁrst two tests the null hypothesis is that the
series contain a unit root, whereas in Hadri (2000) the null hypothesis is that the series
are stationary. Except for the test of the frontier variable ln A˜iF t using the method in
Levin et al. (2002), none of the tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Both the
Breitung (2000) test and the Hadri (2000) test point to a unit root also in the frontier
series ln A˜iF t.
Tests for cointegration among the variables (Pedroni, 1999) are based on a pooled sample
and by imposing both a deterministic intercept and trend, see Table 2.3. These tests
indicate that the series are cointegrated. The evidence is weakest for the panel ρ-
statistic, where the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected at the 10 per
cent signiﬁcance level. However, the three other tests all reject the null hypothesis of
no cointegration at least at the 10 per cent signiﬁcance level, with the only exception
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Table 2.3: Panel cointegration tests
Panel v Panel ρ PP ADF
TFP, R&D 13.48** 0.89 -0.33 -1.45*
TFP, R&D, TFP–frontier 12.81** 1.26 -2.26** -3.79**
TFP, R&D, TFP–frontier, Skill intensity 2.11** 2.01 -2.67** -4.07**
Sample: 1977 – 2008, 7 countries, 6 industries. Pedroni (1999) cointegration tests,
assuming both a deterministic intercept and trend. The 10 and 5 per cent signif-
icance levels are marked with * and **, respectively. The null hypothesis of no
cointegration is rejected if the test statistic is signiﬁcant. The TFP variable is de-
ﬁned by lnAijt. The R&D and TFP–frontier variables are deﬁned by the log of the
auxiliary variables R˜t = e(Rijt/Yijt) lnRijt and A˜iF t = eln(AiFt−1/Aijt−1) lnAiFt , where
R, Y and A represent R&D investments, value added and TFP, respectively, and
where the index F denotes the frontier country with the highest level of TFP. Skill
intensity is deﬁned by high skilled workers’ share in total hours worked. Countries
included: USA, Germany, France, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Indus-
tries included: Manufacturing (only for Norway, Denmark, France and Germany);
Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Transportation and storage; Information
and communication; and Financial and insurance activities.
for the PP test between the TFP and the R&D variable. Interestingly, the evidence is
stronger in the speciﬁcations that includes the distance to the frontier and the share of
high skilled labour (Sijt). These results suggest that a stable long-run relation can be
estimated using a pooled estimation technique.
Three diﬀerent models are estimated and the results are reported in Table 2.4. Dynamic
OLS (DOLS) has been used to estimate both models. This estimator was suggested by
Saikkonen (1991) and it has been commonly used in the literature, see e.g., Kao et al.
(1999) and Coe et al. (2009). In contrast to the standard OLS estimator, the DOLS
estimator controls for both serial correlation and endogeneity among the regressors,
and in Monte Carlo experiments it also outperforms the Fully Modiﬁed OLS estimator,
see Kao and Chiang (2000). It is a suitable estimator also when the time series are
dependant across industries since the data is demeaned over the cross-section dimension
before the augmented cointegrating regression is estimated, see Mark and Sul (2003, p.
668).
Only the R&D variable enter as explanatory variable in Model 1. The estimated return
to R&D, estimated to 5 per cent, is signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level. An
estimated return to R&D of 5 per cent is lower than what is found in many other studies.
As shown in Hall et al. (2010) there is great variation in estimated returns to R&D, but
most studies ﬁnd rate of returns larger than 10 per cent. One exception is the study by
Parisi et al. (2006) who estimate the return of R&D to approximately 4 per cent using
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Table 2.4: Estimation results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
R&D 0.05** 0.05** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
TFP–frontier 0.80** 0.92**
(0.14) (0.16)
Skill intensity 0.95**
(0.09)
Standard error 0.12 0.11 0.09
R2 0.92 0.94 0.96
Observations 409 384 337
Sample 1977 – 2007 1977 – 2007 1977 – 2007
Estimator DOLS DOLS DOLS
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total fac-
tor productivity (lnAijt). The 10 and 5 per cent signiﬁcance
levels are marked with * and **, respectively. Standard er-
rors in parenthesis. Estimation is conducted using Panel Dy-
namic OLS (DOLS) where leads and lags speciﬁcations are
based on the AIC criterion. The R&D and TFP–frontier
variables are deﬁned by the log of the auxiliary variables
R˜t = e(Rijt/Yijt) lnRijt and A˜iF t = eln(AiFt−1/Aijt−1) lnAiFt ,
where R, Y and A represent R&D investments, value added
and TFP, respectively, and where the index F denotes the
frontier country with the highest level of TFP. Skill intensity
is deﬁned by high skilled workers’ share in total hours worked.
Countries included: USA, Germany, France, Finland, Swe-
den, Denmark and Norway. Industries included: Manufac-
turing (only for Norway, Denmark, France and Germany);
Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Transportation
and storage; Information and communication; and Financial
and insurance activities.
Italian data. In Model 2 the impact from the distance to the technological frontier is
included and signiﬁcantly estimated. The inclusion of this variable has negligible eﬀect
on the estimated return to R&D. In Model 3 the share of high skilled is also added as an
explanatory variable. It is estimated signiﬁcantly at the 5 per cent level. Interestingly,
when the share of high skilled is added as an explanatory variable, the return to R&D,
which was estimated signiﬁcantly at 5 per cent, drops to 0 per cent and is insigniﬁcant.
The main purpose of this section is to see if there has been a particular development of
productivity in Norway during the period 1995 – 2005. To this end, I use the framework
developed above and analyse the diﬀerence between actual TFP growth and the TFP
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Figure 2.6: Actual and unexplained TFP growth. Sample: 1995 - 2005. Median growth rate.
Actual TFP growth for country j is calculated as the weighted average across industries i of ac-
tual TFP growth (ΔlnAijt), i.e.,
∑
i sijtΔlnAijt, where the weights sijt are value added shares
measured in current prices. Unexplained TFP growth in country j is calculated as the weighted
average across industries i of the diﬀerence between actual and model predicted TFP growth
(ΔlnAMijt) in absolute terms, i.e.,
∑
i sijt
∣∣ΔlnAijt −ΔlnAMijt∣∣. Industries included: Manufac-
turing (only for Norway, Denmark, France and Germany); Construction; Wholesale and retail
trade; Transportation and storage; Information and communication; and Financial and insur-
ance activities. The vertical line is 0.9 standard deviations above the mean across countries in
each panel.
growth implied by Models 1 – 3 in Figure 2.6. For all countries are Construction; Whole-
sale and retail trade; Transportation and storage; Information and communication; and
Financial and insurance activities included, but only for only for Norway, Denmark,
France and Germany is the Manufacturing industry included in the sample. Actual
TFP growth for country j is calculated as the weighted average across industries i of ac-
tual (ΔlnAijt) TFP growth, i.e.,
∑
i sijtΔlnAijt, where the weights sijt are value added
shares measured in current prices. The unexplained growth in country j is calculated
as the weighted average across industries i of the diﬀerence between actual and model
predicted (ΔlnAMijt) TFP growth in absolute terms, i.e.,
∑
i sijt
∣∣∣ΔlnAijt −ΔlnAMijt∣∣∣.
Note that the unexplained TFP growth in Models 1 – 3 in Figure 2.6 does not show
the error of how the models would predict aggregate TFP growth in each country. Such
a measure would yield smaller errors since a negative prediction error in one industry
would be oﬀset by a positive prediction error in another industry.
Figure 2.6a shows the median growth rate in actual TFP. Growth in TFP has been
much higher in the Nordic countries between 1995 and 2005 compared with the growth
in USA, Germany and France. In Norway the median growth rate was 3.1 per cent and
0.9 standard deviations above the mean, represented by the vertical line.
A productivity puzzle can loosely be deﬁned as a high level of actual TFP growth
compared with a low level of the determinants of TFP, such as R&D. If a productivity
puzzle exists, one would expect the unexplained level of TFP to be higher in Norway
when taking the determinants of TFP into account. To analyse if there has been a
productivity puzzle in Norway, I compare the level of unexplained TFP in Norway when
using Models 1 – 3. If a puzzle exists, one would expect the unexplained level of TFP
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in Norway being further away from the mean compared with the distance to the mean
of actual TFP (0.9 standard deviations). As shown in Figure 2.6b – Figure 2.6d, for
all models, the unexplained level of TFP in Norway is less than 0.9 standard deviations
from the mean. In Model 1, when taking only R&D into account, the unexplained level
of TFP in Norway is 0.3 standard deviations above the mean. In Model 2 and 3 the
distance to the mean is -0.8 and 0.1 standard deviations, respectively. In other words,
when taking the standard determinants of TFP into account, productivity in Norway is
less puzzling than what the relatively high growth rate in actual TFP could indicate.
Based on these results there is no reason to claim that the development of total factor
productivity in Norway between 1995 and 2005 represents a puzzle.
2.5 Conclusions
The Norwegian productivity puzzle is rooted in the seemingly contradictory “facts” that
Norway is one of the most productive OECD countries, that Norway has experienced
high growth in productivity and that the level of R&D investments has been low. The
aim of this chapter has been twofold. The ﬁrst was to analyse if productivity in Norway
really has been as high as reported statistics suggest. I have shown that using PPPs from
the expenditure side can grossly overestimate productivity in Norway, mainly because
it is assumed that relative net export prices can be proxied by the market exchange rate
in the calculation of expenditure PPPs. Since price indices fail when value aggregates,
such as net exports, are close to zero, small deviations between the terms of trade and
the market exchange rate can yield a large bias in the contribution from export prices
and import prices to the overall PPP. It was shown that using terms of trade instead of
market exchange rate can account for most of the gap between current expenditure and
constant production PPPs. As a result, using expenditure PPPs instead of production
PPPs overrates productivity in Norway by 23.3 per cent compared with the USA in
2010. When measured using the production PPPs from Timmer et al. (2006), Norway
is not particularly productive compared with either the USA, Germany, Sweden or
France. The exceptionally high productivity level in Norway, which was the premise
of the Norwegian productivity puzzle, can thus be an artifact of the strong assumption
that exchange rates are a good proxy for relative net export prices and the sizable price
increase in statistical discrepancies.
The second aim of the chapter was to analyse the relatively high growth in productivity
beginning in the mid 1990s. Using an empirical model that took the level of human
capital, R&D capital stock and the distance to the technological frontier into account,
it was shown that unexplained productivity growth has not been signiﬁcantly higher
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in Norway compared with other countries. In contrast to what a productivity puzzle
implies, the unexplained growth in TFP when taking R&D, distance to the technological
frontier and human capital into account, is less pronounced in Norway compared with
actual growth TFP. Based on these results there is thus no reason to claim that the
development of productivity in Norway represents a puzzle.
Chapter 3
Understanding the productivity
slowdown: the importance of exit
and entry of workers
Abstract: Many OECD countries have experienced a measured slowdown in labor productivity from
2005 and onwards. Norway is no exception in this respect. Most countries use a simple aggregate of
hours worked when measuring labour productivity. One way to improve measurement of labour services
is to control for worker characteristics. A theoretical rationale for doing so is given by Diewert and Lippe
(2010). We generalise previous analyses by allowing for exit and entry by workers when measuring labor
services for Norway. We ﬁnd that the bias from using hours worked compared to a labour index capturing
various compositional eﬀects can be substantial and systematic over time. In the case of Norway they
explain about a quarter of the productivity slowdown after 2005.
3.1 Introduction
Many OECD countries have experienced a measured slowdown in labor productivity
from 2005 and onwards. Norway is no exception in this respect. While the average
productivity growth was 2.7 per cent between 2002 and 2005, it dropped markedly after
2005 and reached -1.4 per cent in 2008, see Figure 3.1. This productivity slowdown oc-
curred in tandem with a massive increase in immigration following the 2004 enlargement
of the European Union. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, the ratio of net immigration to the
total number of employees almost tripled from a level of about 0.6 before 2005 to 1.7 in
2008. Several other European countries have experienced a similar surge in immigration
after 2005.
This chapter is written together with A˚dne Cappelen and Diana-Cristina Iancu. Thanks to Karen
Helene Ulltveit-Moe, P˚al Boug and Terje Skjerpen for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Figure 3.1: Labour productivity and immigration. Labour productivity is measured as value
added per hour worked in the mainland economy. Net immigration is shown relative to the total
number of employees in Norway. Source: Statistics Norway.
The negative correlation between net immigration and productivity growth raises a
particular concern with respect to how productivity is measured. Labour productivity
growth is deﬁned as the ratio of the index for value added to the index for labour
services. It is standard practice to use the change in hours worked as a proxy for the
labour services index. However, it is well known that hours worked represents a biased
proxy for labour services. The reason is that a worker’s contribution to labour services
should be weighted by his or her cost to the ﬁrm, not the share of hours worked. For
example, if there are a large number of low paid immigrants entering the labour market
after 2005, and if wages reﬂect marginal productivity, a measure of labour services based
on hours worked would overstate the contribution to labour services and consequently
understate the true development in productivity.
The bias between using hours worked and a more theoretically based index for labour
services, such as Fisher or To¨rnqvist, is referred to as the unit value bias. In a more
general context, the unit value bias has been discussed extensively in the literature, see
e.g., Pa´rniczky (1974); Timmer (1996); Balk (1998b) and Silver (2010). Diewert and
Lippe (2010) summarise many of these ﬁndings and analyse the unit value bias more
explicitly with respect to the Laspeyres, the Paasche and the Fisher price indices.
To counteract the weaknesses of using hours worked it is common to control for worker
characteristics in a two-step procedure: the ﬁrst step deﬁnes groups by worker charac-
teristics and the second step aggregates hours worked across these groups using an index
with good theoretical and axiomatic properties such as To¨rnqvist or Fisher, see e.g., Jor-
genson et al. (1987), Jorgenson et al. (2005), Cao et al. (2009) and work based on the EU
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KLEMS databse such as O’Mahony and Timmer (2009); Timmer et al. (2010). Based
on this framework Zoghi (2010) discusses the use of predicted wages in calculating the
weighting scheme, which is the current practice at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Using data for Norway, Hægeland (1997) calculated labour services using register data
and classiﬁcations of workers according to education and sex. Nilsen et al. (2011), anal-
ysed productivity across manufacturing industries in Norway also using register data
and categorised employed persons into 12 subgroups. They added to this literature by
using weights based on an estimate of predicted wages associated with individual skill
attributes.
The theoretical rationale for the two-step procedure can be found in Pa´rniczky (1974)
and Diewert and Lippe (2010). They show that the unit value bias decreases with
increased disaggregation if it is compositional eﬀects between the groups that contribute
most to the overall bias. However, if compositional eﬀects within groups are dominant,
disaggregation may increase the unit value bias. Note that these theoretical results follow
from comparing the change in hours worked relative to indices that require underlying
prices and quantities to be deﬁned in both the base and the comparison period, such as
the Fisher and To¨rnqvist indices. But, when applying hours worked to calculate labour
services, this proxy is also calculated across those workers that were only present in either
the comparison period or the base period. The unit value bias should consequently be
deﬁned relative to an index that allows for workers entering and exiting the labour
market, a property which becomes increasingly important when net immigration surges.
In this chapter, we generalise the results from Pa´rniczky (1974) and Diewert and Lippe
(2010) to allow for workers entering and exiting the labour market. To this end, we build
on the theory of Feenstra (1994) who analysed the impact of new product varieties on
import prices when the underlying cost function was of constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) form. This theoretical framework and some generalisations can also be found in
Balk (1999). Using the case of perfect substitutes as a benchmark, we show that the
contribution from entering and exiting workers on the unit value bias depends on the unit
value of entering and exiting workers relative to the unit value of continuing workers.
We also show theoretically that controlling for worker characteristics in the two-step
procedure can exacerbate the unit value bias through entering and exiting eﬀects.
Using Norwegian register data spanning the years 2002 to 2008, we empirically decom-
pose the contributions from workers entering and exiting employment and those that
are continuously employed. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study on how entry and
exit eﬀects impact aggregate wages, labour services and consequently the measure of
productivity. We ﬁnd that the standard practice of using hours worked overestimates
labour services by approximately between 1 to 2 percentage points annually from 2002 to
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2008. Correspondingly, wages and productivity are thus underestimated by between 1 to
2 percentage points annually. About half is attributed to a bias among continuing work-
ers and half is attributed to the eﬀect of workers entering and exiting employment. We
also ﬁnd that controlling for the level of education in the two-step procedure exacerbates
the unit value bias in most years.
The backdrop of this chapter is the hypothesis that mismeasurement can explain parts of
the observed drop in productivity growth in Norway after 2005. On average, productivity
grew 2.7 per cent annually in mainland Norway between 2002 and 2005. Between 2006
and 2008 average annual growth reduced to 0.2 per cent, down by about 2.5 percentage
points. We show that the bias from using hours worked as a measure for labour services,
compared to an index of labour services with desirable properties in line with index
theory, increases on average with 0.7 percentage points annually after 2005. Most of
this bias is due to an increasing number of entering workers with a relatively low wage
rate, a development that must be seen in conjunction with the surge in immigration
after 2005. Mismeasurement of productivity can thus explain about a quarter of the
measured productivity slowdown after 2005.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 derives theoretically the biases of using
unit values and hours worked as indices for wages and labour services, respectively. Sec-
tion 3.3 presents the data used and Section 3.4 outlines the empirical results. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Biases of standard practice
In this section, we show theoretically the biases of using unit values as the wage index
and aggregating hours worked as the quantity index. In particular, these biases will
be decomposed into contributions from continuing, entering and exiting workers. In
the latter part of this section we also show how the two-step procedure of splitting
workers into smaller groups and then using a “proper” index to aggregate can amplify
the problem caused by using hours worked as the quantity index.
We start the analysis by introducing some deﬁnitions and notation. We let labour costs
refer to the nominal value of compensation payed to employees for their work and denote
labour costs for employee i at time t by Vit. Correspondingly, we let Wit and Hit denote
the hourly wage rate and the number of hours worked. Total labour costs at time t are
then given by Vt =
∑
i∈It Vit, where the set It holds all workers with positive working
hours at time t. The index number problem is then to decompose aggregate labour costs
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into respective price and quantity indices, i.e.,(
Vt
Vt−1
)
=
(
Wt
Wt−1
)(
Ht
Ht−1
)
(3.1)
where
(
Wt
Wt−1
)
and
(
Ht
Ht−1
)
represent indices for wages and labour services, respectively.
There are some workers that were employed at both time periods. We refer to those as
continuing workers. Workers entering employment were employed at time t but not at
time t− 1. Workers exiting employment worked at time t− 1 but not at time t. We can
thus decompose aggregate growth in labour costs into contributions from continuing,
entering and exiting workers. Denote the set of continuing workers by I = It−1 ∩ It.12
Further, let the set of workers entering employment at time t be denoted by Ict and
the set of workers exiting employment be denoted by Ict−1. The total set of workers Ir
has then been split into the complement sets I and Icr such that Ir = I ∪ Icr for times
r = t − 1, t. Given these deﬁnitions, the above decomposition can explicitly be written
as( ∑
i∈It Vit∑
i∈It−1 Vit−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TOTAL
=
⎛⎝ ∑i∈I Vit∑
i∈I Vit−1
⎞⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CONTINUING
×
⎛⎝1 +∑
i∈Ict
Vit
/∑
i∈I
Vit
⎞⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ENTERING
×
⎛⎝1 + ∑
i∈Ict−1
Vit−1
/∑
i∈I
Vit−1
⎞⎠−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
EXITING
. (3.2)
The growth contribution from entering workers is thus based on the ratio of entering to
continuing workers at time t. The higher the ratio of entering to continuing workers, the
higher the overall growth in aggregate labour costs. Correspondingly, the contribution
from exiting workers depends on the ratio of exiting workers to continuing workers at
time t − 1. The higher the ratio of exiting to continuing workers, ceteris paribus, the
lower the overall growth in aggregate labour costs.
Given the above classiﬁcation, the index number problem of decomposing aggregate
labour costs into respective indices for wages and labour services can then be further
broken down into separate contributions from continuing, entering and exiting workers.
There are thus separate index number problems for the sets of continuing, entering
and exiting workers. In this chapter, we will mainly focus on decomposing the change
in labour services. Of course, from the product rule in Equation 3.1, any bias in the
measure of labour services across either continuing, entering or exiting workers of say
12It is assumed that the set of continuing workers is non-empty.
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k per cent, is tantamount to a (1/k) per cent bias in the measurement of wages. In
the following we ﬁrst recapitulate the standard practice of using hours worked and then
compare it with our deﬁnition a “true” index with appropriate theoretical properties.
3.2.1 Decomposing hours worked
The standard measure of change in labour services is obtained by dividing the registered
total hours worked at time t by the registered total hours worked at time t− 1( ∑
i∈It Hit∑
i∈It−1 Hit−1
)
, (3.3)
where the index i runs across the sets It and It−1 of workers with positive working hours
at time t and t − 1, respectively. As with the decomposition of total labour costs in
Equation 3.2, the change in hours worked can be decomposed into contributions from
continuing, entering and exiting workers by
(
Ht
Ht−1
)Hours worked
TOTAL
=
⎛⎝ ∑i∈I Hit∑
i∈I Hit−1
⎞⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CONTINUING
×
⎛⎝1 +∑
i∈Ict
Hit
/∑
i∈I
Hit
⎞⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ENTERING
×
⎛⎝1 + ∑
i∈Ict−1
Hit−1
/∑
i∈I
Hit−1
⎞⎠−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
EXITING
. (3.4)
The ﬁrst term after the equality sign shows the change in hours worked among continuing
workers. The second term shows the contribution from entering workers. It is increasing
in the ratio of hours worked of entering workers relative to hours worked of continuing
workers at time t. Correspondingly, the impact from exiting workers is decreasing in the
ratio of hours worked of exiting to continuing workers at time t− 1.
3.2.2 Deﬁning the “true” index
In this section we outline our concept of a “true” index both across continuing workers
and those entering and exiting employment. We start by recapitulating how a wage
index across continuing workers is evaluated and then outline how economic theory can
guide us in deriving an index for labour services that takes into account the entry and
exit of workers.
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Indices calculated across continuing workers are often evaluated on their economic and
axiomatic properties. In the axiomatic approach the index should hold a number of
desirable properties. For example, the Identity axiom states that if wages do not change
between time periods neither should the overall index. The Commensurability axiom
states that the price index should be invariant to changes in the units of measurement.
The Mean value tests require that the overall wage index lies within the minimum and the
maximum wage ratio and that the overall labour services index lies within the minimum
and maximum ratio of hours worked. A thorough discussion of these and many more
axioms can be found in e.g., The Consumer Price Index Manual (ILO et al., 2004b).
It turns out that the Fisher index is the only index number that satisﬁes all of the 20
axiomatic tests that are discussed in what is labelled the ﬁrst axiomatic approach. In
comparison, the To¨rnqvist index passes 11 of these tests (ILO et al., 2004b, p. 297).
In contrast, in what is labelled the second axiomatic approach, where a price index
is deﬁned by two sets of prices and two sets of values (and not quantities), it is the
To¨rnqvist index that passes all of the axiomatic tests.
There are several practical problems with the axiomatic approaches. It is not clear
what criteria to use to weight the diﬀerent tests and how to decide on which of the two
axiomatic approaches to use. Also, any given list of axioms can be viewed as arbitrary.
Moreover, even if an index fails a particular test, it does not necessarily imply that using
this index will result in a large error. Nevertheless, the Fisher and the To¨rnqvist indices
stand out as superior to many of the other indices in the ﬁrst and second axiomatic
approach, respectively. Also, these indices behave similarly as they both use information
about value shares in both comparison periods.
Using an economic criterion as a basis for evaluating price indices dates back to Konu¨s
(1939). The purpose of the economic approach is to yield an index that shows the change
in the wage cost between two time periods for a given level of production. Interestingly,
both the Fisher and the To¨rnqvist index also score high when assessed by economic
criteria. In a seminal article by Diewert (1976) it was shown that these indices are
superlative, i.e., they are consistent with the change in wage costs when the economic
framework is approximated with second-order accuracy. In particular, the To¨rnqvist
index is exact if the cost function in the economic system is of translog form. Since both
the Fisher and the To¨rnqvist indices score high on both axiomatic and economic test
criteria they are considered by many to be superior indices. We choose the To¨rnqvist
index as our concept of the “true” index among continuing workers since it holds desir-
able axiomatic and economic properties, and since it is often used to control for worker
characteristics in the literature.
The impact on wages and labour services from entering and exiting workers will be
Understanding the productivity slowdown 49
Figure 3.2: Impacts on wage costs from workers entering and exiting employment.
analysed using the theory of new goods. We apply the results in Feenstra (1994) where
the focus of analysis was the construction of a price index when the set of goods available
at time t and t − 1 diﬀered. In the following, we ﬁrst illustrate diagrammatically how
entering and exiting workers impact wages. Second, we show explicitly how to construct
an index for labour services which takes into account diﬀerent sets of workers across
time periods and this index is further decomposed into indices for continuing, entering
and exiting workers.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the theory underlying the impact on wage costs from workers
entering and exiting employment. The isocost line AA′ shows the combination of hours
worked between the two workers which yields the same cost for the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm’s
objective is to minimise costs for a given level of production, the problem is to ﬁnd
a point on the isoquant where the associated isocost curve has the minimal vertical
intercept. At time t − 1, it is only worker H2 that is available and employment is at
point A. At time t, however, both workers are available for the ﬁrm. When both workers
are available, the isocost curve with the minimal vertical intercept goes through point
B. The entry of a new worker thus enables the ﬁrm to reduce costs for a given level of
production.
The size of the wage cost reduction depends on the curvature of the isoquant, or how easy
it is to substitute one worker for another. When there is some sort of complementarity
between workers, i.e., a worker’s eﬃciency increases when working with others, the
isoquant line will show a curvature as illustrated in Figure 3.2. However, if workers are
perfect substitutes, the isoquant is a straight line, and there is no longer a wage cost
reduction from having a new worker available for production and there is no bias from
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using conventional wage indices. Importantly, absence of a new worker bias does not
require workers to be homogeneous with identical wages. As illustrated in Figure 3.2,
worker H2 has a higher wage than worker H1, which reﬂects that they have diﬀerent
qualities. That workers may earn diﬀerent wage rates is thus unrelated to the question
of a new worker bias. The new worker bias is a result of the curvature of the isoquant,
not the slope of the isocost function.
Figure 3.2 can also be used to illustrate the wage increase when a worker exits the labour
market. When both workers are available, the isocost curve with the minimal vertical
intercept goes through point B. If worker H1 exits the labour market at time t, the ﬁrm
will only employ worker H2 (point A), which increases the wage cost for a given amount
of production.
Feenstra (1994) showed the intuitive results described above analytically in the case
of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technology, based on the Sato-
Vartia index (Sato, 1976; Vartia, 1976). Consider the CES cost function for one unit of
output
(∑
i∈It biW
1−σ
it
) 1
1−σ where σ is the elasticity of substitution which is assumed to
exceed unity and where bi is a quality parameter for worker i.13 Given that the set of
workers available is ﬁxed between time periods and given by I = It = It−1, the Sato–
Vartia index shows the wage index for a given unit of output. It is a geometric mean of
the individual wage changes across continuing workers
∏
i∈I
(Wit/Wit−1)xit(I) , (3.5)
where the weights xi(I) are constructed from the expenditure shares by the relationships
sit(I) =
Vit∑
i∈I Vit
(3.6)
xit(I) =
(
sit(I)− sit−1(I)
ln sit(I)− ln sit−1(I)
)/∑
i∈I
(
sit(I)− sit−1(I)
ln sit(I)− ln sit−1(I)
)
. (3.7)
Note that the Sato-Vartia wage index in Equation 3.5 does not depend on the unknown
quality parameters bi, i ∈ I. Also, although the Sato-Vartia index is consistent with the
CES function it violates the monotonicity axiom, see Reinsdorf and Dorfman (1999).
The index in Equation 3.5 requires that the same workers are working in both time
periods. Feenstra (1994) generalised this result to also take into account that the set of
workers (goods) might diﬀer between time periods. More speciﬁcally, Feenstra (1994)
showed that when the sets It and It−1 diﬀer, the total wage index is given by the product
of the Sato-Vartia index in Equation 3.5 and two adjustment factors for entering and
13 If σ < 1, all workers are needed to achieve positive production, see Feenstra (1994, p. 159).
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exiting workers
(
Wt
Wt−1
)
=
(∏
i∈I
(Wit/Wit−1)xit(I)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CONTINUING
×
(
λ
1
σ−1
t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ENTERING
×
(
λ
− 1
σ−1
t−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
EXITING
. (3.8)
Henceforth, the index in Equation 3.5 will be referred to as the Sato-Vartia-Feenstra
index. λr is the fraction of labour costs of the workers available at both time periods,
i ∈ I, relative to labour costs aggregated across the entire set of workers i ∈ Ir at time
r, i.e.,
λr =
∑
i∈I Vir∑
i∈Ir Vir
, for r = t− 1, t. (3.9)
λ
1
σ−1
t measures the impact from new or entering workers. For example, the higher the
share of new workers, the smaller the value of λt and the lower the value of the Sato-
Vartia-Feenstra wage index. Note that the introduction of new workers cannot lead
to a higher wage index. The impact from exiting workers is opposite. If the share of
workers exiting employment in t− 1 is large, λt−1 becomes small which raises the wage
index. The extent to which new workers lower the wage index, and the extent to which
exiting workers increase the wage index, depends on the elasticity of substitution σ. As
illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 3.2, when workers are perfect substitutes, the
elasticity of substitution goes towards inﬁnity (σ → ∞), the isoquant becomes linear
and the impact from new workers λ
1
σ−1
t goes to unity. Consequently, new workers will
not reduce the wage index when workers are perfect substitutes. Correspondingly, when
workers are perfect substitutes, the impact from exiting workers will not increase the
wage index as λ
− 1
σ−1
t−1 goes towards unity.
We will use the case of perfect substitutes as the main alternative index from which we
evaluate standard practice.14 We will refer to this index as the “true” index. When
workers are perfect substitutes it follows that any change in labour costs from entering
or exiting workers is due to a change in labour services only and there is thus no impact
from wage changes. The “true” index for labour services can therefore be decomposed by
substituting the impact from entering and exiting workers on labour costs in Equation 3.2
14In the empirical section we conduct robustness checks by allowing for diﬀerent elasticities of substi-
tution.
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as15
(
Ht
Ht−1
)True
TOTAL
=
(
Ht
Ht−1
)To¨rnqvist
CONTINUING
×
⎛⎝1 +∑
i∈Ict
Vit
/∑
i∈I
Vit
⎞⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ENTERING
×
⎛⎝1 + ∑
i∈Ict−1
Vit−1
/∑
i∈I
Vit−1
⎞⎠−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
EXITING
. (3.10)
Note that we deﬁned the index across continuing workers by the To¨rnqvist and not the
Sato-Vartia index. This is due to the desirable properties of the To¨rnqvist index and
since this index is often applied in the literature using the two-step procedure to control
for worker characteristics. Note also that the case of perfect substitutes is consistent
with the procedure of constructing elementary aggregates when calculating indices. For
example, in the consumer price index an elementary aggregate is a group of relatively
homogenous products. An elementary aggregate in the calculation of labour services
would correspondingly consist of workers that are as similar as possible. Ideally, an
elementary aggregate is deﬁned by an elasticity of substitution equal to inﬁnity within
each group. Since the aggregate entering and exiting eﬀects are a weighted average of the
entering and exiting eﬀects in each elementary aggregate, and since the To¨rnqvist index
is approximately consistent in aggregation (Diewert, 1978), the index in Equation 3.10
approximates an index based on elementary aggregates. Equation 3.10 is therefore our
benchmark “true” index from which the standard practice of using hours worked will be
evaluated. While the bias from using hours worked among continuing workers and an
index for labour services based on an acceptable index formula is well known from e.g.,
the results in Pa´rniczky (1974) and Diewert and Lippe (2010), the biases from entering
and exiting workers will be further analysed. To this we now proceed.
3.2.3 Decomposing the biases of entering and exiting workers
In the previous two sections, the impact from entering and exiting workers has been
established both for the change in hours worked in Equation 3.4 and for the theoretical
index Equation 3.10. In this section we compare these indices and explicitly state the
bias from using hours worked.
We deﬁne the total bias by the ratio of the true index to hours worked. As with the
indices for wages and labour services, the total bias can then be decomposed into the
15The “True” index for labour services follows from the product rule by dividing Equation 3.2 with
Equation 3.8 using the To¨rnqvist quantity index and letting σ →∞.
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biases of continuing, entering and exiting workers
TOTAL BIAS = CONTINUING BIAS × ENTERING BIAS × EXITING BIAS.
The continuing bias has been extensively analysed in the literature and it measures
compositional eﬀects among continuing workers, see e.g., Diewert and Lippe (2010). The
problem arises because hours worked from labour of diﬀerent types are added together in
Equation 3.3. For example, consider the case when the hourly wage rate of all persons is
constant from one period to the next and assume further that there is a shift in demand
towards lower payed labour. Since wage rates are constant, an aggregate wage index
which satisﬁes the identity test, such as the Sato-Vartia index in Equation 3.5 or the
To¨rnqvist index, equals unity. However, since it was assumed that there was a shift in
demand towards lower paid labour, the “average” unit value has decreased, resulting in
a lower unit value wage index. The product mix towards lower paid labour thus causes
a downward bias in the measurement of labour services: the CONTINUING BIAS is
less than unity. In other words, the unit value wage index fails the identity test, i.e., if
the wage of every person is identical during the two periods, then the wage index should
equal unity. The unit value index also fails the axiomatic test of homogeneity (unless
relative quantities do not change), i.e., if each price in the base period increases by a
factor then the index should also increase by the same factor, a property regarded to
be fundamental by most index number theorists, see ILO et al. (2009, Section 17.37).
Also, it fails the mean value tests and it is not invariant to changes in the units of
measurement (ILO et al., 2009, Sections 2.22 and 2.25).
The main focus of this chapter is on the two last biases, the entering bias and the
exiting bias. Dividing the last two terms in Equation 3.10 with the last two terms in
Equation 3.4 yields
ENTERING BIAS =
(
1 +
∑
i∈Ict Vit
/∑
i∈I Vit
1 +
∑
i∈Ict Hit
/∑
i∈I Hit
)
, (3.11)
EXITING BIAS =
(
1 +
∑
i∈Ict−1 Vit−1
/∑
i∈I Vit−1
1 +
∑
i∈Ict−1 Hit−1
/∑
i∈I Hit−1
)−1
. (3.12)
Both of these biases relate to the relative value of labour costs to hours worked of either
entering to continuing or exiting to continuing workers. In particular, if the unit value
wage of entering workers are lower than the unit value wage of continuing workers, the
entering bias is lower than unity, and using hours worked will overestimate the level
of labour services. The reason is that the index using hours worked is based on each
hour being equally important for the development of the index. However, if the unit
value wage of entering workers is lower than the unit value wage of continuing workers,
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there are more “low productive” workers entering employment, and these hours should
from theory be valued by their labour cost contribution, not the contribution from the
amount of hours worked. Correspondingly, if the unit value wage of exiting workers is
lower than the unit value wage of continuing workers, the exiting bias is higher than
unity and using hours worked will underestimate the level of labour services.
These relationships can be seen more clearly by deﬁning the unit value wage u by the
aggregate labour costs relative to the number of hours worked, i.e., ut(Z) =
∑
i∈Z Vit
/∑
i∈Z Hit in any given set Z. The biases above can then be approximated by
16
ENTERING BIAS ≈
(
ut(I
c
t )
ut(I)
)ωt
, (3.13)
EXITING BIAS ≈
(
ut−1(Ict−1)
ut−1(I)
)−ωt−1
. (3.14)
where the weight ω is deﬁned as the ratio of hours worked of entering or exiting workers
to continuing workers, respectively, i.e., ωr =
(∑
i∈Icr Hir∑
i∈I Hir
)
for r = t− 1, t. For example,
consider the case when the unit value of new workers is 80 per cent the unit value
of continuing workers, and the hours worked by entering workers is 5 per cent the
hours worked of continuing workers. Using hours worked as an index for labour services
will then lead to an overvaluation of labour services by approximately 1 percentage
points, i.e., ENTERING BIAS=0.80.05 = 0.99. In contrast, if the unit value of exiting
workers is 80 per cent the unit value of continuing workers, and the hours worked by
exiting workers is 5 per cent the hours worked of continuing workers, this will lead to an
undervaluation of labour services by approximately 1 percentage point, i.e., EXITING
BIAS=0.8−0.05 = 1.01.
3.2.4 The two-step procedure – controlling for worker characteristics
The literature that tries to control for the “quality” of labour divides the labour force
into diﬀerent groups deﬁned by characteristics such as education, age, sex etc and then
in a second step, applies a proper index, such as the To¨rnqvist index, to aggregate these
groups. In this section we analyse the theoretical rationale for this two-step procedure
and show that it may amplify the problems caused using hours worked as an index for
labour services.
We divide the workforce into two complement sets consisting of those that are skilled
(S) and those that are unskilled (U) so that It = St ∪ Ut. We also maintain the notation
used so far, so e.g., Sct represents the set of skilled workers entering the workforce at time
16See the appendix, Section B.1.
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t, Sct−1 represents the set of skilled exiting the workforce at time t− 1 and S represents
the set of skilled workers that are continuing. It follows that the aggregate number of
hours worked by for example skilled workers can be written as
∑
i∈St Hit. The To¨rnqvist
index across skilled and unskilled labour can then be written as
(
Ht
Ht−1
)Two-step
TOTAL
=
( ∑
i∈St Hit∑
i∈St−1 Hit−1
)υt(St,It)( ∑
i∈Ut Hit∑
i∈Ut−1 Hit−1
)(1−υ(It,t))
, (3.15)
where υt(St, It) =
∑
i∈St Vit/
∑
i∈It Vit is the labour cost share of high skilled and
where the overline is the moving average operator between time t − 1 and t, i.e.,
υt(St, It) = 1/2 [υt(St, It) + υt−1(St−1, It−1)]. This expression can be compared to the
index in Equation 3.4. The total bias between these indices can also be split into three
components: the bias of continuing workers, the bias of entering workers and the bias
of exiting workers. The bias of continuing workers from the two-step procedure was
analysed in e.g., Diewert and Lippe (2010). They found that the bias decreases with
increased disaggregation if there are compositional eﬀects between the groups that con-
tribute most to the overall bias. The bias of entering and exiting workers between the
group based index and hours worked diﬀers from the entering and exiting bias based on
the theoretical index. As an approximation, the two-step entering bias, can be written17
TWO-STEP ENTERING BIAS ≈ e
(
υt(St,It)−ψt(S,I)
)[(∑
i∈Sct
Hit
∑
i∈S Hit
)
−
(∑
i∈Uct
Hit
∑
i∈U Hit
)]
,
(3.16)
where the weight ψt(S, I) is the high skilled hours worked share of continuing workers
evaluated at time t, i.e. ψt(S, I) =
(∑
i∈S Hit∑
i∈I Hit
)
. The bias is larger than unity if both
brackets are positive (or if both are negative). The ﬁrst bracket is positive if high skilled
workers are paid more than low skilled workers and the high skilled hours worked share
of continuing workers is the same as high skilled hours worked share for all workers, i.e.,
if ψt(S, I) ≈ ψt(St, It). The second bracket is positive if skilled entry is proportionally
larger than unskilled entry. To see this, let the weight θt =
(∑
i∈S Hit∑
i∈U Hit
)
denote the ratio
of skilled to unskilled man-hours across continuing workers at time t. The last bracket
will then be positive if skilled entry exceeds weighted unskilled entry, i.e.,
∑
i∈Sct Hit >
θt
∑
i∈Uct Hit. For example, if there are twice as many skilled man-hours compared
with unskilled man-hours among continuing workers (θt = 2) and there are 1 million
unskilled man-hours entering the labour market, there must be more than 2 million
skilled man-hours entries for the two-step entering bias to be larger than unity.
17See the appendix, Section B.2.
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Correspondingly, the two-step exiting bias can be approximated by17
TWO-STEP EXITING BIAS ≈ e
(
υt(St,It)−ψt(S,I)
)[(∑
i∈Uct−1
Hit
∑
i∈U Hit
)
−
(∑
i∈Sct−1
Hit
∑
i∈S Hit
)]
.
(3.17)
The bias is larger than unity if both brackets are positive (or if both are negative). The
ﬁrst bracket is positive if skilled workers are paid more than unskilled workers and the
skilled hours worked share of continuing workers are the same as skilled hours worked
share for all workers, i.e., if ψt(S, I) ≈ ψt(St, It). The second bracket is positive if
unskilled exit is proportionally larger than skilled exit. In particular, the last bracket
is positive if θt−1
∑
i∈Uct−1 Hit >
∑
i∈Sct−1 Hit, where the weight θt−1 =
(∑
i∈S Hit−1∑
i∈U Hit−1
)
denotes the man-hour ratio of skilled to unskilled continuing workers at time t. For
example, if there are twice as many skilled man-hours compared to unskilled man-hours
among continuing workers (θt−1 = 2) and there are 1 million unskilled man-hours exiting
the labour market, there must be less than 2 million skilled man-hours exiting the labour
market for the bias to be greater than unity.
The purpose of splitting the workforce into groups and then aggregating using for ex-
ample a To¨rnqvist index is to reduce the bias from using hours worked. It is thus of
particular interest to analyse whether the two-step procedure actually reduces the over-
all bias, e.g., to analyse when the theoretical entering and exiting biases in Equation 3.13
and Equation 3.14 will be below unity and at the same time, the group biases in Equa-
tion 3.16 and Equation 3.17 will be above unity. Explicitly, the two-step procedure will
amplify the problem caused by using hours worked if there are a large number of newly
educated skilled workers entering the labour force with a relatively low wage. In this
case, the relatively low wage of the newly educated workers leads to an entering bias
lower than unity in Equation 3.13. In contrast, since skilled workers overall have a higher
wage than unskilled, the two-step entering bias is larger than unity in Equation 3.16.
The two-step procedure will also worsen the problem when there are a large number of
unskilled workers exiting the labour market with a relatively high wage. In this case,
the relatively high wage of the unskilled leads to the exiting bias in Equation 3.14 being
lower than unity. In contrast, since unskilled workers earn less than skilled, the two-step
exiting bias in Equation 3.17 will be above unity. These examples illustrate that there
can be situations where the 2-step procedure yields entering and/or exiting eﬀects that
are further away from the true indices than the standard practice of using hours worked.
Importantly, the two-step procedure can also exacerbate the overall bias even though the
individual entering or exiting biases are reduced. This occurs when there are asymmetric
reductions in biases from exiting and entering workers. To illustrate, consider the case
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when the overall bias is lower than unity due to for example a large entry of workers with
relatively low wages. Also, let the bias from exiting workers be larger than unity due to a
lower wage among workers exiting employment. If skilled entry is proportionally equal to
unskilled entry, the two-step entry bias in Equation 3.16 will be unity. But, if there is a
large number of unskilled workers that exit employment with relatively low wages, both
the exiting bias and the two-step exiting bias are above unity. Although the two-step
procedure has reduced the exiting bias, since the exiting bias is above unity while the
overall bias is below unity, a reduction of the exiting bias exacerbates the overall bias.
Whether the two-step procedure actually worsens the problem of using hours worked
as a quantity index, also depends on the two-step bias of continuing workers. In the
empirical section, we decompose these eﬀects separately.
3.3 Data
Our dataset holds information about hours worked and labour costs for all employed
persons in Norway between 2002 and 2008. It is based on information from the Reg-
ister of Employers and Employees and the Pay Statements Register. Labour costs are
measured by wage income and include wages and other remunerations. It also includes
income earned at sea and company beneﬁts such as a car or a phone. Wage per hour
are constructed as annual labour costs divided by contractual annual working hours.
We have trimmed the data by removing workers with a registered hourly wage above
NOK 4 000 and below NOK 40. Workers registered with more than 4 000 working
hours a year were also removed. As a robustness check, we changed cut-oﬀ points to
workers earning more than NOK 5 000 and less than NOK 30, and workers with more
than 5 000 working hours. This way of treating the data was also compared with not
trimming the data. In total, our benchmark trimmed dataset holds 2.9 million annual
observations, which amounts to 98 per cent of the total number of observations. The
results presented below are not sensitive to the level of trimming. In the appendix,
Section B.3, we compare our measure of contractual hours with the measure of actual
hours worked in the National Accounts. Further details about the register-based micro
data and how they compare to data from e.g., the Labour Force Survey can be found in
Villund (2009) and Aukrust et al. (2010). Information about worker’s level of education
is taken from the Population’s level of education statistics.18 There are ten educational
levels based on the revised Norwegian Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (NUS2000):
0–No education and preschool education, 1–Primary education, 2–Lower secondary ed-
ucation, 3–Upper secondary (basic), 4–Upper secondary (ﬁnal year), 5–Post-secondary
18See https://www.ssb.no/en/utdanning/statistikker/utniv
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Figure 3.3: Wages and hours worked. The left panel shows the ratio of hours worked and
the ratio of wage per hour between 2007 and 2006. The right panel shows the ratio of hours
worked between 2007 and 2006 and wage per hour in 2007. Source: Statistics Norway, authors’
calculations.
non-tertiary education, 6–First stage of tertiary education (undergraduate level), 7–First
stage of tertiary education (graduate level), 8–Second stage of tertiary education, grad-
uate level, 9–Unspeciﬁed. We deﬁne high skilled as workers with a NUS2000 level from
4–8, i.e., from Upper secondary ﬁnal year to the second stage of tertiary education. Low
skilled is thus deﬁned as workers with no education to basic upper secondary education,
and it also covers workers with an unspeciﬁed level of education. About 1.5 per cent
of the workers are registered with an unspeciﬁed level of education. Most of these are
immigrants.
Figure 3.3 shows descriptive evidence for wages and hours worked. The left panel shows
the ratio of hours worked and the ratio of wage per hour between 2007 and 2006. There
is a clear negative correlation between growth in hours worked and growth in wages.
The right panel shows the ratio of hours worked between 2007 and 2006 and wage
per hour in 2007. There is also a clear negative correlation between growth in hours
worked and the wage level. From theory we know that a negative correlation between
wage changes and changes in hours worked yields a positive bias between the Laspeyres
index and the Paasche index, see e.g., ILO et al. (2004a, p. 285). We also know that a
negative correlation between the wage level and changes in hours worked yields a positive
bias between the overall change hours worked and for example the To¨rnqvist or Fisher
index, see e.g., Diewert and Lippe (2010). The extent to which the negative correlations
shown in Figure 3.3 impact the indices for labour services will be further analysed in
the empirical section.
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3.4 Empirical results
We now turn to our empirical ﬁndings based on the theoretical framework in Section 3.2.
We start by decomposing labour costs into wage changes and labour services changes
using the standard practice. Second, we take a closer look how indices such as Laspeyres,
Paasche, To¨rnqvist and Fisher compare with the standard practice when calculated
across continuing workers. Third, based on the theory of entering and exiting workers,
we compare the standard practice with our preferred “true” index and decompose the
contributions from continuing, entering and exiting workers. Forth, we analyse how
controlling for the level of education using the two-step procedure performs empirically.
Fifth, we conduct a robustness analysis allowing for diﬀerent elasticities of substitution
in our deﬁnition of the “true” index. Lastly, we show how mismeasurement of labour
services using the standard practice has impacted the development of productivity in
Norway.
3.4.1 Decomposing labour costs using the standard practice
In Table 3.1 we show the results of decomposing the logarithmic change in labour costs
into its respective price and quantity components applying the unit value index. Labour
services are thus measured by hours worked, see Equation 3.4. Labour costs growth was
temporarily reduced to 3.29 per cent in 2003 before increasing to 10.15 per cent in 2008.
The contribution from continuing, entering and exiting workers changed during this time
period. From 2002 to 2005 the contribution from continuing workers was higher than the
total ﬁgure, indicating that the impact from exiting workers outweighed the impact from
entering workers. In tandem with a booming economy and an increase in immigration
after 2005, the impact from entering workers increased and the reduction in wage costs
from exiting workers was reduced. Nevertheless, the large increase in total labour costs
was due to an increase in labour costs among continuing workers. Growth in labour costs
is decomposed into wage growth and growth in labour services. From 2002 to 2005 most
of the labour cost growth was attributed to wage growth. After 2005, a larger portion
of the total labour cost growth is due to labour services growth, measured by hours
worked. Workers entering the workforce reduced total wages by between 1.3 and 1.8
percentage points. In contrast, exiting workers contributed to an increase in total wages
between 0.8 and 1.0 percentage points. As a result, the impact from entering workers
is larger than from exiting workers. The increased negative impact on unit values from
entering workers after 2005 may reﬂect the relatively low wages paid to immigrants in
conjunction with the large increase in immigration.
Understanding the productivity slowdown 60
T
a
b
l
e
3
.1
:
D
ec
om
po
si
ng
la
bo
ur
co
st
s
us
in
g
un
it
va
lu
es
L
ab
ou
r
co
st
s
W
ag
es
(U
ni
t
va
lu
es
)
L
ab
ou
r
se
rv
ic
es
(H
ou
rs
w
or
ke
d)
T
ot
al
C
on
ti
nu
in
g
E
nt
er
in
g
E
xi
ti
ng
T
ot
al
C
on
ti
nu
in
g
E
nt
er
in
g
E
xi
ti
ng
T
ot
al
C
on
ti
nu
in
g
E
nt
er
in
g
E
xi
ti
ng
20
02
5.
70
6.
30
5.
33
−5
.9
2
4.
52
5.
11
−1
.6
0
1.
01
1.
18
1.
19
6.
93
−6
.9
3
20
03
3.
29
4.
40
5.
20
−6
.3
1
3.
68
4.
25
−1
.4
3
0.
86
−0
.3
9
0.
15
6.
63
−7
.1
7
20
04
3.
92
4.
09
4.
78
−4
.9
5
2.
87
3.
20
−1
.3
3
1.
00
1.
05
0.
89
6.
11
−5
.9
5
20
05
4.
68
5.
24
4.
32
−4
.8
8
4.
64
5.
09
−1
.4
9
1.
03
0.
04
0.
14
5.
81
−5
.9
1
20
06
8.
20
7.
53
5.
42
−4
.7
6
4.
85
5.
81
−1
.7
8
0.
81
3.
35
1.
72
7.
20
−5
.5
7
20
07
9.
34
8.
91
5.
22
−4
.7
9
5.
85
6.
84
−1
.7
9
0.
80
3.
49
2.
07
7.
01
−5
.5
9
20
08
10
.1
5
8.
91
5.
66
−4
.4
3
5.
56
6.
51
−1
.7
6
0.
81
4.
59
2.
40
7.
43
−5
. 2
3
T
he
pr
od
uc
t
ru
le
of
in
di
ce
s
(V
al
ue
in
de
x
=
P
ri
ce
in
de
x
×
Q
ua
nt
it
y
in
de
x)
is
de
co
m
po
se
d
us
in
g
un
it
va
lu
es
as
th
e
pr
ic
e
in
de
x
in
to
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
s
fr
om
co
nt
in
ui
ng
,e
nt
er
in
g
an
d
ex
it
in
g
w
or
ke
rs
.
M
ea
su
re
d
as
th
e
lo
ga
ri
th
m
ic
di
ﬀe
re
nc
e
in
pe
r
ce
nt
.
So
ur
ce
:
St
at
is
ti
cs
N
or
w
ay
,a
ut
ho
rs
’c
al
cu
la
ti
on
s.
Understanding the productivity slowdown 61
Table 3.2: Labour services across continuing workers. Growth rates.
Hours worked To¨rnqvist Ia To¨rnqvist IIb Fisher Laspeyres Paasche
2002 1.19 0.65 0.57 0.29 4.46 −3.87
2003 0.15 −0.32 −0.31 −0.75 3.10 −4.59
2004 0.89 0.24 0.20 −0.13 3.50 −3.75
2005 0.14 −0.50 −0.57 −0.96 2.43 −4.35
2006 1.72 1.10 0.91 0.77 4.19 −2.65
2007 2.07 1.00 0.81 0.56 3.97 −2.84
2008 2.40 1.62 1.47 1.29 4.75 −2.18
a Measured directly using the To¨rnqvist quantity index:
∏
(Hit/Hit−1)
1/2(sit+sit−1).
b Measured indirectly from the To¨rnqvist price (wage) index by applying the product
rule: (
∑
Vit/
∑
Vit−1)
/∏
(Wit/Wit−1)
1/2(sit+sit−1).
Measured as the logarithmic diﬀerence in per cent. Source: Statistics Norway, authors’
calculations.
3.4.2 Comparing standard practice with other classical indices
Table 3.2 shows the logarithmic change of diﬀerent indices for labour services across con-
tinuing workers only. There are large diﬀerences across the measures of labour services.
To¨rnqvist I is based on a To¨rnqvist quantity index. Overall, the annual growth is lower
than for hours worked, approximately 0.5 – 1 percentage points. Correspondingly, wage
growth is overvalued by 0.5 – 1 percentage points. Note that the increase in labour ser-
vices from 2005 to 2008 is about at the same level as for hours worked. Interestingly, for
some years there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the To¨rnqvist quantity index and the
quantity index measured indirectly using a To¨rnqvist wage index and the product rule,
referred to as To¨rnqvist II. This discrepancy is increasing somewhat in the years after
2005. Also, the Fisher index shows lower growth than the other indices. As illustrated
by Dumagan (2002), this may reﬂect large variations in wage shares and hours worked
across time. These patterns should also be seen in conjunction with the discrepancy
between the Laspeyres and the Paasche indices in Table 3.2. A positive bias between
the Laspeyres index and the Paasche index occurs when there is a negative correlation
between price changes and volume changes, see e.g., ILO et al. (2004a, p. 285). There
has thus been a large shift towards using labour that has become cheaper. In contrast,
the bias between hours worked (unit value index) and for example the Fisher index is
driven by a correlation between the wage level and volume changes. Consequently, Ta-
ble 3.2 also shows that there has been a large increase in employment among workers
with low wage levels.
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3.4.3 Comparing standard practice with the true index
Table 3.3 compares the standard practice using hours worked as a measure for labour
services with the true index calculated both across continuing, entering and exiting
workers, as deﬁned in Equation 3.4 and Equation 3.10. As mentioned, the To¨rnqvist
quantity index is chosen as the preferred alternative index since this index is often used
in the literature to control for compositional eﬀects and it holds desirable axiomatic and
theoretical properties. The table shows the biases between the standard practice and
the true index, in particular the entering and exiting biases as deﬁned in Equation 3.11
and Equation 3.12. The total bias in hours worked ranges from -1 to -2 percentage
points annually. The bias of the wage index will thus correspondingly range from 1 to 2
percentage points annually. About half of this bias is attributed to compositional eﬀects
among continuing workers and half of this bias is attributed to the impact from entering
and exiting workers. Note that the bias from entering workers ranges from -1.3 to -1.8
percentage points, but is somewhat oﬀset by the bias from exiting workers which ranges
from 0.8 to 1.0 percentage points. Interestingly, the overall bias increases (in absolute
value) after 2005, which is the period when productivity growth in Norway decreased.
3.4.4 The two-step procedure – controlling for the level of education
Table 3.4 compares the standard practice for hours worked with the To¨rnqvist index
across hours worked in two educational groups, as the approximations in Equation 3.16
and Equation 3.17 illustrates. In contrast to the negative bias between the “true” index
and hours worked, the total bias when aggregating across two educational groups is
positive from 2002 to 2006. About a third of this bias is due to continuing workers.
From the results in (Diewert and Lippe, 2010, p. 704), we know that this is caused by
compositional eﬀects within groups being dominant. Interestingly, most of the total bias
is a result of exiting workers. The reason is, however, not that the bias for exiting workers
has the “wrong” sign with respect to the true index. It is rather caused by the biases
from entering and exiting workers having opposite signs and it is mostly the exiting eﬀect
which is controlled for in the two-step procedure. As the overall bias is negative and
the exiting bias in Table 3.3 is positive, the two-step procedure exacerbates the overall
bias since it is the exiting bias that is mostly reduced. Towards the end of the sample
period, the total bias changes from being positive to being negative, a change mainly
caused by an increased negative bias among entering workers. From Equation 3.16 this
is caused by the weighted number of unskilled entries into the labour market exceeding
the number of skilled entries, which should be viewed in light of the large increase in
immigration during this time period.
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Figure 3.4: Labour services. Index: 2001=1. Compares the index for hours worked with
theoretical indices based on diﬀerent values of the elasticity of substitution σ. Our deﬁnition
of a “true” index is based on workers being perfect substitutes, which is obtained when the
elasticity of substitution is set to inﬁnity.
3.4.5 Robustness with respect to the elasticity of substitution
Our deﬁnition of the “true” index is based on the assumption of workers being perfect
substitutes, i.e., the elasticity of substitution σ is set to inﬁnity. Although the assump-
tion allows for heterogenous workers earning diﬀerent wages, it may be restrictive, and
hence inﬂuence the overall index. In this section, we analyse how sensitive the aggregate
index is to diﬀerent assumptions about the elasticity of substitution. To this end, we
consider the theoretical index for any value of the elasticity of substitution:19
(
Ht
Ht−1
)σ
TOTAL
=
(
Ht
Ht−1
)To¨rnqvist
CONTINUING
×
⎛⎝1 +∑
i∈Ict
Vit
/∑
i∈I
Vit
⎞⎠(λ− 1σ−1t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ENTERING
×
⎛⎝1 + ∑
i∈Ict−1
Vit−1
/∑
i∈I
Vit−1
⎞⎠−1(λ 1σ−1t−1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
EXITING
,
where λr for r = t, t − 1, deﬁned in Equation 3.9, is the fraction of expenditure on the
workers available at both time periods, i ∈ I, relative to the expenditure on the entire
set of workers i ∈ Ir at time r. Since λr is less than unity, it follows that a lower value
of the elasticity of substitution increases the contribution from entering workers and
decreases the contribution from exiting workers. In Figure 3.4, we compare the index
for hours worked with the theoretical index based on diﬀerent values of the elasticity
19The theoretical index follows from the product rule by dividing Equation 3.2 with Equation 3.8
using the To¨rnqvist quantity index.
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Figure 3.5: Labour productivity. Mainland Norway. Measured as the index for value added
relative to the index for labour services, using Equation 3.10 and Equation 3.4. 2001=1.
of substitution. Interestingly, the “true” index as we deﬁne it, with an elasticity of
substitution equal to inﬁnity, represents a conservative measure throughout the sample
period relative to indices based on lower values of σ. This is driven by the large eﬀect
from exiting workers between 2001 and 2005. In tandem with increased immigration
after 2005, the contribution from entering workers yields a larger increase in indices
with a lower σ. In 2008, all of the theoretical indices are approximately 3.6 per cent
higher than the value in 2001. In contrast, the index for hours worked is 14.2 per cent
higher in 2008 than the value in 2001. The overvaluation from using hours worked as an
index for labour services is thus robust to diﬀerent values of the elasticity of substitution.
3.4.6 Implications for productivity measurement
Figure 3.5 shows how mismeasured labour services have impacted the measured level
of productivity in Mainland Norway. The series ”Hours worked” represents the oﬃcial
index for labour productivity in Mainland Norway from Statistics Norway, normalised
to unity in 2001. The series ”True index” represents an adjusted series where the adjust-
ment is the bias deﬁned by the diﬀerence between Equation 3.10 and Equation 3.4. In
contrast to what oﬃcial ﬁgures shows, productivity did not drop in 2008 but increased
modestly by 0.3 percent. Compared with the period between 2001 and 2005, average
labour productivity growth as measured by oﬃcial statistics was reduced by 2.5 per-
centage points in the period after 2005. Figure 3.5 shows that the bias increases in the
same time period. The average total bias between 2002 and 2005 was 1.1 percentage
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points and it changed to 1.8 percentage points on average from 2006 to 2008, up by
0.7 percentage points. Mismeasurement can therefore explain about a quarter of the
measured drop in productivity growth after 2005.
3.5 Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyse the measured slowdown in productivity
growth in Norway after 2005. To that end, we have computed indices for labour services
with good theoretical properties that take into account the eﬀects from workers entering
and exiting the workforce. We have shown theoretically the poor properties of the
standard practice of using hours worked as and index for labour services. Also, we have
analysed theoretically the two-step procedure often used in the literature to counteract
the weaknesses with unit values and hours worked. In particular, we have shown that
the two-step procedure can exacerbate the unit value bias through entering and exiting
eﬀects if there is asymmetry in the reduction of entering and exiting biases.
The theoretical results have been empirically illustrated in the case of Norway between
2002 and 2008 using register data. We found that using hours worked overestimated
growth in labour services by approximately between 1 to 2 percentage points annually.
Wages have been correspondingly underestimated. About half of this was attributed to
a bias among continuing workers and half was attributed to the eﬀect of workers entering
and exiting employment. In addition, we found that the two-step procedure exacerbated
the unit value bias in the ﬁrst half of the sample when controlling for workers’ level of
education. Importantly, our ﬁndings show that an increasing overestimation of labour
services can account for about a quarter of the measured productivity slowdown after
2005.
Chapter 4
The import price index with
trade barriers: theory and
evidence
Abstract: The standard economic import price index hinges on the assumption of free trade. Applying
it to situations with barriers to trade yields biased results compared to a true import price index. To
circumvent this problem it is common in the literature to use average prices as an aggregator function.
However, average prices may still underestimate the economic eﬀects from trade liberalisation. In this
chapter, I generalise the economic import price index to allow for barriers to trade in the form of quantity
constraints. To illustrate the theoretical framework, I use the case of clothing imports to Norway and
show that a unit value index, which is believed to be appropriate for the aggregation of homogenous
items, overestimates the annual inﬂation rate by 0.5 percentage points.
4.1 Introduction
As pointed out by Boskin et al. (1998, p. 3): “Accurately measuring prices and their
rate of change, inﬂation, is central to almost every economic issue. There is virtually no
other issue that is so endemic to every ﬁeld of economics”. Import prices are of particular
importance. Recently, import prices have been used to increase our understanding on a
wide variety of areas, such as real income growth (Diewert, 2014), inequality (Bekkers
et al., 2012), exchange rate pass-through (Brun-Aguerre et al., 2012) and productiv-
ity growth (Feenstra et al., 2013b). These examples illustrates the need to accurately
measure import prices.
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Import prices can, however, be wrongly measured when trade barriers are present. The
standard economic import price index is based on economic theory in which an estab-
lishment is assumed to minimise the expenditure necessary to reach a particular level
of production for a given set of prices. Within this framework, it is assumed that the
establishment is free to choose between all goods – there are no barriers to trade. If the
assumption is true, the price level of a particular good is irrelevant for the development
of the price index. However, if goods are not traded freely, which is often the case in
practice, the price level becomes important for the ﬁnal index number. Hence, neglecting
the price level can lead to serious mismeasurement of import prices.
The reduction of implicit and explicit barriers to trade has been commonplace in the
last decades. For example, explicit restrictions on imports have been widely present in
textile and garment trade when it was governed by the Multi-Fibre Arrangement from
1974 to 2004. Also, there are still large barriers to trade in agriculture and the question
of further trade liberalisation remains a controversial issue. Recently, the Transatlantic
Free Trade Agreement is a proposed agreement between the European Union and the
United States with the purpose of liberalising trade by reducing regulatory barriers and
tariﬀs. A framework that can account for the impact of trade liberalisation on the cost
of imports is thus of great relevance.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The ﬁrst aim is to generalise the standard
economic import price framework to allow for barriers to trade in the case of homogenous
products. The second aim is to establish under what conditions the index serves as a
conservative measure to the true index also in the case of non-homogenous goods. To
illustrate the theoretical framework, I use the case of clothing imports to Norway using
data between 1988 and 2012. During most of this time period, the price of clothing
from China was between 40–80 per cent lower than the price of clothing from other
countries. Due to a gradual removal of trade barriers, the cost share of imports from
China increased from about 3 to about 50 per cent over the sample period. The empirical
example illustrates that a unit value index, which is believed to be appropriate for
the aggregation of homogenous items, overestimates the annual inﬂation rate by 0.5
percentage points.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, I ﬁrst motivate the need
for a framework that allows for barriers to trade. Second, I introduce the import price
framework, and then generalise it to allow for barriers to trade. In Section 4.3, I deﬁne
the bias of the standard import price index when goods are homogenous and establish
under what conditions it serves as a conservative measure to the true index also in the
case of non-homogenous goods. In Section 4.4, I illustrate the economic framework with
an empirical example using data on imports of clothing to Norway between 1988 and
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2012. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Measuring import prices
To form a point of reference from which this literature has evolved it is instructive to
illustrate how an ordinary index can yield biased results when applied to situations
characterised by trade liberalisation. Consider the following paradox: An establishment
imports shirts of identical quality from country L and H. Let pLt and pHt denote the
price level in country L and H at time t, respectively. It is assumed that country L
is a low cost country while country H is a high cost country (pLt < pHt). Moreover,
inﬂation in country L is assumed somewhat higher than inﬂation in country H, i.e.,
measured in the logarithmic diﬀerence Δ ln pLt > Δln pHt. Due to trade barriers such
as quantity constraints, the establishment cannot import as many shirts from country
L as preferable. Gradually, trade barriers are reduced, and more low cost shirts are
imported from country L. This new availability of low cost shirts reduces the average
price the establishment has to pay for shirts. The cost of imports has been reduced. But a
standard import price index would increase. To see this, consider the aggregate inﬂation
rate from a To¨rnqvist price index. When there is free trade, this index approximates
the true cost of imports with second order accuracy (Theil, 1967; Diewert, 1976). The
aggregate inﬂation rate (Δ ln pt) is given as a weighted average of the inﬂation rates in
country L and H
Δln pt = sLt Δln pLt + (1− sLt)Δ ln pHt, (4.1)
where sLt = 1/2(sLt + sLt−1) and sLt is the value share of imports from the low cost
country. The increased imports of shirts from country L, due to reduced trade barriers,
increases the weight of the inﬂation rate in country L, and reduces the weight of the
inﬂation rate in country H. Since inﬂation is assumed somewhat higher in country L
than H, the overall inﬂation rate increases. That the standard import price index can
increase, when the true cost of imports has decreased, is a paradox. The paradox is
caused by the fact that the standard import price framework implicitly assumes free
trade. Hence, the price level of a particular good is irrelevant for the development of
the price index.
The literature analysing how a gradual lowering of trade barriers and an increased
integration of low cost countries into the world economy have put downward pressure
on inﬂation rates tries to circumvent this problem by looking at a weighted sum of price
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levels. The geometric average price level is deﬁned by
ln pt = sLt ln pLt + (1− sLt) ln pHt. (4.2)
Pain et al. (2006) apply this framework to identify the impact of imports from emerging
markets on inﬂation in OECD economies; Nickell (2005) and Coille (2008) use the frame-
work to analyse the evolution of inﬂation in the United Kingdom; and Benedictow and
Boug (2013) use empirically a similar framework to calculate foreign price impulses to
Norwegian import prices of clothing. Using an arithmetic average instead of the geomet-
ric average, Kamin et al. (2006) study the impact of Chinese exports on import prices
in 26 OECD countries. Røstøen (2004) applies the arithmetic average price framework
to identify external price impulses to imported consumer goods in Norway. An early
reference is Griliches and Cockburn (1995) who studied the shift from branded to generic
drugs. Moreover, bureaus of statistics such as Statistics Norway use an arithmetic av-
erage price framework, with quantity shares as weights (unit values), as sub-indices for
homogenous product groups to calculate import price indices, see the Export and Im-
port Price Index Manual (ILO et al., 2009, Chapter 2). The use of average prices when
there is price variation for the same quality of good or service is also recommended in
the SNA 2008 (European Commision et al., 2009, Paragraph 15.68). To see how the
average price framework can be used to identify the impact from a gradual lowering of
trade barriers on inﬂation, apply the quadratic approximation lemma (Diewert, 1976, p.
118) to the geometric average price level in Equation 4.2 to get the inﬂation rate
Δ ln pt = sLt Δln pLt + (1− sLt)Δ ln pHt + ΔsLt
(
ln pLt − ln pHt
)
. (4.3)
The diﬀerence between the inﬂation rate from the To¨rnqvist price index in Equation 4.1,
and the inﬂation rate from the geometric average price level in Equation 4.2, i.e., the
term ΔsLt(ln pLt− ln pHt), is interpreted as the bias from applying the standard import
price index during times of trade liberalisation. If the value share of imports from the
low cost country increases due to lowering of trade barriers, the bias is negative and the
increased integration of low cost countries into the world economy is interpreted to have
put downward pressure on inﬂation.
The main problem with applying a weighted average of price levels is that, to my knowl-
edge, it cannot be linked to economic theory in the presence of trade barriers. Indeed,
the inﬂation rate in Equation 4.3 is consistent with an import price index from a time
varying Cobb Douglas production technology ut = xαtLtx
1−αt
Ht , where xLt and xHt are the
goods from the low cost and high cost country, respectively, and αt is a time varying
technology parameter equal to sLt in equilibrium. However, within this model where
trade barriers are absent, an increase in the import share is caused by a technological
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change favouring products from the low cost country. This use of geometric average
prices is therefore not suitable if the purpose is to analyse how a gradual lowering of
trade barriers has aﬀected inﬂation. Unit values can only be meaningfully linked to
economic theory when all commodities are homogenous (perfect substitutes) and when
there is no price dispersion, i.e., pLt = pHt, see e.g., Balk (1998a) and Bradley (2005).
In contrast, import price eﬀects from a gradual lowering of trade barriers will only exist
if there is price dispersion.
Since average prices cannot be linked to an appropriate economic framework they may
still yield biased results when applied to situations characterised by trade liberalisation.
To illustrate, consider the example above but now assume that prices are decreasing in
the low cost country and deﬂation occurs at a rate higher than the increase in imports,
i.e., −Δln pLt > ΔlnxLt, where xLt is the quantity of imports from country L. Fur-
thermore, assume that the total value of imports is unchanged between the two time
periods. In this case, even though trade liberalisation has facilitated increased imports
from the low cost country, the cost share of imports from the low cost country decreases
since the price fall outweighs the quantity increase, i.e., ΔsLt < 0. Accordingly, de-
spite the lowering of import costs following the reduction in trade barriers, the term
ΔsLt(ln pLt − ln pHt) is positive. Hence, applying Equation 4.3 can wrongfully lead to
the conclusion that trade liberalisation has led to increased import costs. In contrast
to the true decrease in costs of imports due to trade liberalisation, which refers to an
increase in the quantity of imported goods from low cost countries, the cost share sLt is
aﬀected by changes in both underlying prices and quantities. Equation 4.3 may therefore
yield biased results also in the case of trade liberalisation. For this reason, a diﬀerent
approach is needed to identify a bias that can be interpreted as showing the import price
eﬀects from a reduction in trade barriers. In the following, I ﬁrst outline the standard
import price index based on a cost minimising establishment and then generalise the
framework to allow for changes in the index due to lowering of trade barriers by building
upon the theory of rationed households, see e.g., Rothbarth (1941); Tobin (1952) and
Howard (1977).
4.2.1 The standard import price index
Consider a cost minimising establishment that imports goods. Let xt = (x1t, x2t,
. . . , xnt)′ denote a vector of quantities or imported intermediates at time t and let
pt = (p1t, p2t, . . . , pnt)′ be the corresponding price vector where ′ indicates the trans-
pose operator. Further, let ut = f(xt) denote the establishment’s production technology
as a function of imported goods and let c(pt, ut) be the input price function. Note that
the functional form of the production technology encompasses the particular case when
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goods are homogenous as deﬁned by the linear functional form ut =
∑n
i=1 xit. The input
price function c(pt, ut) represents the minimal cost necessary to achieve the production
level ut at prices pt
c(pt, ut) ≡ min
xt
{
p′txt : ut = f(xt)
}
. (4.4)
An economic import price index is the ratio of the input prices required to attain a
particular level of production under two price regimes. In particular, the standard
Konu¨s (1939) index (IKt ) is deﬁned as
IKt ≡ c(pt, ut−1)/c(pt−1, ut−1). (4.5)
Together, Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.5 constitute the standard import price frame-
work. The index shows the change in the minimal cost necessary to sustain a given level
of production when prices change between period t− 1 and t. From this deﬁnition, it is
obvious that if prices remain unchanged between the two time periods, the import price
index is unity. Any change in the import price index is therefore caused by a change in
prices.
4.2.2 An import price index with trade barriers
The standard import price framework hinges on the assumption that the establishment is
free to choose between all bundles of goods – there are no restrictions on the availability
of goods in the deﬁnition of the import price function Equation 4.4. As a consequence,
the index in Equation 4.5 yields a biased estimate of cost of imports when there are
barriers to trade. In the previous section, it was shown that any change in the standard
import price index must be caused by a change in prices. However, increased imports
from low cost countries is not a phenomenon caused by changing relative prices or
changing income. It is caused by increased availability of low cost goods and services.
This increase in availability allows importers to choose from a plethora of new products
which decrease their costs even when production and prices remain unchanged. An
import price index that takes the eﬀects of trade liberalisation into account should
therefore decrease when the amount of available goods increases.
To be more precise, an import price index should show the ratio of the costs required to
attain a particular indiﬀerence curve under two price regimes and between two diﬀerent
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time periods:20
It ≡ ct(pt, ut−1)/ct−1(pt−1, ut−1). (4.6)
Observe that the diﬀerence between this deﬁnition and the standard import price index
in Equation 4.5 is the time subscript on the cost functions. Even when prices are
unchanged, and production is kept constant, this index can change due to exogenous
factors such as lowering of trade barriers. Moreover, note that allowing the import price
index to change, when prices are unchanged, violates one of the axiomatic requirements
for price indices: the identity axiom explicitly states that if prices are constant over the
two periods being compared, then the price index should equal one (Balk, 2012, p. 58).
The purpose of this article is to identify the reduction in costs from trade liberalisation;
reductions that occur irrespective of price changes. To allow for such eﬀects in an import
price index, the identity property must be violated.
I proceed by deﬁning an economy with restrictions on trade. Let the index j ∈ J run
across goods where such restrictions apply. The import of any good j cannot exceed a
predeﬁned level x¯jt: xjt ≤ x¯jt. The nature of the process x¯jt is exogenous. It represents
the restriction that hinders the importer from choosing freely between goods. Such
restrictions can be due to direct quota restrictions or it can be due to the sluggish
response of supply from the gradual removal of trade barriers. Incorporating these trade
barrier restrictions yields a new deﬁnition of the expenditure function
ct(pt, ut) ≡ min
xt
{
p′txt : ut = f(xt), xjt ≤ x¯jt, j ∈ J
}
. (4.7)
It shows the minimal cost necessary to reach a particular level of production, given
prices, a production technology and possible restrictions on availability. Together, Equa-
tion 4.6 and Equation 4.7 constitute the generalisation of the standard import price
index framework in Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.5. If there are no trade barriers, i.e.,
x¯jt = ∞, j ∈ J , this import price function is equivalent to the import price function
in the previous section. With respect to the topic of this chapter, the standard import
price framework Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.5 can thus be interpreted as a situation
of free trade between countries.
The new good bias is also encompassed by this framework. Assume that a new good,
say xjt, is introduced in period t = s. Before period s, good j cannot be imported,
i.e., x¯jt = 0 when t < s. When the new good is introduced to the market, there is no
20This deﬁnition is similar to the one adopted by Feenstra (1994). It is also equivalent to equation
(4) in Balk (1989), who studied time-varying preferences (or production technology). If production
technology is time-varying, Equation 4.6 implies a cardinal interpretation of technology. In the context
of this chapter, however, the production technology is assumed constant across time periods, and thus
represents an ordinal entity.
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import restriction, i.e., x¯jt = ∞ when t ≥ s. This highlights a diﬀerence between the
bias resulting from the introduction of new goods and the bias resulting from gradual
removal of trade barriers: the former is a one time change in availability, while the latter
is a gradual change in availability.
This diﬀerence between the new good bias and the bias arising from trade liberalisation
is crucial in terms of identiﬁcation. Consider for example how Hausman (1999) identi-
ﬁed the new goods bias of cellular telephones. After these telephones were introduced
to the market, Hausman (1999) estimated the demand curve and then solved for the
expenditure function using Roy’s identity. He identiﬁed the bias of cellular phones by
solving for the price which causes the demand for cellular phones to be zero. Note that
only if consumers are free to choose between all products will their pattern of consump-
tion reveal their underlying preferences. This approach therefore depends on consumers
being free to choose between the new good and other goods, i.e., x¯jt = ∞, after the
new good has been introduced, t ≥ s. The impact from trade barriers is diﬀerent in
this respect since the state of free trade (x¯jt = ∞, j ∈ J ) has not yet been reached.
We have moved gradually from a state with trade restrictions to a state with less trade
restrictions. In terms of identiﬁcation this is a problem. If observed import patterns are
the result of increased availability, and not the result of cost and relative price changes,
import patterns will not reveal the form of the production technology.
This is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.1a and Figure 4.1b. Point A in Figure 4.1a
shows the situation before the new good (x1) has been introduced. This is tantamount
to a situation of autarky in the international trade literature. If x1 cannot be imported,
it is only x2 that is imported. The isoquant curve labeled UA corresponds to the level
of production reached at point A. When the economy opens up to trade, and there
are no restrictions on the imports of x1, the optimal level of imports will be at point
B. Opening up for trade increases the production of the establishment, as shown by
the outward movement of the isoquant curve to UB. Feenstra (1994) shows how to
incorporate this movement from autarky to free trade into a price index when using a
CES utility function. Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) show how to do it from a translog
expenditure function. The new good bias thus represents two extremes: the time before
the new good is introduced can be viewed as a situation of inﬁnitely high trade barriers,
and the time after the good is introduced can be viewed as there being no trade barriers.
The main concern of this chapter is the situation between these two extremes, i.e., the
case when there are some trade barriers that are gradually removed, see Figure 4.1b.
Point A¯ shows the level of imports when some trade restrictions are present. Point B¯
shows the level of imports when fewer trade restrictions are present. The movement
from A¯ to B¯ increases the level of production of the importer, i.e., the isoquant moves
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(a) From autarky to free trade (b) Gradual lowering of trade barriers
Figure 4.1: Eﬀects from increased trade on import prices in the case of non-homogenous
products.
outwards from UA¯ to UB¯. However, the isoquants are not in any of the states tangent
to the isocost curve. Since the trade barrier restriction holds, the standard means of
identifying compensating variation based on observed prices and quantities cannot be
applied.
Figure 4.1 also illustrates another important diﬀerence between the new good bias and
the trade barrier bias. The new goods bias refers to the decrease in costs when the
new product is included in the import price index: In period A, the good x1 is not
included in the index and in period B, it is included in the index. In other words, the
introduction of a new good into the index signalises a potential bias. In contrast, there
is no such signal of a bias arising from a gradual removal of trade barriers. The good
x1 is included in the index in both time periods. It is only outside knowledge about the
existence of trade barriers that can signal a potential bias. For example, it is a historical
fact that the Multi-Fibre Arrangement imposed quota restrictions on imports of textiles
from China. This fact is utilised in the empirical analysis in Section 4.4 to evaluate the
size of the bias in the case of textile imports to Norway.
A third and important diﬀerence between the two biases can be seen in the case of
homogenous goods. The new good bias arises from the assumption that there is a
production gain from increased availability of varieties – isoquants are non-linear. But
if goods are homogenous, isoquants are linear and the availability of varieties has not
increased. There is no “new good” bias since it is the availability of existing goods that
has increased. In contrast, even in the case when goods are homogenous can there be a
bias arising from trade liberalisation, given that importers are restricted from purchasing
the lower priced good, as the next section will illustrate.
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4.3 The bias of the standard import price index
The purpose of this section is to deﬁne the bias of the standard import price index due to
trade barriers in the case of homogenous goods and to establish under what conditions
it will serve as a conservative measure (an upper bound) to the true bias in the case
of non-homogenous goods. To this end, I consider a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production technology over n imported intermediates
ut = (
n∑
i=1
δix
ρ
it)
1/ρ. (4.8)
The parameter δi can be thought of as a measure of quality for good i and the mapping
between the parameter ρ and the elasticity of substitution σ is given by σ = 1/(1− ρ).
Goods are deﬁned as perfect substitutes in the case when ρ = 1, i.e., the when goods
are characterised by a constant technical rate of substitution. If both the technical rate
of substitution is constant (ρ = 1) and if the quality of between two diﬀerent goods are
equal, i.e., δi = δk for i = k, the goods are referred to as being homogenous. Hence,
the production technology in Equation 4.8 enables analysis of both homogenous and
non-homogenous products.
Let the index j ∈ J = {1, 2, . . . , n − 1} run across the n − 1 imported intermediates
with trade restrictions. Since CES production is weakly separable, I let the nth imported
intermediate, xn, represent an aggregate intermediate of all the intermediate goods that
are traded freely. The expenditure function Equation 4.7 in the CES economy with
barriers to trade can then be written
ct(pt, ut) = min
xt
{
p′txt : ut = (
n∑
i=1
δix
ρ
it)
1/ρ, xjt = x¯jt < x∗jt for j ∈ J
}
=
∑
j∈J
pjtxjt +
pnt
δn
⎛⎝uρt −∑
j∈J
δjx
ρ
jt
⎞⎠1/ρ . (4.9)
x∗jt denotes the optimal level of imports of good j when there are no barriers to trade,
i.e., the cost minimising level of imports of good j in Equation 4.4. Since the ﬁrst n− 1
intermediate goods are characterised by binding trade restrictions, the second equality
follows from substituting the production technology for the nth good in the budget
constraint. Utilising that yt−1 = ct−1(pt−1, ut−1), we can write the import price index
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Equation 4.6 in the CES economy as a function of observed prices, quantities and income
ICESt =
⎛⎜⎝∑
j∈J
pjtxjt + pnt
⎛⎝xρnt−1 −∑
j∈J
(δj/δn)(x
ρ
jt − xρjt−1)
⎞⎠1/ρ
⎞⎟⎠ /yt−1, (4.10)
where the numerator is Equation 4.9, evaluated at ut−1.21 To clarify concepts further,
I follow how Diewert (1998, p. 51) deﬁned the outlet substitution bias and deﬁne the
import price bias due to trade barriers (BCESt ) as the diﬀerence between the true index
(ICESt ) and the Laspeyres index (I
L
t )
22
BCESt ≡ ICESt − ILt . (4.11)
The case of perfect substitutes (ρ = 1) is of particular interest, for three reasons: it
encompasses the case of homogenous products, the bias has an intuitive interpretation,
and the case of perfect substitutes will normally represent an upper bound to the true
index (ICESt ). It follows from Equation 4.10 that the index when goods are perfect
substitutes (IPSt ) is given by:
23
IPSt = I
L
t +
∑
j∈J
BPSjt , (4.12)
where the good speciﬁc bias (BPSjt ) is given by
24
BPSjt =
(pjt − (δj/δn)pnt)
yt−1
Δxjt. (4.13)
The numerator represents the quality adjusted price diﬀerence between the low cost
and the high cost intermediate good. When goods are homogenous (δj/δn = 1) the
numerator represents the absolute price diﬀerence between the low cost and the high
cost intermediate good. The whole fraction represents the (quality adjusted) amount
saved per unit of the low cost good with respect to the cost level in the previous period.
In total, the bias when goods are perfect substitutes is deﬁned as the (quality adjusted)
amount saved from the new availability of low cost goods relative to the cost level
21That is, uρt−1 =
∑n
i δix
ρ
i,t−1is inserted for u
ρ
t in Equation 4.9. It is assumed that changes in x¯jt are
such that xρn,t−1 −
∑
j∈J (δj/δn)(x
ρ
jt − xρj,t−1) > 0.
22The Laspeyres index is deﬁned as ILt ≡ (
∑
i pitxit−1)/(
∑
i pit−1xit−1) =
∑
i sit−1(pit/pit−1) for
i ∈ J ∪ {n}.
23See the appendix, Section C.1
24 Equation 4.13 cannot be used directly to calculate the bias when comparing aggregates and not
price levels of speciﬁc goods. For a given spatial index, (pjt/pnt), and temporal indices, (pjt/pjt−1) and
(xjt/xjt−1), the bias can be written in a more usable form:
BPSjt = ((pjt/pjt−1)− (δj/δn)(pjt/pnt)(pjt/pjt−1)) (xjt/xjt−1 − 1) sjt−1,
where sjt−1 is the cost share of good j in period t− 1.
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(a) p1/p2 < δ1/δ2 (b) p1/p2 > δ1/δ2
Figure 4.2: Trade barrier bias – perfect substitutes as an upper bound: IPSt − ICESt > 0.
in the previous period. For example, consider the case of two homogenous products
(n = 2, δ1 = δ2) and assume that prices do not change between two consecutive time
periods. The Laspeyres index is then unity. If the total budget is yt−1 = 500, the
price diﬀerence between the goods is p1t − p2t = −10, and ﬁve more low cost goods are
purchased (Δx1t = 5), the bias is BPS1t = −0.1. The true index is in this case IPSt = 0.9.
The purpose of the following is to establish conditions when the index IPSt and the bias∑
j∈J B
PS
jt represents a conservative approach to identifying the true index I
CES
t and
the bias BCESt . The index I
PS
t is said to represent an upper bound to the true index
ICESt if I
PS
t − ICESt > 0. To provide some intuition, it is appropriate to ﬁrst consider
the case when n = 2:
Proposition 4.1. (Upper bound, n = 2) Consider the import price index Equation 4.10
when n = 2. Let the lowering of trade barriers be small, i.e., x1,t = 1x1,t−1 where 1 is
greater than, but close to unity, and let TRSCES1t denote the technical rate of substitution
of the CES production technology: TRSCES1t ≡ δ1δ2
xρ−11t
xρ−12t
. The index IPSt represents an
upper bound to the true index ICESt if, and only if
TRSCES1t−1 > TRS
PS
1t−1. (4.14)
Proof: See the appendix, Section C.2.
It follows from Proposition 4.1 that the index IPSt represents an upper bound to the true
index ICESt only if x1t−1 < x2t−1. The intuition underlying this result is illustrated in
Figure 4.2a. In this static presentation, it is assumed that prices and costs are unchanged
between the two periods. UCES shows the isoquant for a CES production technology and
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the line UPS represents the isoquant when the intermediate goods are perfect substitutes.
Both isoquants intersect the budget line at point A. When availability is restricted
beyond this point, i.e., x1 < x1A, the technical rate of substitution for UCES is higher
than for UPS : TRSCES > TRSPS . An establishment with technology UCES is willing
to give up more units of x2 in exchange for a unit of x1, compared with an establishment
with technology UPS . As a result, a lowering of trade barriers leads to a larger increase
in production, and a lower cost of imports, when technology is UCES , compared with
that of perfect substitutes UPS . The index IPS , which is based on UPS , will thus
represent an upper bound to the true index ICES based on technology UCES . When
the available amount of x1 exceeds x1A, the situation changes. The technical rate of
substitution for UCES is then lower than the technical rate of substitution for UPS . In
this case the index IPS represents a lower bound to the true index ICES . The line going
from the origin through point B is the expansion path connecting the optimal import
bundles as the cost increases. For CES technology, the expansion path is given by:
x∗2 = f(x∗1) =
(
δ2p1
δ1p2
)σ
x∗1. It will be to the right of the 45◦ degree line if p1/p2 < δ1/δ2.
Figure 4.2b illustrates the case when the expansion path is to the left of the 45◦ degree
line, i.e., when x1 is the high priced good, taking quality into account: p1/p2 > δ1/δ2.
The isoquant UPS∗ shows that it is optimal to only import x2. However, if the lowering of
trade barriers leads to a movement from x1A¯ to x1B¯ for the true underlying technology,
this will be interpreted as a decrease in the level of production and an increase in cost
of imports: the trade barrier bias BPS1 in Equation 4.13 is positive. The index I
PS
when goods are perfect substitutes is still an upper bound, but for the wrong reasons.
Creating an index that serves as an upper bound to the true index when trade barriers
are reduced should exclude the case illustrated in Figure 4.2b.
Some adjustments must be made to the index Equation 4.12 to make it an upper bound
to the true index in the n good case. As illustrated in Figure 4.2a, the index IPS
represents a lower bound if x1 > x1A. To exclude this case, an intuitive approach is to
set the good speciﬁc bias BPSj to zero for all goods that lie between x1A and x1B :
Proposition 4.2. (Upper bound, n) Consider the import price index Equation 4.10 when
pjt−1/pnt−1 < δj/δn for j ∈ J . Let the lowering of trade barriers be small, i.e., xjt =
j xjt−1 where j is greater than, but close to unity. Further, separate the n−1 goods that
are characterised by trade barriers by dividing the set J = {1, 2, . . . , n − 1} into two com-
plement sets At = {j ∈ J : 0 ≤ xjt−1 ≤ xnt−1} and Act =
{
j ∈ J : xnt−1 < xjt−1 < x∗jt−1
}
.
The import price index
ILt +
∑
j∈At
BPSjt (4.15)
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is an upper bound to the price index ICESt if TRS
CES
j,t−1 > pjt/pnt for j ∈ Act , where
TRSCESjt denote the technical rate of substitution of the CES production technology:
TRSCESjt ≡ δjδn
xρ−1jt
xρ−1nt
. Proof: See the appendix, Section C.3.
The condition in Proposition 4.2 is not restrictive and it is far from necessary. Since
xjt−1 < x∗jt−1, the technical rate of substitution is greater than or equal to the price
ratio at time t− 1: TRSCESjt−1 > pjt−1/pnt−1. The condition will thus hold if TRSCESjt−1 >
TRSCESjt , which is equivalent to an increase in the relative consumption of the restricted
good: Δ (xjt/xnt) > 0. Alternatively, it will hold if the relative price decreases or
remains unchanged between the two time periods: Δ (pjt/pnt) ≤ 0.25
4.4 Empirical application
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the importance of the trade barrier bias when
calculating price indices. To this end I use the case of clothing imports from China
to Norway. The data used in this analysis are based on the two digit SITC from the
external trade statistics published by Statistics Norway.26 Let x1t represent the amount
of imported clothing from China (measured in tonnes), and x2t represent the amount of
imported clothing from all other countries and let p1t and p2t be the corresponding unit
values. Because these measures of quantity are not adjusted for diﬀerences in quality or
other characteristics, unit values are considered less reliable than price surveys, see e.g.,
Silver (2010). For example, the unit values of audiovisual equipment would typically be
unreliable since it has decreased in weight at the same time as technological advances
has been considerable. For clothing however, where technological advance has been less
pronounced, it is assumed that unit values are indicative of movement in trade prices.
Figure 4.3 shows how the relative price level (p1t/p2t) and quantity level (x1t/x2t) have
developed between 1988 and 2012.27 In 1988, the price level on imported clothing from
China was about 40% compared with the price of clothing from other countries. Over
the time period, the relative price level has about doubled to 80% in 2012. The relative
level of imported goods from China has also increased during this time period, from a
level of about 8% in 1988 to 120% in 2012. This massive increase in imports from China,
25 Δ(pjt/pnt) ≤ 0 imply that pjt−1/pjt−1 ≥ pjt/pnt.
26Data are taken from the external trade statistics, Table 08809, see
https://www.ssb.no/en/utenriksokonomi. Only countries with a positive level of imports across
the sample are included. In the end, the data set holds 51 countries. On average, these countries
account for 96% of the value of clothing imports to Norway.
27The spatial index is calculated as p1t/p2t =
∑
i∈C wit (p1t/pit) , where i run across all other countries
than China, C, and the weights are the import shares: wit = pitxit/(∑i∈C pitxit). The index (x1t/x2t)
is calculated residually, from the product rule: (y1t/y2t) = (p1t/p2t)(x1t/x2t), where y1t = p1tx1t and
y2t = p2tx2t.
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Figure 4.3: Imports of clothing: (p1t/p2t) and (x1t/x2t)
together with the price surge, begs the question: why has imports from China risen so
much when imports from China have become so much more expensive?
Within the standard import price index framework, Figure 4.3 is consistent with cloth-
ing produced in China being a Giﬀen good, i.e., an intermediate that an establishment
paradoxically imports more of as the price rices. Another, and more plausible explana-
tion, is that this surge in imports is due to a gradual removal of trade restrictions. After
six years of bilateral trade negotiations, Norway rejoined the Multi-Fibre Arrangement
(MFA) in 1984. The MFA governed world trade in textiles and garments from 1974
through 2004 by imposing quotas on the amount developing countries could export to
developed countries. These quota restrictions came in addition to already high tariﬀ
rates, ranging from 17% to 25%. Both quota restrictions and tariﬀs were gradually
reduced during the 1990s and the quota arrangement on clothing expired in 1998 (Wil-
helmsen and Høegh-Omdal, 2002). This historical fact tells us that in the ﬁrst ten years
of the sample period, there were indeed restrictions on availability.
Further, and maybe more importantly, the general lowering of trade barriers has led to
an increase in supply of clothing from China. At the 8th round of multilateral trade
negotiations, known as the Uruguay round, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(ATC) ended the MFA and began the process of integrating textile and clothing products
into GATT/WTO rules. China entered the WTO on December 11 2001 and on January
1, 2005, the ATC, and all restrictions thereunder, were terminated. This led to a surge
in Chinese exports and lower prices of textile and clothing. Harrigan and Barrows (2009)
show that the prices of quota constrained categories in the U.S. fell by 38 % in 2005.
Moreover, as shown by Brambilla et al. (2010), China’s share of U.S. imports jumped
threefold, from 10 to 33 %, between the time it joined the WTO and the end of the
ATC regime. Consistent with a terms-of-trade eﬀect, most of this growth was in existing
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Figure 4.4: Cost of imports. The upper bound index follows from Proposition 4.2 and equals
ILt + B
PS
1t before 2005 and since x1t−1 > x2t−1 for t ≥ 2005, it equals ILt after 2005, where the
good speciﬁc bias is deﬁned by BPS1t =
(p1t−(δ1/δ2)p2t)
yt−1
Δx1t and δ1/δ2 = 1 is set to unity.
varieties (the intensive margin). In line with these ﬁndings, Figure 4.3 shows that the
relative demand for Chinese clothing continued to increase also in Norway after China
joined the WTO.
These historical restrictions on trade in the textile industry, together with the massive
increase in imports from China, support the hypothesis that imports of clothing from
China has been less than under a free trade regime.
Figure 4.4 shows the development in the import price index with trade barriers compared
with the Laspeyres–Paasche band. It is well known that the true import price index lies
within the Laspeyres–Paasche band when preferences are homothetic and when there
are no barriers to trade, see e.g., the Export and Import Price Index Manual (ILO
et al., 2009, p. 421). The diﬀerence between the true economic import price index index
and either the Laspeyres or Paasche index represents a substitution bias, i.e., the bias
from not taking account of how importers switch away from goods that have become
relatively more expensive and toward goods that have become relatively less expensive.
By comparing the trade barrier bias with the Laspeyres–Paasche band yields a visual
picture of its importance with respect to the substitution bias.
If the increase in imports from China is caused by substitution and income eﬀects, and
there have been no restrictions on availability during this time period, the standard
import price framework in Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.5 is valid, and the true index
lies somewhere within the Laspeyres–Paasche band. The Laspeyres–Paasche band shows
that the standard import price index was about at the same level in 2005 as in 1988,
and it was about 30% higher in 2012 than in 1988.
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On the other hand, if the increase in imports is a result of increased availability due to
lowering of trade barriers and an increase in supply, the import price index with trade
barriers (Upper bound index) in Proposition 4.2 should be applied. From the conditions
of Proposition 4.2, the goods speciﬁc bias (BPSjt ) is only subtracted from the Laspeyres
index if x1t−1 < x2t−1. This does not mean that the trade barrier bias is not present when
x1t−1 > x2t−1. From Figure 4.2a and Proposition 4.2 it follows that the trade barrier
bias is also present when x1A < x1 < x1B, but the index IPSt no longer constitutes
an upper bound. In Figure 4.3 it can be seen that the case of perfect substitutes is
an upper bound until t = 2005. The shaded area in Figure 4.4 marks the part of the
sample when this condition do not hold. From 2005 to 2012 the upper bound index is
the Laspeyres index. It is therefore in the period prior to 2005 that the discrepancy
between the Laspeyres–Paasche band and the band of the upper bound index occurs. In
2005, the upper bound index Equation 4.15 is 70% of the Laspeyres index. This amount
to a mean annual inﬂation rate bias between of 1.5 percentage points between 1988 and
2005.
In Figure 4.5 the upper bound index Equation 4.15 is compared with average prices. The
average price with quantity shares as weights, commonly referred to as unit values, is
used by many statistical bureaus to compare homogenous commodities across diﬀerent
countries of origin in the creation of import price indices, see Chapter 2 in the Export
and Import Price Index Manual Manual (ILO et al., 2009). The rationale is that unit
values are thought to be appropriate when goods are homogenous: ”unit values indices
are suitable – indeed they are ideal – for the aggregation of price changes of homogenous
items” (ILO et al., 2009, Section B1, 1.10). The use of unit values when there is price
variation for the same quality of good or service is also recommended in the SNA 2008
(European Commision et al., 2009, Paragraph 15.68). Average prices and geometric
average prices, both using value shares as weights, have been used in the literature to
analyse the impact on inﬂation from a gradual lowering of trade barriers, see e.g., Nickell
(2005); Kamin et al. (2006); Pain et al. (2006); Benedictow and Boug (2013). What is
striking about this comparison is that the average prices all lie above the upper bound
index. Since the true import price index, for any value of the elasticity of substitution
σ, lies below the upper bound index, an alternative measure of the impact of trade
liberalisation on import prices should, at a minimum, also lie below the upper bound
index. That the average prices lie above the upper bound index illustrates how average
prices is not a measure of cost of imports eﬀects from trade liberalisation. The mean
inﬂation rate between 1988 and 2005 of the average price index was -1.1%, the mean
inﬂation rate of the geometric average price was -1.3% and the mean inﬂation rate of
the unit value index was -1.4%. In contrast, the mean inﬂation rate of the upper bound
index was -1.9%. In other words, the annual underestimation of how trade liberalisation
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Figure 4.5: The upper bound index vs. average prices. The upper bound index is Equation 4.15
given in Proposition 4.2, using δ1/δ2 = 1. Unit values, average prices and geometric average
prices are chained from pt/pt−1, where the price levels are deﬁned by pt =
(
x1t
x1t+x2t
)
p1t +(
x2t
x1t+x2t
)
p2t, pt = s1tp1t + (1− s1t)p2t and ln pt = s1t ln p1t + (1− s1t) ln p2t, c.f. Equation 4.2,
respectively.
has aﬀected inﬂation from using average prices, geometric average prices and unit values
was at least 0.8, 0.6 and 0.5 percentage points respectively. When trade barriers are
present, the use of unit values to aggregate homogenous items can thus yield biased
results.
4.5 Conclusions
Applying a standard import price index to situations with trade barriers yields biased
results since the standard index implicitly assumes free trade. The literature analysing
how a gradual lowering of trade barriers and an increased integration of low cost coun-
tries into the world economy have put downward pressure on inﬂation rates try to cir-
cumvent this problem by looking at average prices. However, average prices may still
underestimate the economic eﬀects from trade liberalisation.
The purpose of this chapter has been twofold. The ﬁrst aim was to generalise the original
economic import price index to allow for barriers to trade in the case of homogenous
products. The second aim has been to establish under what conditions this index serves
as a conservative measure to the true index also in the case of non-homogenous goods.
Hence, the results of this chapter can be used to calculate conservative estimates of
cost reductions due to trade liberalisation both in the case of homogeneous and non-
homogenous goods. To illustrate the theoretical framework, I use the case of clothing
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imports to Norway and show that a unit value index, which is believed to be appropriate
for the aggregation of homogenous items, overestimated the annual inﬂation rate by 0.5
percentage points between 1988 and 2005.
Chapter 5
Identifying the sector bias of
technical change
Abstract: The empirical literature studying the sector bias of technical change has only focused on skill-
biased technical change. In this chapter, I analyse the sector bias of both factor-neutral and factor-biased
technical change. The empirical evidence using Norwegian data from 1972 to 2007 is not clear on the
impact of a sector bias of skill-biased technical change, but it points to a sector bias of factor-neutral
technical change from the 1970s to the 1990s. That said, the impact of the sector bias seems to have
reduced towards the latter part of the sample period. I also evaluate the cross-section model used in the
literature and show the strong restrictions that must be placed on a vector equilibrium correction model
to end up with the standard model. If these restrictions do not hold, the results reported in the literature
may be biased. I show that the restrictions are strongly rejected, and that erroneously imposing them
signiﬁcantly changes the estimates of skill-biased technical change in many sectors. These results can, to
some extent, be traced back to how the cross–section model ignores initial disequilibrium and imposes
factors of production to be either complements or substitutes.
5.1 Introduction
In the past three decades, most OECD countries have experienced an increase in the wage
premium and/or an increase in the relative unemployment rates between high- and low-
skilled labour. The underlying reasons for this development are still debated (Acemoglu
and Autor, 2011). A growing body of research points to increased international trade,
capital-skill complementarity or a shift in the production technology that favours skilled
over unskilled.
This chapter has been published in Empirical Economics, see Brasch (2015). Thanks to A˚dne Cap-
pelen, Karen Helene Ulltveit–Moe, P˚al Boug, H˚avard Hungnes, Terje Skjerpen and Victoria Sparrman
for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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In the literature on skill-biased technical change (henceforth SBTC) there is an ongoing
debate concerning the importance of a sector bias of SBTC. While the SBTC hypoth-
esis is based on the relative proﬁtability between factors of production, the sector bias
hypothesis focuses on the relative proﬁtability between sectors. For example, if the
proportion of high-skilled labour varies across sectors, it is not clear that skill-biased
technical change will lead to a higher wage premium. If technical change favours skilled
labour in a sector where the proportion of skilled labour is low, this will increase the
proﬁtability of the sector where technical change takes place. Even if technical change
were directed at the high-skilled, because technical change took place in a sector dom-
inated by low-skilled labour, this would lead to an increase in demand of low-skilled
labour and consequently a lowering of the wage premium. In other words, the skill in-
tensity of the sector where technical change occurs matters for the development of the
wage premium. This theoretical result is well known and dates back to at least Findlay
and Grubert (1959).
Econometric studies have found the sector bias hypothesis to be important in under-
standing the development of the wage premium. In line with the sector bias hypothesis,
Haskel and Slaughter (2002) ﬁnd that in a group of 10 OECD countries where the wage
premia were rising (falling) during the 1970s and 80s, SBTC was generally concentrated
in skill-intensive (unskill-intensive) sectors. Applying a similar econometric framework,
Esposito and Stehrer (2009) also ﬁnd the sector bias hypothesis to be important in ex-
plaining the rising wage premia in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland during the
late nineties. In contrast, Robertson (2004) ﬁnds that a weakly signiﬁcant sector bias
has worked in the opposite direction, as would be expected if it was to explain changes
in wage inequality in Mexico during the period of trade liberalisation from 1986 to 1999.
The econometric framework typically used in the literature to identify SBTC is based
on a panel version of the growth rate econometric model (Hendry, 1995, Section 7.4),
henceforth referred to as the cross-section model. This approach implicitly assumes
that a number of restrictions are satisﬁed. For example, it is assumed that initial
disequilibrium is irrelevant to the identiﬁcation of structural parameters. The model
also imposes factors of production to be either complements or substitutes. If these
implicit restrictions do not hold, the estimates reported in the literature may be biased.
In this chapter, I present a more general econometric framework. Using a vector equi-
librium correction model (henceforth VEqCM), I show how to identify SBTC without
imposing the strong restrictions implicitly used in the literature. To relate this frame-
work to existing studies, I list a set of testable assumptions that must be imposed on
the VEqCM in order to identify SBTC with the cross-section model. The restrictions
that must be placed on the VEqCM to end up with the cross-section model are strongly
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rejected using Norwegian data from 1972 to 2007. Imposing them signiﬁcantly changes
the estimates of SBTC. This result can, to some extent, be traced back to how the cross-
section model ignores initial disequilibrium and imposes the assumption that factors of
production are either complements or substitutes.
The empirical literature analysing a sector bias of technical change has not, to my
knowledge, analysed the impact from factor-neutral technical change or total factor
productivity growth (TFP). A sector bias of TFP is present if there is a systematic
relationship between TFP growth and skill intensity across sectors. From a theoretical
standpoint, it should be easier to identify the sector bias of TFP than the sector bias
of SBTC, since it is independent of the elasticity of substitution between the factors of
production; see Stehrer (2010, p. 75). Although insigniﬁcant, the empirical evidence
in this chapter points to a sector bias of TFP in the 1970s, but that the impact of the
sector bias gradually reduced towards the ﬁrst decade in the current century.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the theoretical litera-
ture on the sector bias of technical change. Section 5.3 evaluates the empirical framework
used in the literature and outlines how to identify the sector bias of both SBTC and TFP.
Section 5.4 describes the data set used in the empirical analysis. Section 5.5 reports and
discusses the empirical results. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 The sector bias of technical change
The sector bias hypothesis focuses on the relative proﬁtability between sectors. For
example, if technical change favours skilled labour in a sector where the proportion of
skilled labour is low, this will increase the proﬁtability of the sector where technical
change takes place. Even if technical change were directed at the high-skilled, this
would lead to an increase in demand for low-skilled labour and may consequently lead
to a lowering of the wage premium. This result, that the skill intensity of the sector
where technical change occurs matters for the development of the wage premium, was
the basis for the analysis by Haskel and Slaughter (2002).
The extent to which the sector bias impacts factor prices depends on the properties of
the economy under consideration. Xu (2001) analysed how diﬀerent forms of technical
change impact relative factor prices in a two-country, two-good, two-factor Heckscher-
Ohlin model. Some of the results were ambiguous. Stehrer (2010) shed light on this
ambiguity. In a more detailed study, he analysed the eﬀects of technical change on
relative wages for various combinations of parameter values in an economy characterised
by CES utility and production functions. Of particular importance is the elasticity of
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substitution in demand and in production. Since the model in Stehrer (2010) holds a
discrete number of sectors the elasticity of substitution in production can be assumed
to be sector-speciﬁc. Stehrer (2010) assumes endogenous product prices both when
considering a closed economy and when extending the framework to a discrete number
of trading economies. Consequently, in the case of trading economies, the law of one
price does not hold, since each good is considered a speciﬁc brand. Haskel and Slaughter
(2002) also considers the case when product prices are endogenous, but in contrast to
Stehrer (2010), the main assumption is not the speciﬁcity of brands, but rather that the
country under consideration is suﬃciently large in the world economy to aﬀect product
prices.
Stehrer (2010) showed that the size and the direction of the sector bias depend on the
size of the elasticity of substitution. When factors of production are substitutes, SBTC
increases the wage premium if the innovating sector is not too skill intensive.28 When
SBTC occurs in a very skill-intensive sector, the demand for goods in the unskill-intensive
sectors rises due to a dominating income eﬀect which moreover causes a reduction in the
relative wage rate. If, on the other hand, the factors of production are complements,
the impact of SBTC on the wage premium becomes ambiguous (Stehrer, 2010, p. 76,
footnote 14.). The second case, when the elasticity of substitution in demand is high,
is similar. If factors of production are substitutes but the elasticity of substitution
in production is lower than the elasticity of substitution in demand, SBTC increases
the wage premium for a large range of sectors, unless SBTC occurs in sectors with a
very low skill level. In sum, the impact from the sector bias of SBTC depends on the
skill intensities where SBTC occurs, whether factors of production are complements or
substitutes, and on the elasticity of substitution in demand.
Although the empirical literature has focused on the sector bias of SBTC, Stehrer (2010)
also analysed the sector bias of TFP. How TFP impacts the relative wage rate also
depends on the elasticity of substitution of demand. If the elasticity of substitution of
demand is lower than unity, the relative wage rate will rise if TFP occurs mostly in
unskilled sectors. The rising wage premium is due to a dominating income eﬀect which
causes increased demand for all goods and in particular for goods produced with high
skill intensities. On the other hand, if the elasticity of substitution of demand is greater
than unity, the relative wage rate will rise if TFP occurs mostly in skilled sectors. In
either case, a sector bias of TFP is thus caused by a systematic relationship between
TFP growth and skill intensity across sectors.
28Note that I refer to SBTC only, i.e., skill-biased (skill-using) technical change, which is the Hicksian
notion of technical change. Stehrer (2010, Section 2.2) discusses the diﬀerent typologies of technical
change and how they relate to the parameters in a CES production function more explicitly.
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5.3 Econometric framework
Since Norway represents a very small open economy, and since the empirical analysis in
this chapter also includes services sectors where product prices typically are determined
endogenously, the theoretical results from Stehrer (2010) are considered the most rel-
evant for the econometric framework. In particular, the econometric framework takes
into account both the skill intensity of sectors and, in the case of skill-biased technical
change, the size of the elasticity of substitution between the factors of production. In
the following, I ﬁrst present the cross-section model adopted by Haskel and Slaughter
(2002) to identify SBTC and then show how the vector equilibrium correction model
encompasses this model. Thereafter, I show the index used to calculate TFP, and ﬁnally,
I outline how to identify the sector bias of both SBTC and TFP.
5.3.1 Framework used in the literature
Haskel and Slaughter (2002) used a two-stage estimation procedure to identify the sector
bias of SBTC. First they regressed the level change in the cost share of high-skilled (S) in
sector i on changes in the wage premium, i.e., the ratio of the hourly wage of high-skilled
(WH) and the wage of low-skilled (WL), and changes in capital intensity (K/Y )
ΔSi = b1 + b2Δln(WH/WL)i + b3Δln(K/Y)i + ui, (5.1)
where K is capital and Y is real value-added output. The wage premium was modelled as
the relative wage between production and non-production workers where non-production
workers served as a proxy for high-skilled. The variation in the cost share that could
not be explained by variation in neither the wage premium nor the capital intensity was
attributed to SBTC, i.e., (b1 + ui) was a measure of SBTC in sector i. In the second
stage, the estimate of SBTC is regressed on the skill intensity
SBTCi = γ1 + γ2(H/L)i + vi, (5.2)
where the skill intensity is the ratio of high- (H) to low (L) skilled workers. Haskel
and Slaughter (2002) considered the coeﬃcient γ2 to represent the sector bias of SBTC.
They state that if the sector-bias hypothesis is true, then a positive γ2 is associated with
rising skill premia and a negative γ2 with falling skill premia (p. 1768). In the following
two sections, I evaluate the suitability of this framework for analysing the sector bias
hypothesis.
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5.3.2 Identifying SBTC
Most econometric studies analysing SBTC and a potential sector bias use the translog
cost function due to its ﬂexibility and to the fact that it represents a second-order
approximation of a general cost function; see for example Berman et al. (1994) and
Binswanger (1974). The cost share of high-skilled labour in levels (S) is given by
Sit = b0i + b1it + b2i ln(WH/WL)it + b3i ln(K/Y)it. (5.3)
This framework is empirically convenient, since the cost share is a linear function of
the wage premium, the capital intensity and a deterministic time trend (t).29 A posi-
tive parameter b3i indicates capital-skill complementarity. The parameter b1i represents
technical change. For example, if one empirically ﬁnds a signiﬁcant positive value, it
means that there has been an exogenous force increasing the relative demand for skilled
labour and thus increasing the cost share of skilled labour. SBTC or skill using technical
progress therefore occurs within the translog framework when there is a ceteris paribus
deterministic increase in the cost share of high-skilled labour, i.e., b1i > 0. Conversely, a
negative value (b1i < 0) implies that technical change has been biased towards unskilled
labour. Note that even though this model is derived under cost minimisation, any trends
in, for example, international product prices or general equilibrium eﬀects that are not
related to the wage premium, capital or value-added will empirically be interpreted as
SBTC.
The parameter b2i is closely related to the elasticity of substitution. As there are only
two variable inputs, the expression for the elasticity of substitution between the two
factors is deﬁned by
σi ≡ ∂ ln(Hi/Li)
∂ ln(WLi/WHi)
= 1− b2i
Sˆi(1− Sˆi)
, (5.4)
where Sˆi is the predicted high-skilled cost share at some central point such as the mean.30
Since there are only two variable factors of production, the elasticity of substitution is
non-negative, i.e., an increase in ln(WLi/WHi) (a lowering of the wage premium) is met
by either an increase in the skill ratio (Hi/Li) or a constant skill ratio. Importantly,
a positive estimate of b2i implies an elasticity of substitution lower than unity, and a
negative estimate of b2i implies an elasticity of substitution greater than unity.
29 Both constant returns to scale and price homogeneity have been imposed; see the appendix, Sec-
tion D.1.
30In contrast, several measures of the elasticity of substitution have been discussed in the literature
when there are many inputs; see for example Blackorby and Russel (1989) and Thompson (1997).
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The vector equilibrium correction (VEqCM) model can be used to identify the param-
eters of the theoretical cost share Equation 5.3. The point of departure is the general
model
(VEqCM) Δxi,t = γ˜i + Γ1iΔxi,t−1 + · · ·+ ΓkiΔxit−k +Πix˜it−1 + it,
where I allow for both a constant and a trend within the potential cointegrating rela-
tionships by deﬁning the (3×1) vector x′it = [S ln(WH/WL) ln(K/Y)]it and the (5×1)
vector x˜′it = [x
′
it t 1]. The model allows for the possibility of a linear trend in all the
components of xit, as captured by the vector of constants γ˜i. The fact that there must
be a mapping between these trends and the trend in the cointegrating relations can
be used to identify the constants in the cointegration relationships, see e.g,. Hungnes
(2010). Although the model is speciﬁed with a stable deterministic trend, the methods
outlined in Johansen et al. (2000) and Hungnes (2010) can be used to identify possi-
ble structural breaks. it is assumed multivariate normally distributed with covariance
matrix Ω. The (3×5) matrix Π can be partitioned into Π = αβ′ where the (3 × r)
matrix α represents the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium, β′ is the (r×5) matrix of
long-run coeﬃcients and where r represents the number of cointegration relationships.
If there is one cointegration relationship only (r = 1), the matrix Π can be partitioned
to identify the long-run structure in the translog model in Equation 5.3, that is
Πi = αiβ′i =
⎡⎢⎢⎣
α1i
α2i
α3i
⎤⎥⎥⎦[1 −b2 −b3 −b1 −b0]i .
The VEqCM is somewhat diﬀerent from the framework used in the literature, for ex-
ample Haskel and Slaughter (2002). In particular, the VEqCM can be viewed as a
more general model. In the following I list the set of testable assumptions that must
be imposed on the VEqCM in order to end up with the framework used by Haskel and
Slaughter (2002).
Assumption 1. The wage premium and capital intensity are weakly exogenous, i.e.,
α2i = α3i = 0
The weak exogeneity assumption implies that it is the cost share variable alone that
adjusts towards the equilibrium relationship. If true, this assumption allows for single
equation modelling. More speciﬁcally, the conditional process for the cost share is then
given by
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(A1) ΔSit = γi + ω1iΔ ln(WH/WL)it + ω2iΔ ln(K/Y)it
+α1iβ′ix˜i,t−1 +
k∑
j=1
Γ˜jiΔxit−j + 1it,
where the subscript on the residual 1it refers to the assumption under which it is con-
structed. The relationships between γi, ω1i, ω2i, Γ˜j,i and 1itin model A1 and the
parameters in the VEqCM model are shown in Johansen (1995, p. 122). If the weak
exogeneity assumption is wrongly imposed, the estimate of the long-run parameter βi
will be ineﬃcient (Johansen, 1992).
Assumption 2. There are no signiﬁcant lags in the VEqCM, i.e., Γ˜ji = 0 ∀ i, j
If there are no signiﬁcant lags in A1, the model is reduced to the speciﬁcation
(A2) ΔSit = γi + ω1iΔ ln(WH/WL)it + ω2iΔ ln(K/Y)it + α1iβ
′
ix˜it−1 + 2it.
This model is more eﬃcient than A1 if Assumption 2 holds, since no unnecessary co-
eﬃcients are estimated. However, if Assumption 2 is wrongly imposed, the error term
is serially dependant and the estimate of the long-run parameter βi will be biased.
Inference on skill-biased technical change is no longer valid.
Assumption 3. There is no adjustment towards equilibrium, i.e., α1i = 0.
Assumption 3 leads to the speciﬁcation commonly referred to as a cross-section model
(A3) ΔSit = γi + ω1iΔ ln(WH/WL)it + ω2iΔ ln(K/Y)it + 3it.
In the models VEqCM, A1, and A2 the structural parameters of the translog framework
have been a part of the vector β′i, but in Model A3 the vector β
′
i is not included. In
this model the structural parameters can be found by taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the
translog framework (5.3),
(A3) ΔSit = b1i + b2iΔ ln(WH/WL)it + b3iΔ ln(K/Y)it + 3it,
which yield the relationships b1i = γi, b2i = ω1i and b3i = ω2i. Given that Assumptions
1–3 are all true, the OLS estimate of SBTC (b1,i) is unbiased and eﬃcient. However,
for given time paths of Δ ln(WH/WL)it and Δ ln(K/Y)it, the time path of ΔSit, may
depend on the relationship between the initial levels of the cost share (S0t), the wage pre-
mium (ln(WH/WL)i0), and capital intensity (ln(K/Y)i0). There are no a priori grounds
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for assuming that such an initial disequilibrium is irrelevant. If the assumption of no
equilibrium correction is false and – in particular – if there is a large deviation from
equilibrium initially, estimates of SBTC will be biased.31
Assumption 4. Homogeneous slope parameters across sectors, i.e., b2i = b2 and b3i =
b3.
The assumption that the slope parameters are homogeneous across sectors yields the
ﬁxed eﬀects model
(A4) ΔSit = b1,i + b2Δ ln(WH/WL)it + b3Δ ln(K/Y)it + 4it,
In this framework, sector-speciﬁc SBTC is still identiﬁed by the sector-speciﬁc constant
b1i. If Assumptions 2–4 are all true, the estimates of the slope parameters are more
eﬃcient than the OLS estimates of A3, since fewer parameters are estimated and infor-
mation across sectors is also utilised. By denoting the estimators of SBTC in A3 and A4
by bˆA31i and bˆ
A4
1i respectively, the diﬀerence between these estimators can be decomposed
into separate eﬀects from the two explanatory variables as
bˆA31i − bˆA41i = (bˆ2 − bˆ2i)Δ ln(WH/WL)i + (bˆ3 − bˆ3i)Δ ln(K/Y)i. (5.5)
If Assumption 4 is wrongly imposed, the estimates of the slope parameters in a given
sector will be biased, and this bias leads to wrongful inference of SBTC unless the two
eﬀects precisely oﬀset each other. Moreover, by imposing homogeneous slope parameters
across sectors, one is restricting the elasticity of substitution between the factors of
production to be of the same type. From equation (5.4) it follows that even though
the elasticity of substitution can vary between sectors with a common slope parameter,
σi = 1− b2Sˆi(1−Sˆi) , the elasticity of substitution is either above or below unity depending
on whether b2 is positive or negative. Since unity marks a threshold for the elasticity of
substitution in terms of how SBTC impacts the wage premium (Stehrer, 2010), imposing
that factors of production are either substitutes or complements can lead to wrongful
inference about the sector bias.
Assumption 5. No sector-speciﬁc heterogeneity, i.e., b1i = b1.
Assumption 5 leads to a speciﬁcation without sector-speciﬁc heterogeneity, i.e., where
both the slope coeﬃcients and the intercept are the same for all sectors
(A5) ΔSit = b1 + b2Δ ln(WH/WL)it + b2Δ ln(K/Y)it + 5it.
31See Hendry (1995, Section 7.4) for further discussion of the cross-section model.
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The estimator for the slope coeﬃcients is often referred to as a global estimator since
it utilises both the variation within and between sectors. It is this framework Esposito
and Stehrer (2009) used when identifying a sector bias in three central and eastern
European transition economies. According to Esposito and Stehrer (2009), b1 measures
the cross-sector average of SBTC whereas (b1 + 5it) reﬂects the sectoral distribution of
SBTC (p. 358). But the reason why b1 measures the cross-sector average of SBTC is
due to Assumption 5 where it is explicitly stated that there is no cross-sector variation
in SBTC. Deﬁning a new variable b1+5it to capture cross-sectoral distribution of SBTC
is inconsistent with the assumption that there is no heterogeneity in SBTC.
If one incorrectly imposes Assumption 5, there will be a double bias in the estimation
of SBTC. To see this, rewrite the ﬁxed-eﬀects model A4 as
ΔSit = b1 + b2Δ ln(WH/WL)it + b3Δ ln(K/Y)it + (b1i − b1 + 4it),
where it follows from A5 that 5it = b1,i − b1 + 4it. The sectoral distribution of SBTC,
as deﬁned by Esposito and Stehrer (2009), is then given by b1 + 5it = b1i + 4it. First,
all of the random noise captured in the data that is included in the residual 4it will in
this model be interpreted as sector-speciﬁc SBTC. Second, unless there is no correlation
between the regressors and the sector-speciﬁc means (b1i), the estimator for b2, b3 and
most importantly b1 will be biased. Consequently, the estimator for sector-speciﬁc SBTC
is also biased. In other words, if one really believes that the intercepts vary across sectors,
one should stick to modelling the ﬁxed-eﬀects equation (A4) where such heterogeneity
is explicitly allowed for.
Assumption 6. Estimating the multiperiod diﬀerence:32 ΔSiT = SiT − Si0
For the purpose of identifying sector-speciﬁc SBTC, Haskel and Slaughter (2002) and
Robertson (2004) used the cross-sectoral model
(A6) ΔSiT = b1 + b2Δ ln(WH/WL)iT + b3Δ ln(K/Y)iT + 6iT , (5.6)
where for example ΔSiT represents the multiperiod diﬀerence ΔSiT = SiT − Si0. In
this model, T−1(b1 + 6iT ) is viewed as the sectoral distribution of SBTC. Identifying
sectoral distribution of SBTC in this way was also done by, for example, Berman et al.
(1994). However, the inconsistency of identifying sector-speciﬁc parameters in a model
where all parameters are homogeneous still applies to this model. The use of A6 in the
literature is therefore probably due to lack of proper panel data and not because it is a
32Even though the multiperiod diﬀerence represents a new type of model, and not an assumption that
can be tested empirically, I list it as an assumption since this framework is linked to the more general
framework A4, as this section will show.
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preferred econometric model when panel data is readily available. This point becomes
clearer when comparing the estimator for the slope coeﬃcients in A4 with the estimator
for the slope coeﬃcients in A6. To this end, note that the multiperiod diﬀerence can be
written
ΔSiT = SiT − Si0 = (SiT − SiT−1) + (SiT−1 − SiT−2) + · · ·+ (Si1 − Si0) =
∑
t
ΔSit.
In other words, the model A6 is an equation in sector-speciﬁc means and the estimator
of the slope coeﬃcients is typically referred to as the between estimator. In contrast, the
estimator for the slope coeﬃcients in the ﬁxed-eﬀects model A4 is commonly referred to
as the within estimator. Given that A4 is the preferred econometric model and that A6
is used due to lack of time series data, it would be favourable in terms of identiﬁcation
if there were a connection between the two estimators. However, there is no connection,
as the two estimators are uncorrelated; see for example Arellano (2002, p.36). Even if
Assumption 5 holds and there is no sector-speciﬁc heterogeneity, estimating the slope
parameters with the between estimator in A6 instead of the global estimator in A5 is
ineﬃcient. The econometric model A6 should therefore not be used to identify sector-
speciﬁc SBTC when panel data are available.
5.3.3 Identifying TFP growth
Total factor productivity growth is calculated using the To¨rnqvist productivity index
Δ lnTFPit = Δ lnYit − sHitΔlnHit − sLitΔlnLit − sKitΔlnKit, (5.7)
where Yit is value-added in sector i at time t, sjit is the factor share of factor j =
H,L,K computed with regard to value-added in current prices. An overline above a
variable indicates the moving average operator, in this case between two time periods,
i.e., sHit = 1/2(sHit + sHit−1). This index is exact for a translog production function
and is commonly used to identify TFP growth; see for example OECD (2001).
5.3.4 Identifying a sector bias of SBTC
The second stage of identifying a sector bias of SBTC is to regress the estimate of
SBTC in the ﬁrst stage on the level of skill intensity in Equation 5.2. In Stehrer (2010),
it was shown that the impact of the sector bias depends on the type of substitution
between high- and low-skilled labour in a sector. Since an elasticity of substitution
equal to unity marks a threshold value for the sector bias, the second-stage regression
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is done separately in the case where factors of production are substitutes (σi > 1) and
complements (σi < 1).
5.3.5 Identifying a sector bias of TFP
The results from Stehrer (2010) implied that there is a sector bias of TFP if there is a
systematic relationship between TFP growth and skill intensity. To identify a sector bias
of TFP, I apply a similar procedure as used in Haskel and Slaughter (2002) to identify
the sector bias of SBTC and regress the mean growth in TFP on the skill intensity
Δ lnTFPi = φ1 + φ2(H/L)i + zi, (5.8)
where the overline represents the moving average operator Δ ln TFPi = 1/T
∑
ΔlnTFPit.
As shown in Stehrer (2010), if the elasticity of substitution of demand is low, the relative
wage rate will rise if TFP occurs mostly in unskilled sectors, which is consistent with a
signiﬁcant negative estimate of φ2. On the other hand, if the elasticity of substitution of
demand is high, the relative wage rate will rise if TFP occurs mostly in skilled sectors,
which is consistent with a positive estimate of φ2.
5.4 Data description
In total, the dataset covers 12 private sectors over the period 1972-2007. Data on
wages separated into high-skilled and low-skilled and data on employment classiﬁed by
high-skilled and low-skilled are taken from the Labour Accounts classiﬁed by level of
education. Low-skilled labour is deﬁned as workers with primary, secondary and/or
vocational education only, i.e., less than 13 years of schooling. Workers with 13 years
of schooling or more are deﬁned as skilled. The employment ﬁgures in the Labour
Accounts classiﬁed by level of education are based on the Register of Employers and
Employees (REE). All employers are obliged to report employment information to the
Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) which administers the REE. The
REE database, where each person is identiﬁed with his or her personal identiﬁcation
number, has been linked with information about educational levels from the Norwegian
State Educational Loan Fund (L˚anekassen) from 1986 onwards. Prior to 1986, register-
based employment ﬁgures consistent with the National Accounts were not available. In
order to extend the series prior to 1986, data from the Labour Force Survey between 1972
and 1986 are used. Details concerning the creation of employment statistics classiﬁed
by level of education can be found in Skotner (1994). Wage data are retrieved from the
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Table 5.1: Descriptive evidence
Wage premium Skill intensity Cost share
1972 1986 Δ 1972 1986 Δ 1972 1986 Δ
15 Consumption goods 1.72 1.58 -0.13 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.03
25 Misc. manufacturing 1.68 1.49 -0.20 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.05
30 Energy intensive manufacturing 1.92 1.78 -0.14 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.21 0.08
45 Engineering products 1.74 1.61 -0.13 0.14 0.22 0.07 0.20 0.26 0.06
50 Oil platforms and ships 1.90 1.75 -0.15 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.16 0.23 0.07
55 Construction 1.63 1.77 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.06
63 Financial intermediates 1.32 1.31 -0.02 0.25 0.30 0.05 0.25 0.28 0.03
64 Oil and gas exploration 1.63 1.36 -0.28 0.04 0.47 0.43 0.06 0.39 0.33
71 Electricity 1.79 1.62 -0.16 0.16 0.21 0.05 0.23 0.26 0.03
74 Domestic transportation 1.79 1.63 -0.16 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.05
81 Wholesale and retail trade 1.94 1.61 -0.33 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.06
85 Other private services 1.45 1.37 -0.08 0.33 0.42 0.10 0.32 0.37 0.05
1987 2007 Δ 1987 2007 Δ 1987 2007 Δ
15 Consumption goods 1.57 1.45 -0.13 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.06
25 Misc. manufacturing 1.44 1.39 -0.04 0.12 0.23 0.11 0.14 0.24 0.10
30 Energy intensive manufacturing 1.70 1.57 -0.13 0.16 0.22 0.06 0.21 0.26 0.04
45 Engineering products 1.57 1.48 -0.09 0.22 0.26 0.04 0.26 0.27 0.02
50 Oil platforms and ships 1.72 1.55 -0.17 0.18 0.23 0.04 0.24 0.26 0.02
55 Construction 1.70 1.58 -0.12 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.10 -0.00
63 Financial intermediates 1.27 1.40 0.13 0.32 0.83 0.51 0.29 0.54 0.25
64 Oil and gas exploration 1.32 1.25 -0.06 0.48 0.61 0.13 0.39 0.43 0.05
71 Electricity 1.63 1.50 -0.12 0.23 0.47 0.24 0.27 0.41 0.14
74 Domestic transportation 1.58 1.57 -0.02 0.07 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.21 0.11
81 Wholesale and retail trade 1.61 1.43 -0.18 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.19 0.07
85 Other private services 1.36 1.31 -0.05 0.42 0.58 0.15 0.37 0.43 0.06
Deﬁnitions: Wage premium = WH/WL, Skill intensity = H/L and the high-skilled Cost share
(S) = WHH/(WHH + WLL). Δ shows the diﬀerence in levels (in the top part of the table
between 1986 and 1972 and in the lower part between 2007 and 1987).
survey-based Wage Statistics.33 The population for the wage statistics is basically all
active establishments in the Central Register of Establishments and Enterprises. All of
the largest enterprises are sampled. Among the small- and medium-sized enterprises,
the sampling rates are about 40–50 and 10–20 per cent, respectively. In 2007, the
Labour Accounts classiﬁed by the level of education covered about 60 per cent of all
wage earners. In total, this new account system now holds information, consistent
with the National Accounts at a two-digit level, concerning employment, hours worked,
wages, and payroll costs across wage earners and self-employed, and educational levels.34
33In 1997, Statistics Norway established a set of uniform and comprehensive wage statistics. The use
of national and international standards makes the statistics accessible and comparable to other national
and international statistics. Hytjan et al. (2005) and Lien et al. (2009) provide further details regarding
the Wage Statistics.
34See Skoglund and Todsen (2007) for details regarding the deﬁnitions applied in the Labour Ac-
counts. For example, wages refer to cash remuneration for services rendered, paid by the employer to
the employee, while payroll costs include national insurance and pension premiums.
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Further information about the most recent Labour Accounts can be found in Gimming
(2010).
Value-added and capital ﬁgures are taken from the National Accounts.35 Capital may
include objects such as buildings, oil and gas pipelines, boats, means of transport, ma-
chinery, software, valuables, oil platforms, airplanes and helicopters. The perpetual
inventory method with geometric depreciation rate is used to construct capital series
from observed levels of real investment,
Kit+1 = (1− δ)Kit + Iit,
where Iit represents real investment and δ represents the rate of depreciation. For
example, the rate of depreciation is approximately 2 per cent for housing; 4 per cent for
oil and gas pipelines; 5 per cent for trains; 10 per cent for helicopters, ships and airplanes;
20 per cent for cars, trucks, and buses; and 50 per cent for intangibles. Valuables do
not depreciate. The choice of depreciation rates for capital objects in the Norwegian
National Accounts corresponds to the levels chosen in Sweden, Germany, and Canada.
Further details about the construction of capital levels can be found in Todsen (1997).
Table 5.1 shows how the wage premium, skill intensity, and cost share have developed
between 1972 and 1986 and between 1987 and 2007. Between 1972 and 1986, the only
sector that experienced an increase in the wage premium was Construction. In the
time period 1987-2007, the Construction sector also experienced a decrease in the wage
premium. In this latter time period, only the Financial intermediates sector experienced
an increase in the wage premium.36 The wage premium in this sector was the lowest of
all sectors in 1987. A ﬂexible labour market with mobility between sectors could cause
the wage premium to converge across sectors. Note that the variation in wage premium
decreased over the sample period in line with such convergence and that the wage of a
high-skilled was roughly 1.4–1.5 that of an unskilled in most sectors in 2007.
The lowering of the wage premium has occurred in tandem with an increase in skill
intensity. This general increase in skill intensity more than oﬀsets the lowering of the
35http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/default fr.asp?PLanguage=1
36I refer to Hægeland and Kirkebøen (2007) and references therein for a detailed analysis of wage
diﬀerentials across educational groups. Hægeland and Kirkebøen (2007) ﬁnd an increasing wage premium
during the nineties. The data used in Table 5.1 shows no such tendency. Note that Hægeland and
Kirkebøen (2007) use a trimmed data set, i.e., only full-time workers (more than 30 hours per week)
and exclude workers who were registered as unemployed or who left or started a new job during the
year. They also exclude workers born outside Norway. Furthermore, they exclude workers with less than
seven years of education as well as workers with particularly high or low income. In sum, they exclude
up to 50 per cent of the data material within each category. In contrast, since the focus is on the macro
economy, I do not exclude anything in my material. Also, since I aim for a measure of marginal cost
(W ), I use hourly wage costs while they analyse diﬀerences in full-time income. These diﬀerences should
be taken into account when comparing Table 5.1 with the results from Hægeland and Kirkebøen (2007).
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Table 5.2: Total factor productivity growth
1975 – 1986 1987 – 1997 1998 – 2007
15 Consumption goods 1.95 1.73 1.92
25 Misc. manufacturing 1.00 0.45 2.66
30 Energy intensive manufacturing 3.57 2.61 0.99
45 Engineering products 1.95 1.76 3.10
50 Oil platforms and ships 2.07 0.73 1.47
55 Construction 1.89 2.18 -2.17
63 Financial intermediates -2.19 -1.94 3.80
64 Oil and gas exploration 4.03 4.45 -0.76
71 Electricity 0.68 1.29 4.09
74 Domestic transportation 1.69 3.58 3.37
81 Wholesale and retail trade 4.25 4.70 6.72
85 Other private services 1.21 1.22 1.33
The table shows the mean growth rates in per cent, i.e., 100T
∑
t ΔlnTFPt, where
the TFPt series have been smoothed with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter using the
smoothing parameter λ = 100.
wage premium and has led to an overall increase in the cost share of high-skilled in
both time periods. There are, however, variations in the development of the cost share
between the two time periods. In particular, there was a surge in the cost share of high-
skilled in the Oil and gas exploration sector from 0.06 in 1972 to 0.39 in 1986. This surge
should be viewed in connection with the initial development of the Norwegian oil boom
that began with the discovery of the Ekoﬁsk oilﬁeld. Production from the ﬁeld started
in June 1971, and several large discoveries such as Statfjord (1974), Gullfaks (1978),
Oseberg (1979), and Troll (1983) were made during the following years (Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013). Even though the
increase in the cost share continued in the latter time period, the increase was modest
and in line with development in other sectors, reaching a level of 0.43 in 2007. In the
empirical section, I return to the particular development in the Oil and gas exploration
sector.
Table 5.2 shows TFP growth across sectors in the time periods 1975-1986, 1987-1997,
and 1998-2007. There was particularly high productivity growth between 1975 and 1986
in Energy intensive manufacturing and in Wholesale and retail trade, with an average
growth of 3.57 and 4.03 per cent respectively. These two sectors experienced quite dif-
ferent productivity growth rates towards 2007. While productivity growth decreased to
an average of 0.99 between 1998-2007 in Energy intensive manufacturing, the already
high level of productivity growth between 1975–1986 in Wholesale and retail trade in-
creased further, reaching an average of 6.72 between 1998 and 2007. From the 1990s,
the Wholesale and retail trade industry has undertaken both horizontal and vertical
integration. There has also been a surge in shopping malls since the late 1980s; see
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Rasmussen and Reidarson (2007). These developments are consistent with the eﬃciency
gains illustrated in Table 5.2. There has also been an increase in productivity growth
in Other private services; Domestic transportation; Electricity; and Financial interme-
diates. Between 1998 and 2008, ﬁve sectors experienced average TFP growth higher
than 3 per cent: Engineering products; Financial intermediates; Electricity; Domestic
transportation; and Wholesale and retail trade.
5.5 Econometric results
The econometric results are presented in three parts. In the ﬁrst part, I discuss the
estimates of SBTC based on the VEqCM and the simpliﬁed models from Assumptions
1 to 6. In the second part, the identiﬁcation of a sector bias of SBTC is discussed, and
in the third part, the identiﬁcation of a sector bias of TFP is analysed.
5.5.1 Identifying SBTC
In Table 5.3, estimates of the cost share function Equation 5.3 are reported together
with the adjustment coeﬃcients.37 The lag structure was chosen so as to whiten the
residuals, with particular focus on avoiding autocorrelation.38
There is wide variation in how the wage premium impacts the high-skilled cost share (b2).
In Energy intensive manufacturing; Oil and gas exploration; and Other private services,
an increase in the wage premium leads to a lowering of the cost share of high-skilled,
indicating that these sectors are characterised by great substitutability between the
high- and low-skilled labour, as shown in the last column. In contrast, the insigniﬁcant
estimates in many of the other sectors could be interpreted by how price and quantity
eﬀects cancel out. When the wages of high-skilled increase, more unskilled workers are
employed, but the change in employment is not large enough to signiﬁcantly impact the
cost share of high-skilled (ceteris paribus). An elasticity of substitution equal to unity
is consistent with the Cobb-Douglas production function.
Capital is treated as a quasi-ﬁxed factor of production. A signiﬁcant positive estimate
of capital intensity (b3) implies that capital is complementary to skilled labour, that is,
skilled workers are more eﬃcient in utilising capital equipment than unskilled workers.
37The results of the trace statistics used in testing for the cointegration rank can be found in the
appendix; see Table D.1. I assume that the cointegration rank is common across sectors, and I impose
one cointegration relation in all sectors.
38Tests for autocorrelation are shown in the appendix; see Table D.2.
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Table 5.3: VEqCM: estimates of the translog cost share function
bˆ2 bˆ3 bˆ1 αˆ1 αˆ2 αˆ3 Lags σ
15 Consumption goods -0.02 0.01 2.46** -0.42** 0.08 2.51 1 1.3
(0.04) (0.01) (0.21) (0.12) (0.55) (2.50)
25 Misc. manufacturing 0.08 0.07** 4.41** -0.68** -0.49 1.00 4 0.5
(-) (0.01) (0.15) (0.16) (0.92) (2.05)
30 Energy intensive manufact. -2.58** 1.21** 7.04** -0.06** -0.26** 0.37 4 16.1
(0.42) (0.20) (2.56) (0.03) (0.04) (0.39)
45 Engineering products -0.01 0.14** 2.41** -0.32** -0.10 0.25 1 1.1
(0.11) (0.02) (0.51) (0.07) (0.23) (0.99)
50 Oil platforms and ships 0.13 0.10** 3.84** -0.36** -0.92** 1.59 2 0.2
(-) (0.01) (0.23) (0.16) (0.20) (2.53)
55 Construction 0.05 -0.44 8.90 -0.04 -0.07 -0.52 1 0.4
(-) (0.16) (3.68) (0.02) (0.08) (0.29)
63 Financial intermediates 0.19 0.07** 2.79 -0.12* 0.34* -2.01** 3 0.2
(-) (0.03) (1.72) (0.10) (0.25) (0.66)
64 Oil and gas exploration -0.56** 0.10** 3.41** -0.35** 0.30** 1.83** 1 3.4
(0.09) (0.03) (0.80) (0.04) (0.06) (0.57)
71 Electricity 0.17 -0.15** 4.50** -0.59** -0.38* -3.20 4 0.2
(-) (0.02) (0.28) (0.19) (0.46) (2.87)
74 Domestic transportation 0.05 -0.08 4.44 -0.13 0.05 -0.58 1 0.5
(-) (0.04) (0.66) (0.05) (0.21) (0.97)
81 Wholesale and retail trade -0.06 0.02 4.33 -0.27* -0.84 -3.14 1 1.5
(0.05) (0.01) (0.76) (0.09) (0.57) (1.77)
85 Other private services -2.42** -0.15 0.13 -0.10** -0.27** 0.06 1 11.2
(0.40) (0.11) (1.80) (0.02) (0.06) (0.17)
The estimate of b1 is multiplied with 103. k refers to the number of lags in the VEqCM
model: Δxit = γ˜i + Γ1iΔxit−1 + · · · + ΓkiΔxit−k + Πix˜it−1 + it. The LR statistic have
been applied to test if the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Rejection at the
10 per cent signiﬁcance level is indicated with ∗ and ∗∗ indicates rejection at the 5 per cent
signiﬁcance level. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in brackets. The last row shows the
elasticity of substitution σ = 1− b2/(Sˆ(1− Sˆ)) where Sˆ is the mean cost share of high-skilled.
In some sectors bˆ2 have been restricted by bˆ2 = mint St(1− St) to ensure a positive elasticity
of substitution, marked with (−).
Misc. manufacturing; Energy intensive manufacturing; Engineering products; Oil plat-
forms and ships; Financial intermediates; and Oil and gas exploration are characterised
by signiﬁcant complementarity towards the skilled while there is signiﬁcant complemen-
tarity towards the unskilled in the Electricity sector only.
There is evidence of SBTC, i.e., a signiﬁcant positive estimate of b1, in most sectors. In
Construction; Financial intermediates; Domestic transportation; Wholesale and retail
trade; and Other private services, the estimates of SBTC are positive but not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero. Technical change has been particularly skill-biased in Energy
intensive manufacturing and Electricity.
Table 5.4 shows the estimates of SBTC (b1) in the models where Assumptions 1–6 have
been imposed. This table should be analysed in conjunction with Table 5.5 where the
imposed assumptions are empirically tested. Assumption 1 is empirically rejected in
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Table 5.4: Estimates of SBTC with diﬀerent models
VEqCM A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
15 Consumption goods 2.5** 2.5** 2.5** 2.7** 3.0 3.1 5.5
(0.2) (0.8) (0.8) (0.6)
25 Misc. manufacturing 4.4** 4.7** 4.3 5.0** 5.0 5.0 7.5
(0.2) (1.8) (1.8) (0.6)
30 Energy intensive manufact. 7.0** 2.1** 2.6 3.9** 4.1 4.1 6.0
(2.6) (0.9) (1.3) (1.2)
45 Engineering products 2.4** 2.4** 2.4** 2.8** 2.6 2.5 3.4
(0.5) (1.0) (0.4) (1.1)
50 Oil platforms and ships 3.8** 7.7** 7.6** 4.9** 3.5 3.4 4.4
(0.2) (2.0) (1.7) (1.6)
55 Construction 8.9 3.1** 3.9** 1.8** 1.5 1.6 3.9
(3.7) (1.3) (1.6) (0.7)
63 Financial intermediates 2.8 5.6** 17.3* 7.4** 8.2 8.3 9.4
(1.7) (2.4) (6.2) (1.9)
64 Oil and gas exploration 3.4** 2.5** -0.2 6.4* 11.5 11.5 12.6
(0.8) (0.9) (0.0) (3.4)
71 Electricity 4.5** 6.4** 8.6* 6.4** 5.9 5.9 6.3
(0.3) (2.0) (4.4) (1.8)
74 Domestic transportation 4.4 4.6* 1.2 5.0** 4.9 4.8 5.3
(0.7) (2.2) (0.6) (1.0)
81 Wholesale and retail trade 4.3 7.0** 7.1** 4.4** 4.8 4.7 4.5
(0.8) (3.1) (2.4) (0.9)
85 Other private services 0.1 2.0 0.3 3.5** 3.3 3.4 5.3
(1.8) (1.5) (0.1) (0.8)
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The estimate of SBTC (b1) is multiplied
with 103. The LR statistic have been applied to test if the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in the VEqCM model. Rejection at the 10 per cent signiﬁcance
level is indicated with ∗ and ∗∗ indicates rejection at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level.
In models A1 and A2, the test of signiﬁcance is made with respect to the short term
parameter α̂1b1. Standard errors are computed by dividing the standard error of the
short term parameter α̂1b1 with the estimate of the adjustment coeﬃcient α̂1. Note
that the method in B˚ardsen (1989) can be applied to test if b1 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from a value that is not equal to zero.
all sectors except for Consumption goods; Engineering products; and Wholesale and
retail trade. Imposing this restriction changes the estimate signiﬁcantly in, for example,
Energy intensive manufacturing and Domestic transportation. Given that Assumption 1
is already imposed, further restricting the model by imposing Assumption 2 is rejected
in almost every sector.39 Given that both Assumptions 1 and 2 have been imposed,
39Given that the residuals from the VEqCM model are multivariate normal, the test for weak exogene-
ity of the wage premium and capital intensity (Assumption 1) is valid. However, the sequential testing
procedure in Table 5.5 is not generally appropriate, and the test statistics should be interpreted with a
grain of salt. For example, if test of Assumption 2 is rejected, as is the case in Misc. manufacturing,
the consecutive test of Assumptions 3 is made with reference to a model with no empirical support.
In order to reduce the magnitude of this problem, I have used robust standard errors that take both
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Table 5.5: Testing assumptions 1 to 5
Assumptions
1 2 3 4 5
15 Consumption goods 0.9 9.4** -2.9** 1.8 -1.4
25 Misc. manufacturing 22.6** 3.7** -2.8** 0.2 0.1
30 Energy intensive manufact. 31.2** 6.2** -3.5** 0.5 -0.6
45 Engineering products 0.1 0.4 -9.9** 0.8 -1.7*
50 Oil platforms and ships 5.5* 2.3* -5.2** 6.4** -1.1
55 Construction 12.9** 1.0 -6.4** 31.0** -2.5**
63 Financial intermediates 18.2** 15.7** -3.9** 45.8** 2.5**
64 Oil and gas exploration 18.8** 4.4** -5.8** 8.8** 5.2**
71 Electricity 8.4** 24.3** -2.8** 0.8 0.8
74 Domestic transportation 5.5* 6.5** -2.3** 1.4 0.0
81 Wholesale and retail trade 2.9 0.9 -4.7** 4.7** -0.0
85 Other private services 14.5** 2.5* -4.6** 1.6 -1.2
Model VEqCM A1 A2 A3 A4
Test α2i = 0 Γ˜ji = 0 α1i = 0 b2i = b2 b1i = b1
α3i = 0 ∀j b3i = b3
Test statistic χ2 F -value t-value F -value t-value
Robust standard errors that take both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation into
account (Newey and West) are used in models A1, A2 and A3. In the panel model,
A4, robust standard errors that handle between-period correlation (cross-section clus-
tering) have been imposed; see Beck and Katz (1995). Rejection at the 10 per cent
signiﬁcance level is indicated with ∗ and ∗∗ indicates rejection at the 5 per cent
signiﬁcance level.
the hypothesis that Assumption 3 can also be imposed is rejected at the 5 per cent
signiﬁcance level in all sectors. Models A4, A5, and A6 are thus rejected in all sectors.
The estimates of SBTC vary across models, particularly in Financial intermediates and
Oil and gas exploration, where all assumptions were rejected at the 5 per cent level.
Since both of these sectors experience a high level of skill intensity, this variation will
impact the estimate of a sector bias.
5.5.2 Identifying a sector bias of SBTC
If the sector bias hypothesis is relevant, one should ﬁnd a systematic relationship between
the level of sector-speciﬁc technical change and skill intensity. The previous section dis-
cussed the sector-speciﬁc level of technical change and how it changed when imposing
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation into account. In the panel model, A4, I have imposed robust
standard errors that handle between-period correlation (cross-section clustering); see Beck and Katz
(1995) and (Quantitative Micro Software, 2010, p. 611).
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Figure 5.1: The sensitivity of key assumptions. The y axis measures SBTC while the x axis
measures skill intensity at the 1990 level, i.e., the relative number of man-hours of skilled and
unskilled (H/L). The OLS regression line speciﬁed in Equation 5.2 is included. Signiﬁcance of
the γ2 slope coeﬃcient is indicated by ∗ at the 10 per cent signiﬁcance level and by ∗∗ at the 5
per cent signiﬁcance level.
Assumptions 1–6. The purpose of Figure 5.1 is to illustrate how the conclusion regard-
ing a sector bias can change when imposing Assumptions 1–6. Note that, in contrast to
Haskel and Slaughter (2002) and Esposito and Stehrer (2009), which focused on man-
ufacturing sectors only, both manufacturing and services sectors are included. Also,
following Haskel and Slaughter (2002), all sectors are included irrespective of the size
of the elasticity of substitution. The estimate of the parameter γ2 from Equation 5.2 is
shown in all sub-ﬁgures.
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Figure 5.2: The Oil and gas exploration sector
In Figure 5.1a, which is based on the most general VEqCM speciﬁcation, there is a
signiﬁcant negative relationship between skill intensity and SBTC. The estimate of γ2
is still negative when imposing Assumption 1, but it becomes insigniﬁcant. However,
when also imposing Assumption 2, the insigniﬁcant negative estimate changes to an
insigniﬁcant positive estimate. This change can mostly be traced back to the increased
estimate of SBTC in Financial intermediates. Imposing Assumption 3 does not change
the positive estimate of γ2, but now the estimate is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the
10 per cent signiﬁcance level. Imposing further Assumptions 4, 5, and 6 yields a higher
estimate of γ2. As a result, applying the framework used in the literature therefore leads
to the conclusion that there has been a signiﬁcant positive sector bias in Norway.
Trying to pinpoint exactly why the estimates of γ2 change when more assumptions
are imposed can lead the discussion astray. However, the results from the Oil and
gas exploration sector shed light on two general problems with the framework used in
the literature. Figure 5.2 shows the cointegration relationship (βx˜t−1) in this sector
together with the cost share of high-skilled (St). Initially, the cost share of high-skilled
is far from equilibrium, as shown by the cointegration relationship. It takes about seven
years until the cointegration cost share schedule is in equilibrium. The general VEqCM
speciﬁcation allows for such initial disequilibrium. The rapid increase in the cost share
of high-skilled in the 1970s, which occurred when the Norwegian oil boom began, is in
this framework interpreted as a process of equilibrium correction. SBTC was estimated
to be 3.4×10−3. In contrast, in a pure diﬀerence approach, such as models A3–A6, there
is no equilibrium correction. The rapid increase in the cost share of high-skilled in the
1970s will therefore be interpreted as SBTC. This explains the estimated level of SBTC
in model A3 of 6.4× 10−3, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the VEqCM estimate. To
check that the initial disequilibrium is the cause of the bias, I re-estimate model A3
beginning in a year where the cost share schedule was roughly in equilibrium. It can
be seen from the cointegration relationship in Figure 5.2 that the cost share schedule
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Figure 5.3: The sector bias of SBTC. The y axis measures SBTC while the x axis measures
skill intensity (H/L) in 1990. The OLS regression line speciﬁed in Equation 5.2 is included.
Signiﬁcance of the slope coeﬃcient is indicated by ∗ at the 10 per cent signiﬁcance level and by
∗∗ at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level.
is roughly in equilibrium in 1982. Re-estimating model A3 starting in 1982 lowers the
estimate of SBTC to 4.0 × 10−3, which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the VEqCM
estimate. Therefore, as the results from the Oil and gas exploration sector have shown,
using an econometric framework that does not take initial disequilibrium into account
can lead to biased estimates.
The second problem with the cross-section model is the assumed homogeneous slope
parameters. In the Oil and gas exploration sector, the estimated level of SBTC was
bˆA31 = 6.4×10−3 in model A3 while the estimated level in model A4 was bˆA41 = 11.5×10−3.
Decomposing the diﬀerence between these estimates according to Equation 5.5 yields
bˆA31 − bˆA41 = (bˆ2 − bˆ2,64)Δ ln(WH/WL)64 + (bˆ3 − bˆ3,64)Δ ln(K/Y)64
= −5.2× 10−3 + 0.1× 10−3 = −5.1× 10−3,
where the values bˆ2 = .0569, bˆ2,64 = −.4289, bˆ3 = .0001, bˆ3,64 = .0045, Δ ln(WH/WL)64 =
−.0108 and Δ ln(K/Y)64 = −.0290 have been used and where 64 is the industry code for
the Oil and gas exploration sector. The estimate bˆ2,64 = −.4289 indicates that the Oil
and gas exploration sector is characterised by great substitutability between high- and
low-skilled labour. Since the “average” sector in contrast is characterised by low sub-
stitutability, bˆ2 = .0569, the error of assuming the same type of labour substitutability
across sectors is signiﬁcant in the Oil and gas exploration sector. As the decomposi-
tion shows, it is the impact of wrongly imposing a homogeneous eﬀect from the wage
premium that causes the increased estimate of SBTC. Moreover, if one has erroneously
imposed homogeneous slope parameters in the ﬁrst stage, the second stage of the es-
timation procedure Equation 5.2 will wrongfully include all sectors, irrespective of the
true size of the elasticity of substitution.
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Figure 5.4: The Sector Bias of TFP. The y axis measures smoothed TFP growth while the x
axis measures skill intensity (H/L) in (a) 1980, (b) 1990 and (c) 2000. The TFP series has been
smoothed with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter using the smoothing parameter λ = 100. The OLS
regression line speciﬁed in Equation 5.8 is included. Signiﬁcance of the slope coeﬃcient φ2 is
indicated by ∗ at the 10 per cent signiﬁcance level and by ∗∗ at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level.
The impact of a sector bias of SBTC depends on whether a sector is characterised by
elasticity of substitution in production higher or lower than unity. To identify the sector
bias of SBTC, Figure 5.3 plots SBTC against the skill intensity separately for sectors
where factors of production are complements Figure 5.3a and substitutes Figure 5.3b. In
neither of the two cases is the slope coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. However,
the negative relationship between SBTC and skill intensity in Figure 5.3b shows that
SBTC has mainly occurred in sectors with a low skill intensity. This is consistent with
a rising wage premium when the elasticity of substitution of demand is low, or with a
decreasing wage premium if the elasticity of substitution of demand is high. The lack
of a signiﬁcant estimate of γ2 should be viewed in conjunction with the sample size. As
there are only six sectors in each subﬁgure, the empirical evidence presented provides
neither clear support for a sector bias of SBTC nor clear rejection of a sector bias of
SBTC.
5.5.3 Identifying a sector bias of TFP
Figure 5.4 plots the average TFP growth over the time periods 1975–1986, 1987–1997 and
1998–2007 against skill intensity evaluated in 1980, 1990, and 2000 respectively. The Oil
and gas exploration sector has been excluded from the sample since increased extraction
of oil and gas, which represents economic rent, ends up as TFP in the index formula
Equation 5.7. Further, to control for business cycles, the TFP indices have been chained
and smoothed with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter using a smoothing parameter λ = 100.
There is a clear shift in trend between the time periods. Between 1975 and 1997, TFP
growth was highly concentrated in low-skilled sectors. This is consistent with the sector
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bias hypothesis, i.e., a rising relative wage rate if the elasticity of substitution in demand
is low and a falling relative wage rate if the elasticity of substitution in demand is high.
In the time period 1998–2007, this relationship changes. TFP growth becomes higher in
high-skilled sectors and lower in low-skilled sectors. The negative relationship between
TFP growth and skill intensity observed between 1975 and 1997 has disappeared. The
empirical evidence points to a sector bias of TFP from the 1970s to the 1990s, but the
impact of the sector bias reduced towards the latter part of the sample period.
5.6 Conclusions
The sector bias of technical change is a theoretical result, implying that the skill in-
tensity of the sector where technical change occurs matters for the development of the
wage premium. Identifying the importance of a sector bias is therefore crucial in un-
derstanding the development of the wage premium. The empirical literature studying
a sector bias of technical change has only focused on skill-biased technical change. In
this chapter, I have analysed the sector bias of both factor-neutral and factor-biased
technical change. In Norwegian data from 1972 to 2007, the empirical evidence is not
clear on the impact of a sector bias of skill-biased technical change, but it points to a
sector bias of factor-neutral technical change from the 1970s to the 1990s. That said,
the impact of the sector bias seems to have gradually reduced towards the latter part of
the sample period. I also evaluated the cross-section model used in the literature and
showed that strong restrictions must be placed on a vector equilibrium correction model
to end up with this model. If these restrictions do not hold, the results reported in
the literature may be biased. I showed that the restrictions were strongly rejected, and
erroneously imposing them signiﬁcantly changed the estimates of skill-biased technical
change in many sectors. The results from the Oil and gas exploration sector shed light
on two general problems with the framework used in the literature. It was shown that
what is interpreted as equilibrium correction in the VEqCM is wrongfully interpreted
as SBTC in the cross-section model. Also, assuming high- and low-skilled labour to be
either substitutes or complements leads to a large bias of SBTC. By using a VEqCM
speciﬁcation, the pitfalls of the cross-section model can be avoided.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 The E`lteto¨-Ko¨ves-Szulc (EKS) index
An index number formula PPPjk is said to satisfy the transitivity property if and only
if for all choices of j, k and l, the index satisﬁes PPPjk = PPPjl × PPPlk. (ILO et al.,
2004b, p. 497). The transitivity property implies that attaining the PPP between Nor-
way and Germany directly is equivalent to the indirect comparison between Norway and
a third country, and the third country and Germany. The EKS method yields a transi-
tive index. Although the transitivity property is an important requirement, as pointed
out by Deaton and Heston (2010), the transitivity property implies that “the price index
for any pair of countries depends on prices and budget shares in third countries, a vio-
lation of the independence of irrelevant country property” (p. 8). As shown by Veelen
(2002), any method of comparing wealth of nations must violate either the independence
of irrelevant country property, or one of three other reasonable requirements.40 However,
when countries have relatively similar structures, which is the case for the countries in
this article, the EKS index is not very sensitive to budget shares in third countries. This
follows since the EKS method also attempts to provide PPPs that retain the essential
features of indices comparing pairs of countries separately, i.e., the index deviates least
from pairwise Fisher binary comparisons (Eurostat and OECD, 2012, p. 245). The EKS
index PPPEKS for a particular industry aggregation, e.g., manufacturing, is calculated
as a geometric mean of all the indirect Fisher indices PPPF between countries j and k
PPPEKSjk =
M∏
l=1
(
PPPFjl × PPPFlk
)1/M
. (A.1)
40The three properties are Weak continuity, Dependence on prices and Weak Ranking Restrictions.
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The Fisher index is the geometric average between the Paasche (PPPP ) and Laspeyres
indices (PPPL)
PPPFjl =
(
PPPLjl × PPPPjl
)1/2
. (A.2)
The Laspeyres and Paasche indices are deﬁned by
PPPLjl =
I∑
i=1
PPPij
PPPil
sil and PPPPjl =
(
I∑
i=1
(
PPPij
PPPil
)−1
sij
)−1
,
where i runs across sub industries within manufacturing and where the weight sil is
industry i’s gross output share in manufacturing in country l.
A.2 PPPs for capital input
To calculate PPPs for capital input I have used the PPPs for gross ﬁxed capital forma-
tion provided by OECD and Eurostat (2008). The use of PPPs for gross ﬁxed capital
formation implies the assumption that the relative price between capital and investment
is equal between all countries. Following Inklaar and Timmer (2008, p. 35), if PK
denote the user cost of capital and P I is the price of real gross ﬁxed investments, the
PPP for capital between country j and the USA can be written as
PPPKj = PPP
I
j
PKj /P
I
j
PKUSA/P
I
USA
. (A.3)
Since I do not hold the user cost of capital for all countries it is assumed that the
ratio of relative capital to investment prices are equal between countries, i.e., PKj /P
I
j =
PKUSA/P
I
USA for all j, and that the PPPs for investment are good proxies for the PPPs
for capital.
A.3 Mapping from ISIC Rev. 2 to ISIC Rev. 3
Longer time series for R&D were created by extending ISIC Rev. 3 data backwards in
time using the growth rates of ISIC Rev. 2 data. To this end, the approximate mapping
scheme outlined in the documentation of the STAN databse (OECD, 2005, Annex 1,
p. 25) were applied. This mapping is also illustrated in Table A.1. To illustrate how
precise the approximation is, the percentage deviation (in absolute terms) between the
oﬃcial ISIC Rev. 3 data and the transformed ISIC Rev. 2 data for R&D expenditure
in 1990 in Norway is shown in column 3 and 6 of Table A.1.
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Table A.1: Approximate mapping from ISIC Rev. 2 to ISIC Rev. 3 – R&D expenditure
in Norway in 1990
Rev. 3 Rev. b Deviation (%) Rev. 3 Rev. 2 Deviation (%)
c01t99 b01t99 0.0 c30 b3825 0.0
c15t37 b3 0.0 c31 b383x 0.0
c15t16 b31 0.0 c32 b2832 0.0
c17t19 b32 0.2 c33 b385 0.0
c20 b33 c34 b3843 0.0
c21t22 b34 c351 b3841 0.0
c23t25 b35 0.0 c353 b3845 0.1
c24x b3512x 0.0 c352a9 b3842a 0.5
c2423 b3522 0.0 c35 b3841+b3845+b3842a 0.0
c23 b3534a 0.0 c36 b39
c24 b3512x+b3522 0.0 c40t99 b4t9 0.0
c25 b3556a 0.0 c40t41 b4 0.0
c26 b36 0.0 c45 b5 0.0
c27 b37 0.0 c60t63 b71
c28 b381 0.0 c64 b72
c29 b382x 0.0 c74 b8284 0.0
The table shows the approximate mapping between the 2nd and 3rd revision of the
International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation in the STAN OECD database, see the
documentation of the STAN database (OECD, 2005, Annex 1., p. 25). Columns 3 and 6
show the absolute value of the mean deviation of R&D expenditure in 1990 in Norway in
current prices
A.4 Mapping from ISIC Rev. 3 to ISIC Rev. 4
The ISIC Rev. 4 was oﬃcially released 11 August 2008. Data in ISIC Rev. 3 format
have been mapped to the new ISIC Rev. 4 classiﬁcation using the approximate 2-digit
mapping provided in The OECD Compendium of Productivity Indicators 2013 (OECD,
2013, Annex D). This mapping is also provided in Table A.2. To illustrate how precise
the approximation is, the percentage deviation (in absolute value) between the oﬃcial
ISIC Rev. 4 data and the transformed ISIC Rev. 3 data for value added in current
prices (VALU ) between 1990 and 2000 across industries in Denmark is shown next to
the industry codes. For many industries there is a close correspondence between the
ISIC Rev. 4 series and the transformed ISIC Rev. 3 series. However for industries such
as Computer, electronic and optical products (d26), Furniture, other manufacturing and
repair and installation of machinery and equipment (d31t33), Warehousing and support
activities for transportation (d52) and Professional, scientiﬁc, technical, administrative
and support service activities (d69t82) the mean discrepancy between the two series was
more than 10 per cent.
For some industries the approximation follows a one-to-one mapping between the classi-
ﬁcation systems. Some ISIC Rev. 3 industries are however split between two ISIC Rev.
4 industries. This is shown with an asterisk (∗) in Table A.2. For example, the Post and
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telecommunications industry (c64) is split between the two ISIC Rev. 4 industries Postal
and courier activities (d53) and Telecommunications (d61). To calculate the two ISIC
Rev. 4 industries one must provide a weighting scheme between the two industries, i.e.,
Xd53 = wd53Xc64 and Xd61 = wd61Xc64, where the weights are given by wd53 = Yd53Yd53+Yd61
and wd61 = Yd61Yd53+Yd61 for a given weighting variable Y . For most variables, such as
value added, gross output and intermediate input, the weights were taken from OECD
STAN ISIC Rev. 4 using Y = X. The weights were extrapolated using constant shares
if needed. For some variables, the weighting variables diﬀered from the variable being
transformed. For example, the mapping of the capital stock used gross ﬁxed capital
formation (GFCF) as weighting variable.
For some variables the information at the ISIC Rev. 3 classiﬁcation level was not de-
tailed enough and the ISIC Rev. 3 data has been disaggregated before the mapping
procedure were applied. For example, the real ﬁxed capital stock were only available
from EU KLEMS for the Pulp, paper, printing and publishing industry (c21t22) for the
USA. However, to map the capital level to the ISIC Rev. 4 industries Printing and
reproduction of recorded media (d18) and Publishing activities (d58), the Pulp, paper,
printing and publishing industry (c21t22) were split into Pulp, paper and paper products
(c21) and Printing and publishing (c22) using capital compensation as weighting vari-
able. For some countries, there is thus greater uncertainty surrounding those industries
were a one-to-one mapping was not suﬃcient.
Data for France are based on the ISIC Rev. 3 version of the STAN database. The data
have been mapped to ISIC Rev. 4 and extrapolated backwards using the growth rates
from the STAN ISIC Rev. 4 database. This was done since net capital was not available
in the ISIC Rev. 4 database.
The EKS index requires a weight for gross output for all countries. To map the PPPs
from Timmer et al. (2006) to ISIC Rev. 4 some assumption were made when information
for gross output was not available. In particular, gross output for Postal and courier
activities (d53) in Sweden were not available, and the auxiliary weight for this industry
was created using the gross output from the aggregate industry Transportation and
storage (d49t53) and multiplying with the share of d53 from d49t53 in Norway, i.e.,
Xd53,SWE = Xd49t53,SWE (
Xd53,NOR
Xd49t53,NOR
). Correspondingly, auxiliary weights for Printing
and reproduction of recorded media (d18), Publishing activities (d58), Audiovisual and
broadcasting activities (d59t60) in France, and Electricity, gas, steam and hot water
supply (c41) and Recycling (c37) in the USA was created using weights from Germany.
Thus, also for the mapping of PPPs is there greater uncertainty surrounding those
industries were a one-to-one mapping was not suﬃcient. To map the industry Chemical,
rubber, plastics, fuel products and other non-metallic mineral products (d19t23) for
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Norway as a sum of c23 to c26, the gross output for c23 to c26 is needed. Since there are
currently only two operating oil reﬁneries in Norway, the gross output for Coke, reﬁned
petroleum products and nuclear fuel (c23) and Chemicals and chemical products (c24)
are not published in the main series of the National Accounts. However, in 1997, which
is the benchmark year in Timmer et al. (2006), there were three reﬁneries operating and
Statistics Norway published gross output for these sectors separately in the Input-Output
tables, see https://www.ssb.no/a/english/kortnavn/nr_en/supply_use.html.
Only value and price variables were mapped. Price indices were aggregated using the
To¨rnqvist price index. After the mapping of value and price series, volume series were
then constructed from the product rule., i.e., the identity of a value ratio being equal to
a price ratio times a quantity ratio, see Frisch (1930).
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Table A.2: Approximate mapping from ISIC Rev. 3 to ISIC Rev. 4, Value added in
Denmark, 1990–2000
Rev. 4 Rev. 3 Deviation (%) Rev. 4 Rev. 3 Deviation (%)
d01t99 c01t99 0.0 d35t39 c37+c40t41+c90 0.0
d01t03 c01t05 3.2 d36t39 c37+c41+c90 0.0
d01t02 c01t02 3.5 d37t39 c37+c90 0.0
d01 c01 4.0 d35 c40 0.0
d02 c02 7.7 d36 c41 0.0
d03 c05 0.0 d41t43 c45 0.0
d05t09 c10t14 0.7 d45t47 c50t52 0.5
d05t06 c10t12 0.7 d45t56 c50t55+c60t63 3.2
d07t09 c13t14 0.7 d45 c50 7.5
d10t33 c15t37 4.8 d46 c51 0.0
d10t12 c15t16 0.7 d47 c52 1.1
d10t11 c15 0.7 d49t53 c60t63 12.8
d12 c16 0.0 d49 c60 0.0
d13t15 c17t19 0.5 d50 c61 0.8
d13t14 c17t18 0.9 d51 c62 0.0
d15 c19 3.0 d52 c63 13.0
d16 c20 0.4 d53 c64* 0.0
d16t18 c20+c21+c22* 3.1 d55t56 c55 0.0
d17 c21 5.1 d58t63 c22*+c64*+c92*+c72
d18 c22* 4.3 d59t60 c92* 0.8
d19 c23 0.0 d61 c64* 0.0
d19t23 c23t25+c26 0.6 d62t63 c72 7.5
d20t21 c24 0.6 d64t66 c65t67 0.2
d22t23 c25+c26 0.7 d64 c65 0.3
d22 c25 0.7 d65 c66 0.0
d23 c26 2.2 d66 c67 0.0
d24t25 c27t28 3.6 d68t82 c70t74 4.6
d24 c27 5.7 d68 c70 0.3
d25 c28 6.1 d69t82 c71t74 11.8
d26t28 c29t33 8.7 d72 c73 0.0
d26t27 c30t33 d84t99 c75t99 4.0
d26 c30+c32+c33 14.6 d84t88 c75+c80+c85 0.4
d27 c31 1.3 d84 c75 0.5
d28 c29 7.6 d85 c80 0.0
d29t30 c34t35 9.3 d86t88 c85 0.6
d29 c34 5.6 d90t99 c91+c92*+c93+c95 8.8
d30 c35 19.2 d90t93 c92* 0.8
d31t33 c36 44.9 d97t98 c95 0.0
The table shows the approximate mapping between the 3rd and 4th revision of the
International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation in the STAN OECD databse, see The
OECD Compendium of Productivity Indicators 2013 (OECD, 2013, Annex D). Columns
3 and 6 show the absolute value of the mean deviation of value added in current prices
(VALU) in Denmark between 1990 and 2000. The asterisk (∗) indicates that the ISIC
Rev. 3 industry is split between two ISIC Rev. 4 industries, e.g., Xd53 = wd53Xc64 and
Xd61 = wd61Xc64, where the weights are given by wd53 = Yd53Yd53+Yd61 and wd61 =
Yd61
Yd53+Yd61
for a given weighting variable Y .
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Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Approximation of unit value biases
The entering and exiting bias can be written as the ratio of the last two terms in
Equation 3.2 and Equation 3.4
(
1 +
∑
i∈Ict Vit
/∑
i∈I Vit
1 +
∑
i∈Ict Hit
/∑
i∈I Hit
)(
1 +
∑
i∈Ict−1 Vit−1
/∑
i∈I Vit−1
1 +
∑
i∈Ict−1 Hit−1
/∑
i∈I Hit−1
)−1
. (B.1)
Given that the number of workers entering and exiting is small relative to the number of
workers available in both time periods, and by applying the approximation ln(1+ z) ≈ z
when z is small, the logarithm of the entering bias (the parenthesis in the middle) can
be written as
ln
(
1 +
∑
i∈Ict Vit
/∑
i∈I Vit
1 +
∑
i∈Ict Hit
/∑
i∈I Hit
)
≈
∑
i∈Ict
Vit
/∑
i∈I
Vit −
∑
i∈Ict
Hit
/∑
i∈I
Hit (B.2)
=
∑
i∈Ict Hit∑
i∈I Hit
(∑
i∈Ict Vit
/∑
i∈Ict Hit∑
i∈I Vit
/∑
i∈I Hit
− 1
)
(B.3)
≈
(∑
i∈Ict Hit∑
i∈I Hit
)
ln
(
ut(I
c
t )
ut(I)
)
, (B.4)
where the last equality follows from the approximation z − 1 ≈ ln(z) when z ≈ 1
and the deﬁnition of unit values as the aggregate labour costs relative to the number
of hours worked, i.e., ut(Z) =
∑
i∈Z Vit
/∑
i∈Z Hit in any given set Z. Taking the
exponential on the right hand side of Equation B.4, and by applying the corresponding
approximation for the set of exiting workers, yields the approximate expression for the
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aggregate entering and exiting unit value bias in Equation B.1
(
ut(I
c
t )
ut(I)
)(∑i∈Ict Hit∑
i∈I Hit
)(
ut−1(Ict−1)
ut−1(I)
)−(∑i∈Ict−1 Hit−1∑
i∈I Hit−1
)
. (B.5)
The two terms are the biases of entering and exiting workers, as given in Equation 3.13
and Equation 3.14, respectively.
B.2 Two-step biases
In this section we derive the TWO-STEP ENTERING BIAS in Equation 3.16 and the
TWO-STEP EXITING BIAS in Equation 3.17. Since the workforce can be split into
two complement sets consisting of those that are skilled (S) and those that are unskilled
(U) so that It = St ∪ Ut, the contribution from workers entering the workforce in
Equation 3.4 can be approximately decomposed by41
ln
⎛⎝1 +∑
i∈Ict
Hit
/∑
i∈I
Hit
⎞⎠ = ln(1 + ∑i∈Sct Hit +∑i∈Uct Hit∑
i∈S Hit +
∑
i∈U Hit
)
≈ ψt(S, I)
(∑
i∈Sct Hit∑
i∈S Hit
)
+ (1− ψt(S, I))
(∑
i∈Uct Hit∑
i∈U Hit
)
(B.6)
where the weight ψt(S, I) is the share of man-hours carried out by skilled among con-
tinuing workers evaluated at time t, i.e. ψt(S, I) =
(∑
i∈S Hit∑
i∈I Hit
)
. Correspondingly, the
contribution from workers exiting the workforce in Equation 3.4 can then be approxi-
mately decomposed42
ln
⎛⎝1 + ∑
i∈Ict−1
Hit−1
/∑
i∈I
Hit−1
⎞⎠−1
≈ −ψt−1(S, I)
(∑
i∈Sct−1 Hit−1∑
i∈S Hit−1
)
− (1− ψt−1(S, I))
(∑
i∈Uct−1 Hit−1∑
i∈U Hit−1
)
. (B.7)
These entering and exiting terms will be compared with the entering and exiting terms
in the two-step procedure. The To¨rnqvist index across skilled and unskilled labour in
41Since ln(1 + z) ≈ z for z ≈ 0.
42Since ln(1 + z)−1 ≈ −z for z ≈ 0.
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Equation 3.15 can be written in logs as
υt(St, It) ln
( ∑
i∈It HSit∑
i∈It−1 HSit−1
)
+
(
1− υt(St, It)
)
ln
( ∑
i∈It HUit∑
i∈It−1 HUit−1
)
.
By applying Equation 3.4 for both skilled and unskilled, the To¨rnqvist index can ap-
proximately be decomposed into contributions from continuing, entering and exiting
workers
υt(St, It) ln
( ∑
i∈S Hit∑
i∈S Hit−1
)
+
(
1− υt(St, It)
)
ln
( ∑
i∈U Hit∑
i∈U Hit−1
)
+ υt(St, It)
(∑
i∈Sct Hit∑
i∈S Hit
)
+
(
1− υt(St, It)
)(∑
i∈Uct Hit∑
i∈U Hit
)
− υt(St, It)
(∑
i∈Sct−1 Hit−1∑
i∈S Hit−1
)
−
(
1− υt(St, It)
)(∑
i∈Uct−1 Hit−1∑
i∈U Hit−1
)
. (B.8)
It follows that the (log of the) entering bias from using the two-step procedure can be
approximated by the diﬀerence between the entering and exiting terms in the expression
above with Equation B.6 and Equation B.7, respectively
υt(St, It)
(∑
i∈Sct Hit∑
i∈S Hit
)
+
(
1− υt(St, It)
)(∑
i∈Uct Hit∑
i∈U Hit
)
−
(
ψt(S, I)
(∑
i∈Sct Hit∑
i∈S Hit
)
+ (1− ψt(S, I))
(∑
i∈Uct Hit∑
i∈U Hit
))
.
Taking the exponential of this expression yields the TWO-STEP ENTERING BIAS in
Equation 3.16. Correspondingly, taking the exponential of the diﬀerence between the
exiting terms in Equation B.8 and Equation 3.16 yields the TWO-STEP EXITING BIAS
in Equation 3.17.
B.3 Contractual hours as a proxy for actual hours worked
In our analysis of measuring labour services contractual hours represents a proxy for
actual hours worked. The purpose of this section is to evaluate the discrepancy between
contractual hours and actual hours worked and to analyse if this discrepancy increased
after 2005 when productivity growth slowed.43 To this end, we will compare data on
actual and contractual hours from register based statistics, the National Accounts and
43See ILO (2008) for the diﬀerent concepts of hours worked.
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Figure B.1: Hours worked (Millions). Compares register based employment statistics for
contractual hours worked with national accounts data on actual hours worked.
the Labour Force Survey (LFS). We will also take a closer look at aggregate rates for
overtime and sickness absence.
Figure B.1 compares register-based employment statistics for contractual hours worked
with national accounts data on actual hours worked. Both series start at about 3 300
million hours worked in 2001 and end at about 3 800 million hours worked. However, in
the ﬁrst couple of years, there is some discrepancy between the two series. While there is
a modest increase in contractual hours worked from 2001 to 2005, the number of actual
hours worked as measured by the National Accounts drops from 3 331 million hours
worked in 2001 to 3 242 in 2003, before increasing to 3 360 in 2005. Although there are
some discrepancies between these series in the short term, over the entire sample they
show broadly the same increase in hours worked.
Figure B.2 shows actual and contractual working hours. The data represents the mean
across 3rd quarter observations from the LFS. Workers with either actual or contractual
weekly hours below 5 or higher than 90 are excluded. There has been a reduction in both
weekly contractual and actual working hours from 2000 to 2009, from 35.6 to 35.2 and
from 36.7 to 35.6, respectively. Although there was some variation between 2005 and
2008, neither contractual nor actual working hours changed much between these years:
the mean contractual working hour was 35.3 in both 2005 and 2008 and the mean actual
working hour was 36.0 in both 2005 and 2008. According to these data, the discrepancy
between the two diﬀerent measures of labour services in Table 3.3 between 2005 and
2008 can thus not be explained by diﬀerences between contractual and actual working
hours.
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Figure B.2: Weekly actual and contractual hours worked. Mean across 3rd quarter observations
from the Labour Force Survey. Workers with either actual or contractual weekly hours below 5
or higher than 90 hours are excluded. Source: Statistics Norway.
A diﬀerent way to analyse the wedge between contractual and actual working hours is
to look at overtime and sickness absence rates. The overtime rate is deﬁned as the ratio
of overtime hours to contractual hours and the sickness absence rate is deﬁned as the
ratio of sickness absence hours to contractual hours. In contrast to actual hours worked,
contractual hours worked excludes irregular overtime and includes absence from work
such as sickness absence. To illustrate, we let actual hours worked be deﬁned as the
sum of contractual hours worked and irregular overtime hours but excluding sickness
absence, as a crude approximation. Moreover, let the overtime rate be deﬁned by the
ratio of overtime hours to contractual hours and let the sickness absence rate be deﬁned
by the ratio of sickness absence hours to contractual hours. It then follows that44
Percentage change in hours worked − Percentage change in contractual hours
≈ Change in overtime rate − Change in sickness absence rate.
The wedge between the percentage change in hours worked and contractual hours is
thus the diﬀerence between the change in overtime and sickness absence rate, measured
in percentage points.
Figure B.3 shows overtime and sickness absence rates measured in per cent. The overtime
rate has been fairly constant ranging from 1.5 per cent in 2003 to 2.0 per cent in 2007
and 2008. In 2005 the overtime rate was 1.7 per cent. The change in overtime rate from
44Let Ht denote actual hours worked at time t, Ct contractual hours worked, Ot irregular overtime
hours and St sickness absence hours, where Ht = Ct + Ot − St, and let the overtime rate (rOt ) be
deﬁned by rOt = Ot/Ct and the sickness absence rate (r
S
t ) by r
O
t = St/Ct. It follows that Ht =
Ct(1 + r
O
t − rSt ). When the overtime and sickness absence rates are close to zero Ht = Ct(1 + rOt − rSt )
can be approximated as ln Ht − lnCt ≈ rOt − rSt , since ln(1 + z) ≈ z for z ≈ 0, and the ﬁrst diﬀerence is
given by Δ lnHt −ΔlnCt ≈ ΔrOt −ΔrSt , which is the expression on this page.
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Figure B.3: Overtime and sickness absence rates. Per cent. Overtime rate is measured as
the ratio of overtime hours to contractual hours. The target ﬁgure for sickness absence rate
used in the Labour force survey is the number of employees who have been absent during the
whole registration week in per cent of employees in total while register based statistics measure
man-days lost due to own sickness as a percentage of contractual man-days. Source: Statistics
Norway.
2005 to 2008 was thus 0.3 percentage points during these four years. Two measures of
sickness absence rates are shown in Figure B.3. The measure used in the LFS is the
number of employees who have been absent during the whole registration week in per
cent of employees in total while register-based statistics measure man-days lost due to
own sickness as a percentage of contractual man-days. Diﬀerences in levels between
these series are due to how register-based statistics include persons on partial sick leave
and also cases of sickness absence shorter than one week, which are not included in
the absence rates from the LFS. In addition, the register-based statistics also take into
account both the working time and the duration of the sickness absence when the portion
of sickness absence is calculated. Although the levels between the two series diﬀer, the
changes in the series show broadly the same development. From 2005 to 2008 the sickness
absence rate increased 0.6 percentage points from 3.2 to 3.8 per cent according to the
LFS. According to register based statistics the increase was 0.3 percentage points from
6.7 to 7.0 per cent. Since increases in overtime and sickness absence rates have been
small and since they have oﬀsetting eﬀects on the wedge between contractual and actual
hours worked, the total impact from these changes is negligible.
The purpose of this section has been to evaluate contractual hours as a proxy for actual
hours worked. Overall, both series show the same development from 2001 to 2008. Also,
since the change in overtime rates and absence sickness rates have been very small, we
conclude that it is not the wedge between these measures that explains the measured
drop in productivity after 2005.
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C.1 The bias in import prices due to trade barriers when
goods are perfect substitutes
When goods are perfect substitutes, (ρ = 1), the index in Equation 4.10 can be written
IPSt =
⎛⎝n−1∑
j=1
pjtxjt + pntxnt−1 − pnt
n−1∑
j=1
(δj/δn)(xjt − xjt−1)
⎞⎠ /yt−1
=
⎛⎝n−1∑
j=1
pjtxjt + pntxnt−1 − pnt
n−1∑
j=1
(δj/δn)Δxjt +
n−1∑
j=1
pjtxjt−1 −
n−1∑
j=1
pjtxjt−1
⎞⎠ /yt−1
=
⎛⎝n−1∑
j=1
pjtΔxjt − pnt
n−1∑
j=1
(δj/δn)Δxjt +
n∑
j=1
pjtxjt−1
⎞⎠ /yt−1
=
⎛⎝ n∑
j=1
pjtxjt−1
⎞⎠ /yt−1 +
⎛⎝n−1∑
j=1
(pjt − (δj/δn)pnt)Δxjt
⎞⎠ /yt−1
= ILt +
n−1∑
j=1
BPSjt .
C.2 Proof: Proposition 4.1
The import price index when goods are perfect substitutes, deﬁned in Equation 4.12,
represents an upper bound to the true index (ICESt ) if I
PS
t − ICESt > 0. It follows from
134
Appendix to Chapter 4 135
Equation 4.10 that
IPSt − ICESt =
p2t
yt−1
[
(δ1/δ2)x1t−1 + x2t−1 − (δ1/δ2)x1t−(
(δ1/δ2)x
ρ
1t−1 + x
ρ
2t−1 − (δ1/δ2)xρ1t
)1/ρ ]
.
This expression is positive only if
(δ1/δ2)x1t−1 + x2t−1 − (δ1/δ2)x1t >
(
(δ1/δ2)x
ρ
1t−1 + x
ρ
2t−1 − (δ1/δ2)xρ1t
)1/ρ
. (C.1)
Without loss of generality, I deﬁne the following relationships: c1 ≡ x1t−1/x2t−1 and
d1 ≡ x1t/x2t−1. Inserting these relationships into Equation C.1, and taking the natural
logarithm, yields
ln [1 + (δ1/δ2)(c1 − d1)] > (1/ρ) ln [1 + (δ1/δ2)(cρ1 − dρ1)] .
When the increase in availability of x1t is small, i.e., 1 = d1/c1 is close to unity, it
follows, from a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation, that45
(c1 − d1) > (1/ρ)(cρ1 − dρ1). (C.2)
Inserting c1 = x1t−1/x2t−1 and d1 = x1t/x2t−1 yields(
x1t−1
x2t−1
− x1t
x2t−1
)
> (1/ρ)
(
xρ1t−1
xρ2t−1
− x
ρ
1t
xρ2t−1
)
.
Inserting x1t =  1x1t−1, and rearranging, yields
1 <
xρ−11t−1
xρ−12t−1
1− ρ1
(1− 1)(1/ρ),
where
xρ−11t−1
xρ−12t−1
is the relative marginal rates of transformation: TRSCES1t−1 /TRSPS1t−1 and
1−	ρ1
(1−	1)(1/ρ) goes towards unity when 1 goes towards unity by L’Hoˆpital’s rule. The
opposite relationship, TRSCES1t−1 < TRSPS1t−1, implies that IPSt − ICESt < 0, by the same
arguments.
45ln(1 + z) ≈ z around z ≈ 0.
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C.3 Proof: Proposition 4.2
Deﬁne the auxiliary variables i ≡ xit/xit−1, ci ≡ xit−1/xnt−1 and di ≡ xit/xnt−1. The
sets J , A and Ac are given by J = {1, 2, . . . , n − 1} , At = {j ∈ J : 0 ≤ xjt−1 ≤ xnt−1}
and Act =
{
j ∈ J : xnt−1 < xjt−1 < x∗jt−1
}
. The bias in Equation 4.11 can then be
written
BCESt =
xnt−1
yt−1
⎛⎝∑
i∈J
pit(di − ci)− pnt + pnt
(
1−
∑
i∈J
(δi/δn)(d
ρ
i − cρi )
)1/ρ⎞⎠
The sum of individual biases when goods are perfect substitutes, for goods i ∈ A, is
given by
∑
i∈At
BPSit =
xnt−1
yt−1
(∑
i∈At
(di − ci) (pit − (δi/δn)pnt)
)
The index IPSt is said to represent an upper bound to the true index I
CES
t if I
PS
t −ICESt >
0. Since
IPSt − ICESt =
∑
i∈A
BPSit −BCESt =
xnt−1
yt−1
[
−
∑
i∈At
(di − ci)(δi/δn)pnt−
∑
i∈Act
(di − ci)pit + pnt − pnt
(
1−
∑
i∈J
(δi/δn)(d
ρ
i − cρi )
)1/ρ⎤⎦ ,
the index IPSt is an upper bound if:
1−
∑
i∈At
(di − ci)(δi/δn)−
∑
i∈Act
(di − ci) pit
pnt
>
(
1−
∑
i∈J
(δi/δn)(d
ρ
i − cρi )
)1/ρ
.
When the changes in trade barriers are small, i.e., di/ci is close to unity for all i, it
follows, from a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation, that46
∑
i∈At
(ci − di)(δi/δn) +
∑
i∈Act
(ci − di) pit
pnt
> (1/ρ)
∑
i∈J
(δi/δn)(c
ρ
i − dρi ).
This is positive if the following conditions both hold
i) (ci − di) > (1/ρ)(cρi − dρi ) for i ∈ At,
ii) (ci − di) pit
pnt
> (1/ρ)(cρi − dρi ) for i ∈ Act .
46ln(1 + z) ≈ z around z ≈ 0.
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i) follows from Proposition 4.1 and Equation C.2. Since cρi −dρi =
xρit−1
xρnt−1
(1−ρi ), it follows
that ii) can be written as
TRSCESit−1 > pit/pnt for i ∈ Act ,
since 1−	
ρ
i
(1−	i)(1/ρ) goes towards unity when i goes towards unity.
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D.1 Translog cost function
Below I derive the econometric speciﬁcation of the cost share and show the restrictions
that follow from assuming constant returns to scale and price homogeneity. The translog
cost function is given by
lnCit = b˜0,i + b˜′i ln(yit) + .5 ln(yit)
′B˜i ln(yit),
where the subscripts i and t denote sector and time respectively and ′ is the transpose
operator. The vector of right-hand-side variables (y) include, for example the wage rate
of skilled (WH) and unskilled (WL) labour, the level of production (Y ), the volume of
capital (K), and a deterministic time trend entering as an exponential function
yit =
[
WH WL Y K e
t
]′
it
.
Before any restrictions are imposed on the cost function, it holds in total 21 parameters
including the intercept. There are ﬁve parameters in the vector b where a typical element
is denoted {bk}, while there are 15 parameters in the symmetric matrix of the quadratic
form B˜ where a typical element is denoted {b˜jk} for j, k = 1, . . . , 5. Expanding the
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expression for the translog Cost function yields
lnCit = b˜0,i + b˜′i ln(yit) + .5 ln(yit)
′B˜i ln(yit)
= b˜0i + b˜1i lnWHit + b˜2i lnWLit + b˜3i lnYit + b˜4i lnKit + b˜5it
+ .5b˜11i(lnWHit)2 + b˜12i lnWHit lnWLit + b˜13i lnWHit lnYit
+ b˜14i lnWHit lnKit + b˜15i(lnWHit)t + .5b˜22i(lnWLit)2
+ b˜23i lnWLit lnYit + b˜24i lnWLit lnKit + b˜25i(lnWLit)t
+ .5b˜33i(lnYit)2 + b˜34i lnYit lnKit + b˜35i(lnYit)t + .5b˜44i(lnKit)2
+ b˜45i(lnKit)t + .5b˜55i(t)2,
where I have imposed the symmetry conditions b˜ij = b˜ji for j = i. From the properties
of the logarithmic function, it follows that logarithmic derivation with respect to the
high-skilled wage rate yields the cost share equation of high-skilled labour
∂ lnCit/∂ lnWHit = (∂Cit/∂WHit)(WHit/Cit)
= HitWHit/Cit ≡ Sit,
where the second equality follows from Shepard’s Lemma. The cost share of high-skilled
labour can thus be written
Sit = b˜1,i + b˜11i lnWHit + b˜12i lnWLit + b˜13i lnYit + b˜14i lnKit + b˜15it. (D.1)
Constant returns to scale (CRS) in a cost function with capital as a quasi-ﬁxed factor
of production is generally deﬁned by (Caves et al., 1981)
CRS : 1 =
1− ∂ lnCt/∂ lnKt
∂ lnCt/∂ lnYt
.
In terms of the translog cost function, this implies
1 =
1− b˜4i − b˜14i lnWHit − b˜24i lnWLit − b˜34i lnYit − b˜44i lnKit
b˜3i + b˜13i lnWHit + b˜23i lnWLit + b˜33i lnYit + b˜43i lnKit
,
which further yields the CRS restrictions
b˜3i + b˜4i = 1, b˜13i + b˜14i = 0, b˜23i + b˜24i = 0, b˜33i + b˜34i = 0, b˜43i + b˜44i = 0.
The restrictions implied by price homogeneity follow directly from the deﬁnition of price
homogeneity: C(μW,K, Y, t) = μC(W,K, Y, t). This condition ensures that the cost-
minimising bundle does not change if all prices are multiplied by the same factor μ.
In other words, it is only the ratio of input prices that aﬀect the allocation of inputs.
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If lnC(μW,K, Y, t) = lnμ + lnC(W,K, Y, t) is to hold for the translog cost function,
the following restrictions must be imposed: b˜1i + b˜2i = 1, b˜11i = −b˜12i, b˜13i = −b˜23i,
b˜14i = −b˜24i and b˜15i = −b˜25i.
The elasticity of substitution evaluated at some central point of the cost share (Sˆi) is
given by (see for example Greene (2003, p. 368))
σi ≡ ∂ ln(Hi/Li)
∂ ln(WLi/WHi)
= 1 +
b˜12i
Sˆi(1− Sˆi)
, (D.2)
Imposing both price homogeneity (b˜11i = −b˜12i) and constant returns to scale (−b˜13i =
b˜14i), and using the relationships b0i = b˜1i, b1i = b˜15i, b2i = b˜11i and b3i = b˜14i to the
cost share equation (D.1) and the elasticity of substitution (D.2) yields the speciﬁcations
used in the paper
Sit = b0i + b1it + b2i ln(WH/WL)it + b3i ln(K/Y)it,
σi = 1− b2i
Sˆi(1− Sˆi)
.
D.2 Additional tables
Table D.1: VEqCM: test of the cointegration rank (Trace test).
H0: No. of cointegrating equations 0 ≤ 1 ≤ 2
Sector, i λˆ1 λˆ2 λˆ3
15 Consumption goods 0.41 0.29 0.12
25 Misc. manufacturing 0.83** 0.62** 0.21
30 Energy intensive manufact. 0.80** 0.58** 0.17
45 Engineering products 0.45 0.28 0.20
50 Oil platforms and ships 0.57** 0.45** 0.35**
55 Construction 0.52* 0.28 0.21
63 Financial intermediates 0.74** 0.51** 0.13
64 Oil and gas exploration 0.85** 0.41** 0.30*
71 Electricity 0.70** 0.40 0.14
74 Domestic transportation 0.38 0.26 0.18
81 Wholesale and retail trade 0.36 0.30 0.24
85 Other private services 0.58** 0.41* 0.19
Rejection at the 10 per cent signiﬁcance level is indicated with
∗ and ∗∗ indicates rejection at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level
using Mackinnon-Haug-Michelis p-values.
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Table D.2: VEqCM: Test for autocorrelation
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
15 Consumption goods 9.66 7.95 8.19 5.27 5.97 9.90
(0.38) (0.54) (0.52) (0.81) (0.74) (0.36)
25 Misc. manufacturing 17.40** 11.98 2.78 8.92 5.18 5.72
(0.04) (0.21) (0.97) (0.44) (0.82) (0.77)
30 Energy intensive manufacturing 11.61 11.23 6.30 3.01 10.54 8.86
(0.24) (0.26) (0.71) (0.96) (0.31) (0.45)
45 Engineering products 6.79 7.68 8.11 5.65 8.12 4.91
(0.66) (0.57) (0.52) (0.77) (0.52) (0.84)
50 Oil platforms and ships 3.78 12.72 9.03 6.18 18.31** 8.63
(0.93) (0.18) (0.43) (0.72) (0.03) (0.47)
55 Construction 8.04 9.65 4.56 7.84 9.61 8.34
(0.53) (0.38) (0.87) (0.55) (0.38) (0.50)
63 Financial intermediates 23.66** 24.51** 7.55 7.07 6.54 7.90
(0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.63) (0.68) (0.54)
64 Oil and gas exploration 12.44 12.33 11.07 5.77 7.05 8.26
(0.19) (0.20) (0.27) (0.76) (0.63) (0.51)
71 Electricity 9.70 7.15 17.03** 8.14 8.76 6.95
(0.38) (0.62) (0.05) (0.52) (0.46) (0.64)
74 Domestic transportation 9.31 7.14 1.89 4.32 8.42 5.53
(0.41) (0.62) (0.99) (0.89) (0.49) (0.79)
81 Wholesale and retail trade 3.36 5.73 4.16 5.93 2.00 4.85
(0.95) (0.77) (0.90) (0.75) (0.99) (0.85)
85 Other private services 9.52 5.26 3.48 9.72 3.82 8.92
(0.39) (0.81) (0.94) (0.37) (0.92) (0.44)
Probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation is given in
brackets. Rejection at the 10 per cent signiﬁcance level is indicated with ∗ and ∗∗
indicates rejection at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level.

